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Abstract
Essays in Corporate Responsibility and Finance
by
Mert Demir
Advisor: Armen Hovakimian
This dissertation consists of three chapters:
Chapter 1: The Effects of Corporate Social Performance and Social Norms onMarket Valuation of Nonfinancial
Disclosures Using a novel measure of the quality of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures by global
companies, this paper analyzes how CSR report quality affects firm value when mediating roles of social pressure and
CSR performance are considered. I find that firms operating in socially controversial industries enjoy higher valuations
when they issue high-quality CSR reports. I also find that for firms with poor CSR performance, higher-quality CSR
disclosure is associated with a decline in firm value, while this negative association is mitigated for firms with superior
CSR performance. These results indicate that CSR disclosure quality is priced by the market over and above CSR
performance and the act of CSR disclosure.
Chapter 2: Firm Value, Legal Environment, and Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Regulations I
study valuation implications of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) disclosure quality in countries with strong and
weak legal systems. I find that CSR disclosure quality has a negative impact on firm value when CSR reporting is
regulated and the legal system in place is strong. By contrast, CSR disclosure quality has a positive impact on firm
value when CSR disclosure is regulated and the legal system is weak. I interpret these results as disclosure regulations
partially making up for lack of adequate legal system strength to induce credible disclosures to benefit firm value. CSR
disclosure regulations do not have as much a role to play in countries with strong legal systems, which already foster
disclosure credibility. Instead, CSR disclosure regulations impair the discretion firms could exercise in choosing a
vjudicious level of disclosure quality to improve firm value.
Chapter 3: Does Corporate Responsibility Affect Firm Leverage? The Roles of Environmental Risk Manage-
ment and Stakeholder Relations on Capital Structure This paper investigates the impact of a firm’s corporate
social and environmental activities on its capital structure decisions. I find that firms with superior environmental
corporate responsibility (CR) and poor social CR activities hold significantly higher leverage. However, a strong
environmental commitment completely dominates the leverage impact of CR for firms that excel in both social and
environmental CR. This result is also valid for firms with high cash flow volatility and taxable income, consistent with
the risk reduction benefits associated with pursuing a proactive environmental program. Furthermore, environmental
commitment mostly preserves its impact on leverage even when the incentives to maintain better stakeholder (social)
relations are paramount relative to good environmental reputation, such as for firms producing unique products or those
with high liquidation risk, as predicted by the stakeholder theory of capital structure. These results underscore the
material impact of environmental management policies, alongside social relations, on corporate financing decisions,
and thus extend the stakeholder theory of capital structure beyond its initial conceptualization to cover the role of a
firm’s broader CR orientation on financial leverage.
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NONFINANCIAL DISCLOSURE QUALITY AND FIRM VALUE 1
The Effects of Corporate Social Performance and Social Norms on
Market Valuation of Nonfinancial Disclosures
In response to growing pressure from stakeholders, particularly institutional investors, many firms have started
publishing CSR reports to convey how they manage their exposure to environmental and social risks.1 As of 2013, 72
percent of S&P500 companies published CSR reports, an increase from 53 percent in 2012 and 20 percent in 2011
(Governance and Accountability Institute, 2014). While CSR reporting becomes more ubiquitous, disclosure quality
varies widely across reports, because in most cases these reports are not subject to any disclosure standards or mandatory
audits. Investors, increasingly keen on valuing nonfinancial risks, find CSR reports useful, yet they are unlikely to view
CSR performances equally when disclosure quality differs. That is, a firm reporting a given level of CSR performance
in great detail and accuracy will likely command a different valuation from a firm that reports the same performance but
without providing much detail or accuracy. As such, CSR disclosure quality should matter in firm valuation alongside
CSR performance. While CSR performance has received much attention in the valuation literature, CSR disclosure
quality has not. To fill this void, this paper uses a novel measure of CSR disclosure quality and examines its impact on
firm value over and above CSR performance.
Extant literature documents several benefits associated with higher CSR including a more efficient information
environment and more accurate earnings forecasts (Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, Tsang, & Yang, 2012), lower perceived
risk and cost of capital (El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, & Mishra, 2011), better reputation (Stanaland, Lwin, & Murphy,
2011), and higher valuations (Margolis, Elfenbein, & Walsh, 2007; Matsumura, Prakash, & Vera-Muñoz, 2014; Orlitzky,
Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003; Srivastava, McInish, Wood, & Capraro, 1997; Waddock & Graves, 1997). Other studies
examine the link between the act of issuing a CSR report and proxies of firm value including cost of capital (Dhaliwal,
Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2011) and cash-flows (Plumlee, Brown, & Marshall, 2008).
This study contributes to this literature by analyzing a comprehensive measure of CSR reporting quality
hypothesizing that a firm reporting its CSR activities with better disclosure quality will be viewed more favorably
by investors. I further examine the interaction of a firm’s membership in sin industries and CSR reporting quality,
1I use a broad definition of what constitutes a CSR report, defining it as reporting on various economic, environmental, and social activities of a
company.
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hypothesizing that firms with lower social reputations will benefit more from high quality CSR reporting. As firms
in sin industries (Hong & Kacperczyk, 2009) already face pressure from the general public and socially oriented
investors, a higher quality reporting of their socially responsible activities can mitigate such pressures and positively
impact social risk and firm value.2 Investors would also perceive a CSR report favorably provided that it accurately
and comprehensively explains the firm’s achievements, not lack thereof, in corporate responsibility and sustainability.
Hence, I predict that the relation between CSR reporting quality and firm value will be more pronounced for firms with
higher CSR performance. I analyze the interaction of CSR reporting quality not only with nonfinancial performance,
but also with financial performance, expecting a further improvement in firm value when high CSR disclosure quality is
attained by a financially sound firm. This particular specification also allows us to identify when poor overall market
conditions during the sample period (2009 and 2011) may shape results.
I collect the data on the quality of CSR reports from a unique database provided by the Corporate Social
Responsibility-Sustainability (CSR-S) Monitor® (Weissman Center for International Business, 2012). Using a systematic
content-analysis framework, the CSR-S Monitor evaluates the scope and quality of the information on the eleven
most common contextual elements in CSR reports, including environmental responsibility, supply-chain management,
stakeholder engagement, and corporate governance. A unique feature of the CSR-S Monitor is the external assurance.
Due to limited standardization in this area, the content of a CSR report is largely determined by firm management.
This raises concerns over the reliability of disclosed information. To address these concerns, companies use external
assurance as a control mechanism to establish stakeholder confidence (Simnett, Vanstraelen, & Wai Fong, 2009).
Recognizing the exigence of information quality assurance, the CSR-S Monitor measures and scores the extent to which
a company utilizes third-party integrity assurance to verify accuracy of its CSR disclosure.
To test these hypotheses, I regress firm value (industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q) on CSR reporting quality along
with corporate social reputation (sin stocks), CSR performance, legal environment, firm-level control variables, year,
and industry dummies to control for sectoral heterogeneity. In the analyses, I adopt the Heckman selection model
2I use two alternative definitions of sin industries. I follow Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) and define sin industries as alcohol (SIC 2100-2199),
tobacco (SIC 2080-2085), and gaming (NAICS 7132, 71312, 713210, 71329, 713290, 72112, and 721120). In the rest of the study, I report the results
using this definition. Following Cai, Jo, and Pan (2012), I also extend this definition of sin industries to include environmentally sensitive industries as
weapons (SIC 3760-3769, 3480-3489, 3795), oil (SIC 1310-1339, 1370-1382, 1389, 2900-2912, 2990-2999), biotech (SIC 2833, 2836), and cement
(SIC 3240-3241). I obtain qualitatively the same results using either definitions of sin stocks.
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(Heckman, 1979; Maddala, 1983; Wooldridge, 2002) to account for potential selection bias. All else being equal,
I find negative and mostly insignificant association between CSR reporting quality and firm value. This result is
consistent with those of Dhaliwal et al. (2011), who find a positive and mostly insignificant association between cost of
equity capital and the initiation of a CSR report, and Richardson and Welker (2001), who document a positive relation
between social disclosure and cost of capital. To explain their results, Dhaliwal et al. (2011) examine the interaction of
CSR performance and CSR report initiation and Richardson and Welker (2001) examine the interaction of financial
performance and social disclosure score. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) find a reduction in cost of equity capital for firms
with superior CSR performance, while Richardson and Welker (2001) find only a mitigating effect for firms with high
financial performance.
I examine the interaction of CSR reporting quality with both relative CSR performance and financial
performance. The addition of relative CSR performance interaction with CSR reporting quality reveals a significantly
negative association between firm value and CSR reporting quality for firms with low relative CSR performance.
However, the interaction term moderates this negative association, leading to an economically insignificant impact on
firm value of CSR reporting quality for firms with high relative CSR performance. Apparently, everything else being
equal, firms with low relative CSR performance experience a decline in firm value when they issue more informative
CSR reports, while firms with high relative CSR performance seem to experience no economically significant valuation
impact. The interaction of financial performance with CSR reporting quality, on the other hand, results in a higher firm
value—meaning that firms with better financial performance benefit from issuing a more detailed and accurate CSR
report. Interestingly, the relation between CSR reporting quality and firm value turns significantly positive as well when
I incorporate the interaction of CSR reporting quality with membership in sin industries. This result confirms that
for firms facing inherent reputational risks, credible communication of socially responsible activities is paramount to
improving firm value.
The literature on firm value impact of disclosure quality has to date examined primarily financial disclosure
quality. Recent examples include the firm value impact of changes in financial disclosure quality brought about by
IFRS adoptions (e.g., Charitou, Karamanou, & Lambertides, 2015; Daske, Hail, Leuz, & Verdi, 2008; Pae, Thornton, &
Welker, 2008) and financial disclosure quality in general (e.g., Lang, Lins, & Maffett, 2012; Lang & Maffett, 2011).
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These studies by and large find that increases in financial disclosure quality have positive firm value consequences.
The present paper contributes to this literature by examining the quality of nonfinancial disclosures that are becoming
commonplace and that have been documented to attract the attention of investors via sell-side financial analysts (Dhaliwal
et al., 2012). That the paper documents a positive relation between nonfinancial disclosure quality and firm value at
higher levels of financial performance and for firms more in need of a better public image, yet a negative relation at
lower levels of CSR performance constitutes an interesting addition to this literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I discuss the relevant literature and
develop the hypotheses. In Section 3, I review the methodology and the details of the model as well as the data used for
the analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical results and is followed by robustness checks in Section 5. Lastly, I provide
a summary of the findings and conclude the paper.
Background and Hypotheses Development
Current State of CSR Reporting
Since the 1990s, investors have increasingly gravitated toward sectors promoting environmentally and socially
responsible practices. Investor preferences have shifted toward investments that can effectively address societal
challenges and still maintain profitability (The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment [US SIF], 2012).
According to the US SIF ’s 2012 report on sustainable and responsible investing trends in the United States, at least
$3.74 trillion is managed using one or more socially responsible investing strategies. Growing concerns from investors
related to sustainability issues and increasing demand for socially responsible practices propelled firms to become more
socially aware and engage in social responsibility activities. CSR reports have been a key medium for the communication
of these efforts and to attain a "social license to operate" (Effas, Eurosif, WICI, Railpen, & AccountAbility, 2010;
Gunningham, Kagan, & Thornton, 2004).
These reports outline firms’ CSR strategies to anticipate, evaluate, understand, and better manage present
and future financial and nonfinancial risks and opportunities (Governance and Accountability Institute, 2012). Firms
benefit from disclosing CSR information in several ways. First, less transparent firms may be perceived as being higher
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risk, raising suspicion they might be concealing their unfavorable performance (Grossman & Hart, 1980; Milgrom,
1981). Second, content quality and comprehensiveness of a report signal a firm’s attitude toward sustainability. This is
especially important because such disclosure helps a firm demonstrate alignment with the norms of the social system of
which it is a part and allows it to achieve the organizational legitimacy it needs to operate as well as to avoid potential
legal, economic, and other social risks (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). Third, clearly defined goals, objectively evaluated
results, and independently verified content can reduce the information risk of a firm by leading to better understanding
of its overall CSR performance, thereby resulting in lower required returns (Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005).
Fourth, by reducing uncertainties and investor skepticism as well as encouraging more informed investment decisions,
a high quality CSR report leads to higher credibility and reputation for the firm, which could trigger higher share
prices (Lundholm & Van Winkle, 2006). Last, firms with high-quality CSR reports may be more visible to the public,
particularly socially-responsible investors. This results in a broader investor base and produces higher diversification
benefits that will have positive implications for cost of capital and firm value (Heinkel, Kraus, & Zechner, 2001).
Readers cite comparability along with the credibility and relevance of information as their top priorities
(Wensen, Broer, Klein, & Knopf, 2011). Unlike with financial reporting, companies lack an established format for CSR
reporting (Sethi, Martell, & Demir, 2015b). This results in considerable variation in content and comprehensiveness of
CSR reports, preventing effective evaluations and comparisons (Derwall, Koedijk, & Ter Horst, 2011; Kolk, 2004). A
recent investor survey shows that 79 percent of investors are dissatisfied with the information quality in and comparability
of these reports (PwC, 2014). The 2012 report on global trends in sustainability reporting released by the CSR-S
Monitor attests to these arguments (Weissman Center for International Business, 2012). The Monitor’s assessment of
the scope and quality of the information provided by the world’s largest companies in their CSR reports reveals that
disclosure quality varies widely across a set of 559 global corporations. The highest CSR disclosure quality is 70.75
and the lowest score is 3.25 out of a maximum of 100 points.
Lack of adequate standardization gives managers nearly free rein in determining the content of a CSR report.
Unlimited managerial discretion can lead to ineffective reporting that does not quite meet the needs of a firm’s
stakeholders. Management can also manipulate reporting by promoting more socially alluring activities and concealing
the socially controversial ones, casting doubt on the credibility of these reports (Delmas & Cuerel Burbano, 2011;
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Marquis & Toffel, 2012). A remedy for concerns about credibility of a CSR report is integrity assurance (Sethi, Martell,
& Demir, 2015a). However, outside of Europe, reports with a third-party assurance are relatively scarce. Of the
559 reports analyzed by the Monitor, 28.9 percent are assured by one of the Big Four public accounting firms and
16.1 percent are assured by a specialized provider (such as Bureau Veritas or ERM), while 55 percent have no formal
assurance. Among the North American companies, only 6.6 percent provide assurance from a public accounting
firm, while 15.1 percent use specialized providers and the remaining 78.3 percent provide no formal assurance at all.
In contrast, 56 percent of European CSR reports have assurance from a public accounting firm, 15 percent from a
specialized provider, while 29 percent have no formal assurance.
Overall, these statistics illustrate the major variations in CSR reporting quality and call for a detailed analysis
of the differences in the content and quality of CSR reports. Previous studies have not examined CSR reporting quality,
instead focused on a firm’s dichotomous decision of whether or not to issue a CSR report (or a particular section
of it, such as environmental disclosures).3 Studying CSR reporting using data only on the presence or absence of a
sustainability report cannot capture the impact of rich variation in reporting quality stemming primarily from lack of
standardization. That is, a firm reporting a given level of CSR performance but without detail or qualified third-party
assurance will not be viewed as equivalent to another firm reporting the same CSR performance but with great detail and
qualified third-party assurance. This study aims to examine whether and how a firm’s choice of CSR reporting quality
matters for firm valuation in the present global environment with virtually no established CSR reporting standards.
Prior Research
A central question for firm stakeholders is whether CSR is a value-enhancing or value-destroying activity.
Opponents argue that CSR-based investing wastes a company’s limited resources for suboptimal investments (Friedman,
1970; Jensen, 2002; T. Levitt, 1958), while proponents contend that CSR investments create wealth by addressing
society’s needs (Berman, Wicks, Kotha, & Jones, 1999; Kotler & Lee, 2008; Porter & Kramer, 2006). Scholars have
sought to resolve this dispute by trying to document the link between social and financial performance (Margolis et
al., 2007). To do so, they have relied on sustainability reports as the primary source of information about a firm’s
3Information quality in CSR reports is assessed based on comprehensiveness, specificity of detail, quality, and accuracy of a report’s content. See
the section CSR reporting quality scores for detailed information.
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engagement in CSR on various fronts. Yet the mostly voluntary and unregulated nature of nonfinancial disclosures
precipitates significant variation in the scope and quality of the information in these reports.
In financial reporting, however, disclosure quality has received considerable attention (Botosan, 1997; Botosan
& Plumlee, 2005; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Easley & O’hara, 2004; J. S. Hughes, Liu, & Liu, 2007; Lambert, Leuz,
& Verrecchia, 2007; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). Previous research on financial reporting shows a negative association
between disclosure and cost of capital (Botosan, 2006; Healy & Palepu, 2001). Disclosure theory lends support to these
results on the basis that greater transparency enhances firm value through reducing the information asymmetry between
firm and stakeholders (Botosan, 1997; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991), which leads to reduced information risk and lower
risk premium (Merton, 1987), reduced estimation risk (Barry & Brown, 1984; Clarkson, Guedes, & Thompson, 1996),
or enhanced stock market liquidity and lower transaction costs (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986). While these concepts
typically apply to financial reporting, they can be extended to nonfinancial reporting because their common fundamental
premise is better information content (Bachoo, Tan, & Wilson, 2013; Richardson, Welker, & Hutchinson, 1999). Hence,
benefits similar to those from high quality financial disclosure are expected from nonfinancial disclosure as well.
Research on nonfinancial disclosure can be grouped into two major categories. The first category includes
studies covering the regulatory and policy efforts to address environmental issues and monitor firms’ environmental
impacts. These studies focus particularly on firms’ environmental disclosures and investigate various aspects of such
disclosures, including the stock market’s valuation of sulfur dioxide emissions (K. Hughes, 2000; Johnston, Sefcik,
& Soderstrom, 2008), voluntary disclosure and valuation impact of carbon disclosures (L. Chapple, Clarkson, &
Gold, 2013; Matsumura et al., 2014), the relation between environmental disclosure and performance (Al-Tuwaijri,
Christensen, & Hughes, 2004; Clarkson, Li, Richardson, & Vasvari, 2008; S. B. Hughes, Anderson, & Golden, 2001),
and firm value (Konar & Cohen, 2001; Plumlee, Brown, Hayes, & Marshall, 2010; Plumlee et al., 2008).
The second category includes studies that take a broader perspective by examining disclosures including but
not limited to the environmental activity. Firms are accountable to a diverse set of stakeholders with varying interests
and concerns; these stakeholders exert pressure for disclosure on a wider array of activities, ranging from human rights,
philanthropy, and community relations to bribery and corruption. Therefore, extending scholarly focus to CSR reports in
their entirety instead of concentrating solely on environmental management provides a full scale view into nonfinancial
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reporting.4 For example, Richardson and Welker (2001) use the information on environmental and social performance
provided in annual financial reports to examine the association between nonfinancial disclosure and cost of equity capital
for a sample of Canadian firms between 1990 and 1992. Their results show a positive impact of social disclosure on cost
of capital for firms with poor financial performance, but no impact for firms with better financial performance. Dhaliwal
et al. (2011) investigate the link between the initiation of voluntary stand-alone sustainability reporting and cost of equity
capital for a sample of US firms. They find lower cost of equity with the publication of a CSR report for firms with
above-industry-median CSR performance. While the methods of Dhaliwal et al. (2011) differ from those of this study in
that their CSR initiation proxy does not control for the information quality of a CSR report, their results corroborate
CSR disclosure’s reduced information asymmetry and, thereby, improved firm value under certain conditions.
In both categories of CSR studies, there have been extensions using more elaborate measures of nonfinancial
disclosure. Using a disclosure index consistent with the GRI’s sustainability reporting guidelines, Plumlee et al. (2010)
analyze the relationship between voluntary environmental disclosure quality and valuation for a sample of US firms.
They document both a negative and a positive relationship: a negative one when disclosure is disaggregated by type, and
a positive one when the overall disclosure score is used. Reverte (2012) analyzes the impact of CSR disclosure ratings
on cost of equity capital for a sample of Spanish listed firms and finds a negative impact of disclosure ratings on cost of
capital. He further analyzes the moderating effect of a firm’s environmental sensitivity on the CSR disclosure/cost
of equity association and documents a stronger relationship between the two for firms operating in environmentally
sensitive industries. Similarly, Bachoo et al. (2013) investigate the association between CSR reporting quality classified
by Corporate Analysis Enhanced Responsibility (CAER) and firm value for a sample of Australian firms. They show a
significant negative association between the quality of sustainability reports and cost of equity capital. Like Reverte
(2012), Bachoo et al. (2013) report that firms operating in environmentally sensitive industries are particularly driving
their results.
Nevertheless, even these recent, more complex analyses of CSR impacts leave room for improved precision in
model construction as well as richer sample sets. For instance, the sample used by Plumlee et al. (2010) is comprised
4The CSR-S Monitor reports that an average report includes 8.73 of the 11 most common contextual elements included in CSR reports, including
environmental management (See section CSR reporting quality scores for a list of these 11 contextual elements). This indicates that a typical CSR
report includes considerably more information than environmental performance alone.
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of US firms from five industries, while Bachoo et al. (2013) include only Australian firms. In contrast, the sample
used in this study includes firms from 42 countries in 13 industries. Plumlee et al. (2010) examine only environmental
disclosures, whereas this study analyzes the CSR reports in their entirety, which could include as many as 11 different
CSR aspects. The main disclosure quality measure used by Bachoo et al. (2013) is a dichotomous variable that equals 1
if a report passes qualification tests and 0 otherwise, whereas the measure used in this study examines each sustainability
report on a continuous scale ranging from 0 to 100, providing a more accurate representation of the variance in the
quality of CSR reports. Furthermore, their alternative disclosure quality measure proxies for environmental reporting
quality only, while this study’s measure improves upon that by assessing the overall CSR reporting quality on a set of 11
different contextual elements covering the most common relevant areas of corporate responsibility.
Hypotheses Development
The benefits from reporting on CSR can be justified on several grounds. First, a high-quality CSR report
can reflect a firm’s commitment to CSR policies and practices (W. Chapple & Moon, 2005). Second, a well-prepared
CSR report can also resolve adverse selection problems by reducing transaction costs and eliminating information
asymmetries (S. Brown & Hillegeist, 2007; Leuz & Wysocki, 2008; Verrecchia, 2001). Third, perceived CSR has
positive implications on corporate reputation through a firm’s increased legitimacy in the eyes of its stakeholders
(Stanaland et al., 2011). Furthering this argument, Srivastava et al. (1997) show that investors perceive firms with
good reputations to be less risky than those with poor reputations and Iwu-Egwuonwu (2011) suggests that a good
reputation benefits the firm both financially and otherwise. Fourth, reporting on CSR attracts socially responsible
investors to the firm and increases its analyst coverage (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2010). Issuance of
these reports leads to higher visibility and the chances of being selected by a broader group of investors (Financial
Accounting Standards Board (US), 2001; A. Levitt, 1998; Linsmeier et al., 1998). CSR reporting has thus been shown
to result in a broader investor base, higher diversification benefits, lower cost of capital, and higher valuations for higher
quality issuers (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Heinkel et al., 2001). Fifth, better disclosure can also alter
the estimation risk of the firm in the capital markets (Easley & O’hara, 2004; Lambert et al., 2007; Leuz & Verrecchia,
2000).
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Empirical research, however, does not unanimously support these arguments. Some earlier studies conclude
that capital markets actually penalize CSR-disclosing companies, although such negative impact could be mitigated
when disclosure is about high CSR performance (Dhaliwal et al., 2011), or when accompanied by financial performance
(Richardson & Welker, 2001). Moreover, Clarkson, Fang, Li, and Richardson (2013) find that environmental disclosure
increases firm value with no significant effect on cost of capital. This observed disparity between theory and empirical
evidence suggests that the impact of CSR report quality on firm value may vary, and the association between the two
remains an empirical question. Therefore, I try to aggregate these two perspectives on CSR disclosure in this study. In
particular, despite some of the empirical findings, I hypothesize a positive association between CSR reporting quality
and firm value, yet supplement my hypothesis by investigating potential factors that can influence this association
(discussed in hypotheses 2 and 3):
HYPOTHESIS 1: Firms issuing higher-quality CSR reports will have higher values.
Prior studies show that social norms have become important factors influencing investor behavior (El Ghoul et
al., 2011; Hong & Kacperczyk, 2009). Firms operating in socially controversial industries such as alcohol, tobacco, and
gaming face serious reputational risks and negative public opinion because of the undesirable social and environmental
consequences of their products and services (Hong & Kacperczyk, 2009). According to the value-enhancement
hypothesis, firms may view CSR as an important business strategy that can be integrated with the strengths of a firm to
enhance its economic as well as social and environmental value, especially for those operating in controversial industry
sectors (Cai et al., 2012). I posit that firms with lower reputations and that are subject to more public scrutiny will be
more inclined to engage in socially responsible practices and promote their achievements to the public. Disclosure of
nonfinancial practices will have higher marginal impact on capital markets’ valuation of such firms. Hence, I propose
a stronger relationship between CSR reporting quality and firm value for firms operating in socially controversial
industries.
HYPOTHESIS 2: The relation between CSR reporting quality and firm value will be stronger for firms operating
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in socially controversial industries.
Corporate disclosures improve the information environment, but more disclosure may not guarantee higher
valuation. Extant literature documents that management could use corporate disclosure as a means of influencing the
public’s perception of the company (e.g., N. Brown & Deegan, 1998; Hooghiemstra, 2000). Limited standardization
could also induce managers to manipulate these mostly voluntary disclosures to alter public opinion (Hobson &
Kachelmeier, 2005).5 Moreover, greater transparency for a poor performing firm could also be a negative signal
considering potential nonfinancial risks and the firm’s weaknesses (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). I predict that the relationship
between CSR report quality and firm value will be stronger for firms that actually show high CSR performance, which
alleviates concerns over the riskiness of the firm as well as the credibility of the information disclosed in its report:
HYPOTHESIS 3: The valuation impact of CSR report quality will be stronger for firms with higher CSR perfor-
mance.
Methodology
Sample Selection
The data on CSR reports come from the CSR-S Monitor. The CSR-S Monitor collects CSR reports (standalone
or integrated) published by the world’s largest companies. They are selected among those listed in multiple indices,
such as the Fortune 250 and Fortune Global 250 in the years 2009 and 2011. This generates an initial sample of 1338
unique firms from 47 countries (though companies based in the US, Japan and the UK constitute nearly two-thirds
of the sample). The CSR-S Monitor then searches for CSR reports issued by these companies using various sources
such as the Corporate Register6 and Corporate Responsibility Newswire (CSRwire)7 as well as company websites. The
CSR-S Monitor has identified a total of 1062 CSR reports published by 620 unique companies over the sample period
5This issue is explored in greater depth later in the paper as a robustness check.
6http://www.corporateregister.com
7http://csrwire.com
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that are eligible for scoring. I exclude (i) non-public companies that are not required to issue financial reports to the
public, (ii) firms that lack financial and accounting information, and (iii) financial firms (two-digit SIC code 60-69) due
to their fundamentally different business models. This reduces the initial sample to 998 unique firms (1881 firm-year
observations–data are not available for all firms in both years), and results in a final sample of 815 CSR reports issued
by 467 unique firms. CSR performance data come from the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database (Thomson Reuters
ASSET4 ESG, 2002-2012).8 Financial and accounting data come from the Compustat North America and Compustat
Global databases (Standard & Poor’s/Compustat, 2002-2013). I obtain legal environment variables, Anti-Director
Rights index and Rule of Law index, from La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and the International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) through Lexis-Nexis, respectively. 9
Model Specification
This study aims to analyze the impact of CSR reporting quality on firm value. Using the Heckman (1979)
model, I regress firm value (Tobin’s Q) on CSR reporting quality score, CSR performance, a set of legal and firm-level
variables, industry and year fixed effects. I cluster firms at the country level to capture any correlation across firms in a
given country resulting from similarities in laws and regulations.
Data and Measures
Dependent variable. There can be systematic variations in Tobin’s Q across industries due to overall industry
growth trends or shocks (Cai et al., 2012). I control for such variations in the analysis using industry dummies and
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q.10 In the analyses, I use industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. Industry-
adjusted Tobin’s Q is arguably a better measure than Tobin’s Q in that it controls for the effect of industry-specific
factors on Tobin’s Q (Campbell, 1996). It is also used alone or with other proxies of firm value in several other studies
(e.g., Bebchuk & Cohen, 2005; Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, 2009; Cai et al., 2012; Harjoto & Jo, 2011; La Porta,
Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002). Following La Porta et al. (2002), I define Tobin’s Q as book assets minus
8http://im.thomsonreuters.com/solutions/content/asset4-esg/
9http://w3.nexis.com/sources/scripts/info.pl?10896
10As a robustness check, I exclude industry dummies and redo the analyses with industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. I obtain
similar results (not reported).
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book value of equity and deferred taxes, plus market value of equity, all divided by book assets, where market value of
equity is measured as common shares outstanding multiplied by the year-end price. I measure industry-adjusted Tobin’s
Q as the natural logarithm of a firm’s Tobin’s Q adjusted for annual industry-median Tobin’s Q.
CSR reporting quality scores. The data on nonfinancial reporting quality is provided by the CSR-S Monitor.
The CSR-S Monitor provides an assessment of the quality of CSR reports published by companies worldwide. It is not a
performance assessment or ranking tool for a company’s actual CSR performance or activities. Companies are selected
based on large size and presence on multiple global indices. Out of this initial universe of companies, a company
is included in the CSR-S Monitor if the company has (1) a stand-alone CSR report, or (2) a sizeable CSR reporting
segment as part of its annual report. The CSR-S Monitor uses a multi-step procedure to identify CSR reports that are
eligible for scoring. A CSR report is eligible for scoring if it (1) is published in the sample period of 2009 or 2011, (2)
is written in English or has an English translation available, and (3) is presented as a cohesive unit. Website-based
reports are also accepted provided that they meet the aforementioned criteria. In the case of multiple reports published
by a company (e.g., a standalone CSR report and several other CSR publications), the stand-alone CSR report is given
priority and scored. The Monitor emphasizes the CSR report as a single unit and, therefore, websites with CSR-related
information do not constitute valid documentation and are not included in the sample.
The CSR-S Monitor assesses nonfinancial reporting quality based on 11 key CSR performance attributes
identified as the most relevant areas in the CSR domain (Weissman Center for International Business, 2012). These are:
environmental management, philanthropy, stakeholder engagement, supply-chain management, labor relations, corporate
governance, bribery and corruption, human rights, codes of conduct, executive message, and integrity assurance. The
CSR-S Monitor analyzes the content of a CSR report for each attribute based on comprehensiveness, specificity of
detail, quality, and accuracy of reporting. As such, each category is scored with respect to (1) the acknowledgment of
problems related to the particular attribute, (2) the material and specific activities undertaken to address these problems,
(3) the publication of measurable results, and (4) whether independent verification and assurance of these results were
included in the report. The scores on these categories are then weighted to provide a total score ranging from 0 to 100,
where a higher score indicates higher quality reporting. The CSR-S Monitor provides individual scores for each of the
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11 categories as well as an overall score.11
Unlike other CSR scoring frameworks, the CSR-S Monitor integrates independent third-party assurance in
the scoring process. In the data, assurance measures the degree to which third party validation is part of the report.
Unlike financial reporting, lack of standardization in sustainability reporting raises concerns about the credibility of
these reports. Providing an independent assurance of a CSR report thus increases the credibility of the information
presented in these reports (Simnett et al., 2009).12
Corporate social reputation: Sin industries. Increasing social awareness among investors has led them to
apply varying levels of "social screening," which is the process of selecting companies to invest in based on social
and environmental performance beyond financial performance. The most common type of social screening is avoiding
alcohol, tobacco, or gambling industries, which are defined as sin industries (Hong & Kacperczyk, 2009). Following
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), I identify three groups of sin stocks and create the variable, SIN, which takes values 1
for sin stocks such as alcohol (SIC 2100-2199), tobacco (SIC 2080-2085), and gaming (NAICS 7132, 71312, 713210,
71329, 713290, 72112, and 721120) companies and 0, otherwise. I also search companies at the segment level to
identify if any of a company’s segments fall into any of these sin industries.13 I then augment this list with the previous
one to create a full list of sin stocks.
Independent variables. La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) argue that legal structure
is one of the major factors shaping financial systems. In the regressions, I include their legal environment variable
to measure the strength of a legal regime in a country. According to the literature, however, the structure of legal
regime does not imply that existing laws are enforced strictly. To account for this distinction, I follow Durnev and
Kim (2005) and use two different measures: ADRI, the Anti-Director Rights index, is a de jure measure of investor
protection in a country as in La Porta et al. (1998). The scores on this variable range from 0 to 6. For the strength of
de facto law enforcement, RULE OF LAW, the Rule of Law index from the International Country Risk Guide is used
11See the Appendix for further details of the scoring methodology.
12The CSR-S Monitor lists two groups of assurance providers as (1) public accounting/auditing firms such as one of the "Big Four," and (2)
specialized integrity assurance provider firms such as Bureau Veritas or ERM.
13Company segment data is collected from Compustat Segments (Standard & Poor’s/Compustat, 2002-2013) and Lexis-Nexis Corporate Affiliations
(http://www.corporateaffiliations.com/) databases.
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14. This measures the strength of law enforcement in a country and ranges from 0 to 10. I calculate the past two-year
average of the latter index and use that in the analysis. In Table 3, the Pearson correlation between ADRI and RULE OF
LAW is negative yet insignificant, while the Spearman correlation between the two is significant positive, as shown
in Table 4. This indicates that structure of law and its enforcement do not depart from each other, at least for my sample.
Additionally, I use a combination of ADRI and RULE OF LAW by multiplying the two variables to represent both
aspects of regulation and define it as COMPOSITE. The average for the composite index is 15.16, and the maximum and
minimum scores for our sample are 36.04 for the United Kingdom and 3.58 for China, respectively (not reported). This
shows the dispersion in the quality of legal environment across countries in my sample and supports the inclusion of a
legal variable in the regression analysis.
Limited standardization and regulatory oversight on CSR reporting incentivize managers to manipulate public
perception of their firms through nonfinancial disclosures (Hobson & Kachelmeier, 2005). Such opportunistic behavior
misguides investors as the disclosed information may not reflect actual performance of a firm. Accordingly, previous
research shows that publication of a CSR report reduces cost of capital only for firms that actually show high CSR
performance (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). In the analysis, I follow Dhaliwal et al. (2011) and include a measure of a firm’s
CSR performance relative to its industry median, HIPERF, and its interaction with reporting quality, CSRSxHIPERF.
HIPERF is the relative CSR performance dummy that equals 1 if a firm’s CSR performance in a given year is higher than
its industry median, and 0 otherwise. I use CSR performance scores provided by the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG
database (Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG, 2002-2012).15 16 This database provides annual sustainability performance
information for more than 4,000 companies worldwide. Its measure reflects CSR performance of companies in 18
subcategories of the four main aspects of CSR: environmental, social, corporate governance, and economic. The scores
on each of these 18 categories range between 0 and 1, with high scores indicating stronger performance in a given
category. These scores on each subcategory are then added to create an equally weighted aggregate CSR performance
score ranging from 0 to 100.17
14https://www.prsgroup.com/about-us/our-two-methodologies/icrg
15ESG stands for environmental, social, and governance.
16http://im.thomsonreuters.com/solutions/content/asset4-esg/
17Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG database is used in other studies as well (e.g., Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014; Eccles, Ioannou, & Serafeim,
2014).
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Following Durnev and Kim (2005), I define investment opportunities, INV OPP, as the 2-year geometric
average of annual percentage growth in net sales in the past two years. The motivation behind using a sales- rather than
an earnings-based measure is to avoid accounting for the volatility of earnings as well as to mitigate the influence of
variations in accounting practices, laws, and regulations across countries and regions (La Porta et al., 2002).
Research and development intensity, R&D, is reported as a major factor in CSR research (Padgett & Galan,
2010). It is measured by research and development expenses scaled by lagged sales. However, not all firms report R&D
expenditures in their financial statements. When missing, R&D is set to 0 and following Himmelberg, Hubbard, and
Palia (1999), an R&D dummy, R&D DUMMY, is created and set to 1. This eliminates the possibility of any bias toward
technology-oriented firms in the analysis.
I define firm size, SIZE, as the logarithm of sales. This choice is motivated by the nature of the cross-country
data and to mitigate possible problems due to different accounting practices across countries.
Previous studies show higher valuations for firms cross-listed in the US stock exchanges (Doidge, Karolyi,
& Stulz, 2004). Stricter accounting standards in the US to which ADR-listed firms are subject will also affect their
disclosures (Durnev & Kim, 2005). To control for the impact of US cross-listings, I include a dummy variable, ADR,
that equals 1 if a firm’s shares are listed on US exchanges, and 0 otherwise. ADR information for firms is collected from
Compustat database (Standard & Poor’s/Compustat, 2002-2013).
Profitability is measured by return on equity, ROE, in the analyses. I include capital expenditures, CAPEX,
measured by a firm’s capital expenditures scaled by its book value of total assets. I use a proxy for the level of financial
constraints, LEVERAGE, measured by the ratio of total long and short-term debt to total assets. There is still debate
about whether (and how) leverage affects firm value (Fama & French, 1998). Hence, it is difficult to have any priors on
the direction of its impact. As it is not a variable of interest in my current model, I include LEVERAGE as a control
variable. Following Campbell (1996), I group firms into 13 industries based on their primary two-digit SIC code.
Industry dummies are added to account for differences in accounting practices, business structure, industry-specific
performance, and regulations across industries. Year dummies are included to control for year-specific factors in the
data.
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The Model
CSR reporting is mostly voluntary and several factors could induce firms to disclose their CSR efforts. To
address a potential selection bias, I estimate the firm value regressions in Equation 1 jointly with the issue-choice model
in Equation 2 below, using the Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979; Maddala, 1983) procedure. I employ the
Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) model in the analysis and jointly estimate the following firm-value
model in Equation 1 with the issue-choice model that explains a firm’s decision to report on CSR (ISSUE) in Equation 2
to test my hypotheses:18
VALUEcj,t =α + β1 ∗ CSRScj,t−1 + β2 ∗ CSRScj,t−1 ∗ SINj + β3 ∗ CSRScj,t−1 ∗ HIPERFj,t−1
+ γ1 ∗ SINj + γ2 ∗ HIPERFj,t−1 + γ3 ∗ LEGALct−1
+
K∑
k=1
δk ∗ Zck, j,t−1 +
T−1∑
t=1
yt +
I−1∑
i=1
di + cj,t (1)
ISSUEj,t =β0 + β1 ∗ HIPERFj,t + β2 ∗ SINj + β3 ∗ FIRMAGEj,t + β4 ∗ ASSETSj,t
+ β5 ∗ MANDATORY_REGULc + β6LEGALct
+
K∑
k=1
δk ∗ Zck, j,t +
T−1∑
t=1
yt +
I−1∑
i=1
di + νcj,t (2)
where VALUE is industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q; ISSUE, an indicator variable that takes values 1 if the firm
issues a CSR report for year t, and 0 otherwise; α, a constant; CSRS, CSR reporting quality score; SIN, a dummy for
companies operating in sin industries; HIPERF, a dummy for companies with above-industry-average CSR performance;
18The FIML method requires stricter assumptions (i.e., the two error terms from the full model and the issue-choice model to follow the joint normal
distribution) to hold than the two-step, Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) method. In some cases, the latter could provide more
robust estimates (Wooldridge, 2002). Therefore, I redo the analyses using the latter and the results are consistent with those from FIML (not reported).
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LEGAL, the quality of a country’s legal environment. Interaction terms, CSRS * SIN and CSRS * HIPERF, measure the
interaction of CSR reporting quality score with sin industry and high performance dummies, respectively. Z, firm-level
control variables; y, year dummy; d, industry dummy; c, country; i, industry; j, firm; t, year; K, the number of control
variables; T, the number of years, and I, the number of industries. The exclusion restriction variables in the issue-choice
model are chosen among the variables that are documented to influence a firm’s decision to disclose (but not to have a
direct impact on firm value) in previous studies on nonfinancial disclosure (e.g., Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Durnev & Kim,
2005; Harjoto & Jo, 2011; Matsumura et al., 2014). These variables are FIRMAGE, the age of a firm in a given year;
ASSETS, book value of total assets of a firm; and MANDATORY_REGUL, a dummy for the presence of mandatory CSR
reporting regulations in a country (KPMG, Center for Corporate Governance in Africa, Global Reporting Initiative, &
United Nations Environment Programme, 2013).
Results
The objective is to determine whether the depth of information and scope of coverage in CSR reports have any
impact on firm valuation. I regress firm value on CSR reporting quality, a sin industry dummy, CSR performance, a
legal environment proxy and firm-level control variables, along with industry and year dummies using the Heckman
(1979) model to account for potential selection bias, since CSR reporting is mostly voluntary. I estimate this model
using the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method. I use three different versions of the legal variable to
proxy three distinct aspects of legal environment in the regressions. Following the common practice in the literature, I
use industry and year dummies to capture time invariant differences between industries and years, respectively. I report
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by country to control for similarities among firms within a country.
Summary Statistics
Table 1 provides summary statistics by country for the CSR-S Monitor scores (CSRS). The US has the highest
number of CSR reports with quality scores. The UK leads Europe with 71 reports, followed by France (49) and Germany
(37). These numbers highlight the dominance of developed economies in nonfinancial reporting. Whereas the US leads
the sample with the most reports, it has a relatively low average CSR report quality (29.18) compared to other leading
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countries such as Japan (31.76), the UK (32.12), and France (36.84). Contrary to Maignan and Ralston (2002), who
argue diversion in disclosure practices across European countries, I find overall high-quality reporting from European
firms compared to their counterparts in other parts of the world. Italy has the highest average score (both for Europe
and for the entire sample) of 53.16, followed by Spain (47.36), Germany (42.88), and Sweden (42.12). The results
also indicate that higher quality disclosure is not a phenomenon particular to European firms, but is observed in other
countries, such as Brazil (51.89 average) and Taiwan (48.17 average) as well. Overall, there is still considerable room
for improvement in CSR reporting quality across all countries.
[Table 1 about here.]
Table 2 lists the industry composition of the overall sample as well as sample of issuers based on industry. I
document substantial across-industry variation in reporting practices. Consumer Durables and Basic Industry companies
dominate the sample with the highest number of observations (339 and 270 firm-year observations, respectively) and
published reports (117 and 144 reports published, respectively). These two industries constitute around 32 percent of
the entire sample. At the lower end of the sample are Leisure and Transportation industries with 26 and 39 reports,
respectively. The Textile and Trade industry is ranked around the middle with 146 companies, though only 24 percent of
them issued a valid CSR report for scoring, the lowest issue rate among all industries in the sample.
[Table 2 about here.]
Table 3 and Table 4 present the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients among the main variables,
respectively. The results in Table 3 show a significant (p<0.05) and negative (ρ = -0.0878) correlation between CSR
reporting quality measure (CSRS) and Tobin’s Q, consistent with the empirical studies outlined above. Similarly, the
correlation between CSRS and industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q is negative (ρ = -0.0885) and significant at the 5 percent
level. Additionally, I find significant correlations between several other control variables and the CSR reporting quality
measure. In particular, CSRS and the CSR performance measure, HIPERF, are positively (ρ = 0.209) and significantly
correlated at the 1 percent level. HIPERF is also mostly highly positively correlated with both firm value measures,
supporting earlier meta-analytic research findings (e.g., Margolis et al., 2007; Orlitzky et al., 2003). SIN is positively
correlated with both firm value measures and CSRS, yet the correlations are very small and statistically insignificant.
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INV OPP, R&D and SIZE are significant and positively correlated, while LEVERAGE is negatively correlated with
CSRS. These findings underscore the necessity of controlling for confounding factors in the regression analysis to
isolate the unique impact of CSR reporting quality on valuation. I observe that all correlation coefficients are below the
0.80 threshold, suggesting that multicollinearity is not an issue in the analysis (Gujarati, 2003). Spearman correlation
coefficients presented in Table 4 also provide a qualitatively similar picture.
[Table 3 about here.]
[Table 4 about here.]
CSR Disclosure and Firm Value
Table 5 presents the results of the main analysis.19 Columns (1)-(3) show the results for the baseline regressions.
The signs of the coefficients on CSRS point to an insignificant and negative association between reporting quality and
valuation. Perhaps this is because stakeholder attention privileges those businesses that conflict with environmental and
social norms or with other goals of society at large, thereby resulting in different valuations across firms with varying
social and environmental reputations. Therefore, I investigate the mediating role of corporate social reputation on
the association between CSR reporting quality and firm value in columns (4)-(6). Corporate reputation is proxied by
sin industry membership (SIN), and its interaction with CSR report quality (CSRSxSIN) is included in the model to
test the second hypothesis. The coefficients on the main effect, CSRS, remain insignificant and negative, whereas the
interaction term, CSRSxSIN, is all highly significant (p<0.01) and positive regardless of the choice of legal variable.
Consistent with the second hypothesis, this outcome suggests that high-quality CSR reporting has a significantly positive
impact on firm value only for firms operating in socially controversial industries. The results suggest that, ceteris
paribus, membership in other industries does not result in such a significant impact. These findings further highlight
two important points: First, the valuation impact of CSR reporting quality varies significantly across firms depending
on the public’s perception of their social and environmental impacts. Second, the coefficients on CSRSxSIN indicate
such a strong relation between the quality of a CSR report and firm value for sin industry firms that, combined with the
19In all tables, the coefficients on CSRS and its interaction terms with other variables are multiplied by 100 to represent maximum potential impact
of CSR report quality on firm value.
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main effect of CSRS, the insignificant negative impact for CSR reporting quality turns positive. This result suggests that
it behooves firms with poor reputations not merely to engage in socially responsible projects, but also to document those
activities in a report that is comprehensive, complete and credible to improve their standing with capital markets.
In addition to the possibility that stakeholder attention varies across firms, another explanation may be that
greater transparency accompanied by poor CSR performance actually places a firm into an unfavorable position with
its stakeholders, eventually reducing firm value. A firm with high CSR performance, however, could benefit from
high-quality reporting by promoting its strengths, and lower its social risk relative to its industry peers. This can explain
the negative coefficients on CSRS and is consistent with Dhaliwal et al. (2011), who show that publication of a CSR
report should be supplemented with high CSR performance to exert a favorable impact on cost of capital. In models
(7)-(9), I include the interaction with the relative CSR performance of a firm, CSRSxHIPERF, to test the third hypothesis.
The results reveal a strong negative impact of CSR report quality on firm value (p<0.01) but this relation is almost
fully mitigated by superior CSR performance. I observe all highly significant (p<0.01) and positive coefficients on
CSRSxHIPERF, suggesting that the valuation impact of CSR report quality changes with CSR performance. These
results, however, provide imperfect support for the third hypothesis. While the negative valuation impact of CSRS
for firms with higher than industry-median CSR performance does not turn positive, the combined effect of CSRS
and CSRSxHIPERF is very close to zero, indicating that CSR reporting quality is value-irrelevant for such firms.20
These results are consistent with those of Dhaliwal et al. (2011) in suggesting that capital markets put more weight on
the presence of a CSR report than its scope and quality for high CSR performers. However, this is not the case with
below-median CSR performers for whom higher CSR report quality further reduces firm value.
I have obtained the expected signs on most of the control variables. Consistent with Orlitzky et al. (2003) and
Margolis et al. (2007), CSR performance variable, HIPERF, has all positive and significant coefficients, indicating that
firms that outperform their industry peers in CSR have higher valuations. Other findings indicate that sin firms, firms
with valuable investment opportunities and high capital expenditures, and those that spend more on R&D have higher
firm values. Firms are also valued higher in countries with better investor protection (shown by ADRI), supporting
La Porta et al. (2002). I find no evidence of an effect of ADR-listing on valuations.21 Overall, these results underscore
20Unreported statistics testing the combined effect of the coefficients on CSRS and CSRSxHIPERF show no significant relation.
21There is no consensus on the valuation effect of ADR listing in the literature. Doidge et al. (2004) finds a positive impact of ADR-listing on firm
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the existence of other factors that mediate the valuation effect of CSR reporting quality. I find that higher-quality CSR
reporting (1) provides more incentives to increase firm value for firms that suffer from poor social reputation or face
higher public scrutiny due to negative environmental and social consequences of their businesses, and (2) helps firms
with above-industry-median CSR performances to mitigate potential negative effects of greater transparency on firm
value.
[Table 5 about here.]
Robustness Checks
Industry Screenings
Two industries, Basic Industries and Consumer Durables, have the highest number of issued reports in my
sample, and could be driving the results. To isolate their impact and determine whether these findings truly apply to a
broad range of industries, I drop the observations from these two industries from the sample and redo the analysis.22.
The results are presented in Table 6. CSRS remains insignificant in this reduced industry sample. When integrating the
interaction with SIN, I find qualitatively similar results that indicate a strong negative effect (i.e., a positive coefficient)
of social reputation on the valuation of CSR reporting quality. The results for the interaction with performance,
CSRSxHIPERF, also reiterate the role that relative CSR performance plays in the relation between the quality of a CSR
report and firm value. These results indicate that industry bias does not contaminate the results.
[Table 6 about here.]
The Influence of Economic Conditions
I investigate further the finding of an insignificant valuation effect of CSR report quality for certain groups of
firms such as non-sin and high CSR performers. The latter contrasts with previous research findings, particularly with
those of Dhaliwal et al. (2011), who document that increased cost of capital for first-time CSR reporters turns negative
value. La Porta et al. (2002) analyze the relation across LEGAL settings and find no valuation impact of ADR listing in civil law countries, while only
a small positive effect in common law countries. Durnev and Kim (2005) echo their findings and find no significant effect on firm value.
22Similarly, I drop observations from the two largest countries in the sample, the US and Japan, to isolate a potential unbalanced impact of these
two largest-size countries and redo the analyses. The results are consistent with those in Table 5 (not reported).
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for those with superior CSR performances. I suspect that my findings might be an artifact of the recent financial crisis,
which coincides with the sample period. Financial performance is documented to influence valuations of nonfinancial
disclosures in times of economic distress (Richardson & Welker, 2001), and may explain these results. Due to lack of
data from another period, I follow an approach similar to that of Richardson and Welker (2001), and predict that relative
financial performance of a firm could alter capital markets’ valuation of nonfinancial disclosures. To test this prediction,
I introduce to the model in Equation 1 an interaction of reporting quality with a dummy variable representing a firm’s
relative financial performance (i.e., ROE) against its industry peers, CSRSxDROE.
[Table 7 about here.]
I expect a positive coefficient on the CSR report quality/financial performance interaction term. The results
are shown in Table 7. In line with my expectation, the coefficients on CSRSxDROE are all highly significant positive
(p<0.01), as shown in columns (1)-(3). These results confirm that CSR reporting quality/firm value association is
mediated by financial performance such that firm value increases (decreases) with the quality of CSR reporting for firms
with superior (poor) financial performance. Moreover, in columns (7)-(9), the combined effect of the interactions with
financial and nonfinancial performances adjusted for the main effect of CSR report quality is significantly positive (i.e.,
the sum of the coefficients on the first three variables in Table 7 ranges between 0.121 and 0.129, yielding a combined
significance of p<0.05 (not reported)), suggesting that firms with better financial and CSR performance enjoy even
higher valuations from higher-quality CSR reporting. Conversely, neither of these performance measures alone has a
sufficiently strong positive valuation impact to induce a reversal effect. These results are consistent with Waddock and
Graves (1997), who argue that internal financial resources are used by firms to strategically invest in CSR activities
that are more challenging to finance externally for various reasons (Helfat, 1997; Surroca, Tribó, & Waddock, 2010).
Hence, availability of internal resources (or profitability) that generates the surplus needed to finance CSR investments
is necessary, and perhaps even more so during economic downturns. Thus, the results of this study document firms that
outperform their industry peers both financially and nonfinancially as having higher incentives to publish higher-quality
CSR reports.
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Firm Value Effect by Years
In Table 5, I pool two years of data, 2009 and 2011, for which the CSR-S Monitor provides report quality
scores. Reporting firms publish reports in either one or both of these years, making independence of these observations
questionable. Thus, in Table 8 and Table 9, I split the sample into two and report the results of the analysis for each
year separately. Overall, these results mostly echo the earlier findings and confirm that my results are not driven
by my pooling of sample data. I also observe different coefficients on some of the variables between the two years.
Specifically, I observe some positive coefficients on CSR report quality in 2009, consistent with the first hypothesis.
This effect, however, turns negative in 2011, as in the pooled sample results in Table 5. I observe similar patterns in
some other variables as well. For instance, two traditional measures of firm financial strength, profitability (ROE) and
leverage (LEVERAGE), are also significant in 2009, whereas their significance mostly disappears in 2011. This could
be an artifact of the recent financial crisis during which increasing short-termism overtakes long-term strategic focus.
Sudden shifts in investor preferences between core-financials and nonfinancials over such periods of distress could be a
driving factor. Nevertheless, I continue to find significant and positive coefficients on the interactions with sin industry
membership (CSRSxSIN), relative CSR (CSRSxHIPERF) and financial performances (CSRSxDROE) in both years,
attesting to the hypotheses detailed above. The combined effect of CSRS and CSRSxSIN presents positive valuations
from issuing high-quality CSR reports for firms facing social and environmental issues on a regular basis. Potential
negative impacts of higher-quality disclosure are also mitigated for firms with superior CSR performances, presented
by the joint effect of CSRS and CSRSxHIPERF. Firm relative financial performance preserves its significant impact
on the valuation of CSR reporting quality. Overall, these findings suggest that higher-quality information released by
certain groups of firms is valued favorably by the capital markets despite counter-pressures resulting from overall market
conditions.
[Table 8 about here.]
[Table 9 about here.]
NONFINANCIAL DISCLOSURE QUALITY AND FIRM VALUE 25
Alternative CSR Disclosure Proxy
As a robustness check, I redo the analysis using firm-level CSR disclosure data compiled by Bloomberg
(Bloomberg ESG, 2009-2012) as a substitute for the CSR reporting quality measure of the CSR-SMonitor. 23 Bloomberg
ESG data assesses a firm’s level of disclosure on its environmental, social, and governance (ESG) practices. Bloomberg’s
ESG extends beyond CSR reports and collects ESG data from publicly available resources such as CSR reports, annual
reports, and company websites. Bloomberg ESG assigns an overall as well as component-specific disclosure score
between 0 and 100 (higher score indicates greater transparency) to companies based on the extent to which they disclose
CSR-related activities. ESG scores are based on the presence (or lack thereof) of mainly quantitative information in
company filings and measure whether a company discloses information on a set of CSR-related elements. In contrast,
the CSR-S Monitor provides an assessment of disclosure content and accounts for both quantitative and narrative
information to convey a detailed review of a CSR publication. Therefore, ESG data on Bloomberg can be taken not as
a measure of disclosure quality but, at best, as a measure of disclosure level that enables a somewhat higher level of
objectivity. In untabulated results, I obtain qualitatively similar results in all of the disclosure level regressions and
therefore conclude that the results are robust to alternative measures of CSR transparency.
CSR Reporting Regulations
My sample covers a broad range of countries, which require or endorse CSR reporting at varying levels.
The presence of such restrictions has implications for corporate disclosure behavior in general and CSR reporting in
particular. These requirements represent a bare minimum amount of information firms must provide in their nonfinancial
disclosures and improve informativeness and credibility of such disclosures. To control for their potential influence
on the valuation of CSR reports, I collect country-level data on CSR disclosure regulations and guidelines worldwide
from the Carrots and Sticks report on regulation on sustainability reporting (KPMG et al., 2013). I split the sample of
countries into two groups based on the existence of mandatory CSR reporting requirements. I re-perform the analysis
on each of these samples separately. In these analyses, I continue to find similar results (unreported). Firm value mostly
does not respond to CSR reporting quality in both sub-samples, whereas the positive moderating role of corporate
23https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/sustainable-finance/
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social reputation (and financial performance) on valuation persists for both groups, supporting the second hypothesis.
Similarly, higher-quality reporting leads to less negative impact on firm value for firms that outperform their industry
medians. These results show that my approach is robust with respect to and not affected by government- or exchange-led
efforts with considerable non-governmental organization assistance to regulate disclosure of nonfinancial information.
Additional Sensitivity Analyses
Extant literature posits that endogeneity could be a potential problem in my analysis. It could be argued that
higher-valued firms have more resources to allocate to CSR activities, creating a reverse causality problem. There
could also be other unobserved factors that determine the quality of CSR reporting and that I fail to control for in the
regressions. This will result in the overstatement of CSR reporting quality effects and lead to false conclusions. I try
to address these potential issues by using a lead-lag approach in the analysis. Specifically, I use the lagged values of
all right-hand-side variables in the regressions, as presented in Equation 1. Alternatively, I follow an instrumental
variable approach. I repeat the main analysis using firm age, FIRM AGE, to instrument reporting quality (Harjoto & Jo,
2011). The results are consistent with those in Table 5, indicating that endogeneity is not an issue affecting my findings
(unreported). In further analyses, I analyze sin firms and other firms in my sample separately. Despite the reduced
power of the tests due to smaller sample size of sin industry firms, my results support those in Table 5 for both of these
two subsamples. Finally and in a similar fashion, I check whether my results apply similarly to firms with high and low
financial performances. I split the sample based on the DROE variable, which takes the value of 1 if a firm outperforms
its industry-relevant firms, and 0 otherwise. I form two subsamples, one with firms that have DROE equal to 1 and the
other with those that have DROE equal to 0. I repeat the analyses for these two subsamples and obtain results consistent
with those in Table 7. Overall, I find that these alternative specifications do not alter the main inferences I draw from the
main analysis.
Discussion and Conclusion
Over the last two decades, driven by the globalization of sustainability issues, increasing demand from investors
for ethical and social practices, and the mission and values of company managements, the number of individuals,
NONFINANCIAL DISCLOSURE QUALITY AND FIRM VALUE 27
investment companies, money managers and financial institutions practicing sustainable and responsible investing
has grown dramatically (The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment [US SIF], 2012). Companies have
begun issuing CSR reports to address increasing stakeholder demand and also to earn a "social license" from their
stakeholders to operate (Effas et al., 2010; Gunningham et al., 2004; Wensen et al., 2011). Around 4,000 companies,
most of which are located in Europe, reported their sustainability practices worldwide in 2010 (Wensen et al., 2011). As
the number grows, reporting on CSR performance has also become a source of competitive advantage for companies.
Publishing reports that have better scope, are comprehensive and of higher quality allowed firms to improve their
credibility and public image in the global investment arena. These reports, however, vary widely in quality due to lack
of standardization in nonfinancial reporting (Kolk, 2004; Marquis & Toffel, 2012). Subsequently, it becomes harder for
investors to distinguish between companies truly committed to high-quality reporting from those that are "free-riders."
This is a pressing issue for investors who rely heavily on the information presented in these reports to assess companies’
performances from environmental and social perspectives.
The scoring framework used in this study, the CSR-S Monitor, provides a practical solution to the variation in
sustainability reports. It employs a comprehensive content evaluation framework to evaluate CSR reports based on 11
leading aspects of corporate responsibility. Through these reports, firms inform their stakeholders about their exposure
to ESG-related risks and opportunities, which have emerged as important factors in investment decision-making. Using
overall CSR scores provided by the CSR-S Monitor, this study investigates links between a firm’s commitment to
high-quality reporting and its value perceived by investors. Moreover, given the significant differences across firms and
the environments in which they operate, the relationship between corporate social responsibility and firm performance
may vary under different settings (Goll & Rasheed, 2004). The premise in this paper is that the scope and quality of
disclosed information in CSR reports and their impact on firm value will be stronger (1) in environments where there is
more information asymmetry and higher (reputational) risk, and (2) for firms with superior nonfinancial (CSR) and
financial performance. I find strong support for the influence of both corporate social reputation and social as well as
financial performance on the valuation impact of reporting quality.
This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, it diverges from the prior literature by
focusing on the quality of CSR reports. Our understanding of corporate nonfinancial reporting is limited and its potential
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link to capital markets’ valuation of firms needs further research. This study sheds light on this long-overlooked aspect
of CSR by particularly focusing on the quality of information in CSR reports. Second, using an analytic framework, any
potential concerns regarding reliability and accuracy of the CSR information used in my analyses are mitigated. In this
respect, the CSR-S Monitor has significant advantages over other, mostly author-constructed measures of reporting
quality used in previous studies. Third, with its global coverage, this study overcomes the limitations of previous
research in geographical representation and, thereby, broadens our knowledge of corporate reporting practices worldwide.
Last but not least, I document the role of two important moderating factors, namely membership in sin industries and
above-median CSR performance, in the relationship between CSR reporting quality and firm value. These factors,
although very important, are largely unexplored in the relevant literature. Hence, the results of this study contribute to a
better understanding of firm value implications of disclosing firm nonfinancial information such as CSR disclosure
quality.
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Table 1: CSR Disclosure Quality, by Country
Country Mean Median Max Min Std Dev No. of Reports
Australia 37.99 33.23 62 20.90 12.97 16
Austria 41.50 38.50 48 38 5.63 3
Belgium 27.66 29 37.25 10.25 10.82 5
Brazil 51.89 50.45 70.75 35.90 18.05 4
Canada 31.50 30.50 63.25 5 13.78 20
China 26.60 24.30 31.50 24 4.25 3
Colombia 40.38 40.38 63.75 17 33.06 2
Denmark 33.86 36.05 49.30 16.50 11.37 6
Egypt 13.20 13.20 13.20 13.20 . 1
Finland 35.57 38.88 53 10.70 13.41 10
France 36.84 33.60 65 12.70 13.17 49
Germany 42.88 42.75 59 16 11.04 37
Greece 33.32 33.32 50.75 15.90 24.64 2
Hong Kong 29.61 32.50 39.80 19.75 8.29 5
Hungary 29.45 29.45 33 25.90 5.02 2
India 38.42 40.75 48 26.50 10.94 3
Indonesia 27.62 26.10 36.75 20 8.48 3
Ireland 34.65 28.90 58 18.75 15.99 7
Israel 38.48 38.48 38.75 38.20 0.39 2
Italy 53.16 55.42 66.50 34.25 9.45 10
Japan 31.76 30 68.75 9.10 10.79 113
Malaysia 17.40 17.40 22.30 12.50 6.93 2
Mexico 31.90 30.45 49.30 15 12.96 8
Netherlands 40.77 42.15 61.80 25 9.07 18
New Zealand 29.22 26.50 41.40 19.75 11.08 3
Norway 30.64 36.60 46.25 9.50 15.44 7
Peru 7.70 7.70 7.70 7.70 . 1
Poland 18.77 18.77 20.25 17.30 2.09 2
Russia 16.03 16.03 17.25 14.80 1.73 2
Saudi Arabia 12 12 12 12 . 1
Singapore 16.45 16.40 17.25 15.70 0.78 3
South Africa 34.04 32.25 61.10 14.10 14.34 15
South Korea 43.05 44.63 64.50 13.50 14.18 10
Spain 47.36 51.63 74.30 6.40 16.89 14
Sri Lanka 29.58 29 41.75 18 11.89 3
Sweden 42.12 45.38 64.75 18.40 13.84 16
Switzerland 31.92 32.75 52.30 7.25 12.80 19
Taiwan 48.17 51.60 64 21.80 16.66 6
Thailand 32.90 32 49.50 11.80 15.17 5
Turkey 33.13 33.13 41.75 24.50 12.20 2
United Kingdom 32.12 32.70 63.90 5 14.24 71
United States of America 29.18 27.40 64.75 2 12.65 304
Total 32.95 32.25 74.30 2 13.66 815
Source: Weissman Center for International Business (2012)
Includes firms with non-missing CSR-S scores only.
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Table 5: Firm Value Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Firm-Value Model
CSRS -0.0286 -0.0311 -0.0386 -0.0439 -0.0468 -0.0537 -0.215∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗
(0.610) (0.631) (0.523) (0.409) (0.444) (0.346) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CSRSxSIN 0.301∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
CSRSxHIPERF 0.204∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HIPERF 0.0575∗∗∗ 0.0651∗∗∗ 0.0599∗∗∗ 0.0580∗∗∗ 0.0649∗∗∗ 0.0600∗∗∗ 0.0392∗∗∗ 0.0459∗∗∗ 0.0418∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIN 0.0690∗∗ 0.0704∗∗ 0.0694∗∗ 0.0195 0.0167 0.0196 0.0705∗∗ 0.0717∗∗ 0.0708∗∗
(0.022) (0.034) (0.023) (0.488) (0.566) (0.504) (0.018) (0.029) (0.019)
ADR -0.0586 -0.0445 -0.0494 -0.0612 -0.0483 -0.0524 -0.0609 -0.0475 -0.0517
(0.162) (0.320) (0.215) (0.143) (0.272) (0.186) (0.105) (0.239) (0.149)
INV OPP 0.130∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
R&D 0.833∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗ 0.835∗∗∗ 0.836∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗ 0.835∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIZE -0.00603 -0.00339 -0.00431 -0.00558 -0.00316 -0.00397 -0.00341 -0.000965 -0.00180
(0.282) (0.595) (0.473) (0.328) (0.618) (0.513) (0.552) (0.877) (0.766)
ROE -0.000152 -0.000335 -0.000133 -0.000157 -0.000353 -0.000150 -0.0000304 -0.000233 -0.0000229
(0.945) (0.888) (0.952) (0.944) (0.884) (0.947) (0.989) (0.922) (0.992)
CAPEX 0.398∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
LEVERAGE -0.0425 -0.0446 -0.0440∗ -0.0418 -0.0436 -0.0432 -0.0431 -0.0451 -0.0446∗
(0.107) (0.110) (0.099) (0.107) (0.111) (0.100) (0.101) (0.105) (0.094)
R&D DUMMY -0.0394∗∗∗ -0.0365∗ -0.0355∗∗ -0.0413∗∗ -0.0388∗ -0.0374∗∗ -0.0376∗∗∗ -0.0348∗ -0.0336∗
(0.008) (0.054) (0.044) (0.010) (0.054) (0.048) (0.010) (0.057) (0.052)
ADRI 0.0313∗∗ 0.0307∗ 0.0317∗∗
(0.046) (0.051) (0.041)
RULE OF LAW -0.00441 -0.00555 -0.00535
(0.857) (0.815) (0.818)
COMPOSITE 0.00364 0.00347 0.00361
(0.281) (0.304) (0.272)
Issue-Choice Model
FIRMAGE 0.00880∗∗∗ 0.00864∗∗∗ 0.0101∗∗∗ 0.00880∗∗∗ 0.00868∗∗∗ 0.0101∗∗∗ 0.00876∗∗∗ 0.00864∗∗∗ 0.0100∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
ASSETS 0.340∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MANDATORY_REGUL 0.567∗∗ 0.0975 0.422 0.570∗∗ 0.0981 0.425 0.572∗∗ 0.103 0.429
(0.045) (0.713) (0.106) (0.044) (0.711) (0.105) (0.042) (0.696) (0.101)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ρ 0.379 0.443 0.399 0.385 0.442 0.400 0.398 0.454 0.415
Wald χ2 5.189∗∗∗ 5.245∗∗∗ 5.855∗∗∗ 5.948∗∗∗ 5.835∗∗∗ 6.508∗∗∗ 8.676∗∗∗ 7.661∗∗∗ 9.227∗∗∗
No. of Countries 43 45 43 43 45 43 43 45 43
This table shows the regression results using the Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979; Maddala, 1983). The Heckman model is estimated using the Full Information Maximum
Likelihood Model (FIML). Firm value model in Equation 1 and issue-choice model in Equation 2 are jointly estimated to correct for selection bias. Firm value is measured by
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. FIRMAGE is age of a firm in a given year. ASSETS is book value of total assets of a firm. MANDATORY_REGUL is a dummy for the presence of mandatory
CSR reporting regulations in a country (KPMG et al., 2013). ADR is a dummy that equals 1 if a firm is an ADR-listed firm, and O otherwise. COMPOSITE is ADRI multiplied by RULE
OF LAW. For firms with missing R&D data, R&D is set to zero and an R&D dummy is created and set to 1. Other variables are defined in Table 3. The coefficients on CSRS and its
interactions with SIN (CSRSxSIN) and HIPERF (CSRSxHIPERF) are multiplied by 100. The sample covers the years 2009 and 2011 for which CSR reporting quality data are available.
Regressions include industry and year fixed effects and use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by country. p-values are in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 6: Regression Results Excluding Two High Size Industries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CSRS 0.0636 0.0707 0.0557 0.0366 0.0429 0.0290 -0.0714 -0.0733 -0.0846
(0.318) (0.267) (0.393) (0.570) (0.504) (0.656) (0.384) (0.382) (0.325)
CSRSxSIN 0.306∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
CSRSxHIPERF 0.132∗∗ 0.142∗∗ 0.138∗∗
(0.033) (0.014) (0.032)
HIPERF 0.0388∗∗∗ 0.0475∗∗ 0.0428∗∗∗ 0.0401∗∗∗ 0.0477∗∗ 0.0434∗∗∗ 0.0299∗∗∗ 0.0375∗∗ 0.0331∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.020) (0.005) (0.004) (0.015) (0.004) (0.006) (0.030) (0.006)
SIN 0.0603∗∗ 0.0618∗∗ 0.0611∗∗ 0.0105 0.00833 0.0113 0.0623∗∗ 0.0639∗∗ 0.0631∗∗
(0.036) (0.049) (0.036) (0.711) (0.771) (0.700) (0.034) (0.045) (0.034)
ADR -0.0539 -0.0389 -0.0437 -0.0582∗ -0.0448 -0.0485 -0.0529 -0.0381 -0.0430
(0.117) (0.319) (0.177) (0.088) (0.229) (0.129) (0.108) (0.307) (0.165)
INV OPP 0.133∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D 0.867∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗ 0.869∗∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗ 0.859∗∗∗ 0.881∗∗∗ 0.864∗∗∗ 0.844∗∗∗ 0.866∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIZE -0.00291 -0.00121 -0.000960 -0.00243 -0.00102 -0.000622 -0.00173 0.0000162 0.000205
(0.703) (0.871) (0.904) (0.758) (0.895) (0.939) (0.818) (0.998) (0.979)
ROE -0.000478 -0.000658 -0.000478 -0.000488 -0.000687 -0.000503 -0.000405 -0.000580 -0.000403
(0.847) (0.807) (0.849) (0.846) (0.803) (0.845) (0.870) (0.830) (0.873)
CAPEX 0.390∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LEVERAGE -0.0627∗ -0.0603∗ -0.0635∗ -0.0617∗ -0.0591∗ -0.0624∗ -0.0649∗∗ -0.0628∗ -0.0658∗∗
(0.058) (0.077) (0.059) (0.058) (0.075) (0.060) (0.049) (0.064) (0.049)
R&D DUMMY -0.0347∗∗∗ -0.0346∗∗ -0.0311∗∗ -0.0377∗∗∗ -0.0381∗∗ -0.0342∗∗ -0.0339∗∗∗ -0.0335∗∗ -0.0302∗∗
(0.009) (0.013) (0.035) (0.007) (0.010) (0.031) (0.010) (0.015) (0.038)
ADRI 0.0306∗∗ 0.0301∗∗ 0.0303∗∗
(0.028) (0.032) (0.030)
RULE OF LAW -0.00858 -0.0101 -0.00789
(0.684) (0.615) (0.705)
COMPOSITE 0.00327 0.00309 0.00329
(0.223) (0.252) (0.219)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ρ 0.311 0.376 0.335 0.319 0.374 0.337 0.331 0.393 0.353
Wald χ2 7.450∗∗∗ 8.544∗∗∗ 9.988∗∗∗ 9.271∗∗∗ 10.72∗∗∗ 11.80∗∗∗ 9.576∗∗∗ 10.48∗∗∗ 12.39∗∗∗
No. of Countries 43 45 43 43 45 43 43 45 43
This table shows the firm value regression results for the reduced sample excluding two high-size industries: basic industries and consumer durables. The Heckman model
(Heckman, 1979; Maddala, 1983) is used and estimated using the Full Information Maximum Likelihood Model (FIML). Firm value is measured by industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q.
ADR is a dummy that equals 1 if a firm is an ADR-listed firm, and O otherwise. COMPOSITE is ADRI multiplied by RULE OF LAW. For firms with missing R&D data, R&D is
set to zero and an R&D dummy is created and set to 1. Other variables are defined in Table 3. The coefficients on CSRS and its interactions with SIN (CSRSxSIN) and HIPERF
(CSRSxHIPERF) are multiplied by 100. The sample covers the years 2009 and 2011 for which CSR reporting quality data are available. Regressions include industry and year
fixed effects and use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by country. p-values are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7: Firm Value Regressions With Financial Performance Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Firm-Value Model
CSRS -0.307∗∗∗ -0.306∗∗∗ -0.319∗∗∗ -0.215∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.407∗∗∗ -0.407∗∗∗ -0.414∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CSRSxDROE 0.432∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CSRSxHIPERF 0.204∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.111∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.017) (0.026)
HIPERF 0.0436∗∗∗ 0.0513∗∗∗ 0.0461∗∗∗ 0.0392∗∗∗ 0.0459∗∗∗ 0.0418∗∗∗ 0.0334∗∗∗ 0.0406∗∗∗ 0.0363∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIN 0.0516∗∗ 0.0533∗∗ 0.0520∗∗ 0.0705∗∗ 0.0717∗∗ 0.0708∗∗ 0.0529∗∗ 0.0544∗∗ 0.0531∗∗
(0.033) (0.043) (0.032) (0.018) (0.029) (0.019) (0.027) (0.036) (0.027)
ADR -0.0525 -0.0382 -0.0436 -0.0609 -0.0475 -0.0517 -0.0540∗ -0.0401 -0.0451
(0.106) (0.249) (0.149) (0.105) (0.239) (0.149) (0.075) (0.197) (0.111)
INV OPP 0.0980∗∗∗ 0.0942∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.0994∗∗∗ 0.0955∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.022) (0.009) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.018) (0.007)
R&D 0.827∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗ 0.830∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗ 0.835∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗ 0.827∗∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIZE -0.00397 -0.00124 -0.00222 -0.00341 -0.000965 -0.00180 -0.00252 0.0000932 -0.000870
(0.356) (0.809) (0.645) (0.552) (0.877) (0.766) (0.589) (0.986) (0.864)
ROE -0.00178 -0.00191 -0.00175 -0.0000304 -0.000233 -0.0000229 -0.00167 -0.00182 -0.00165
(0.496) (0.495) (0.503) (0.989) (0.922) (0.992) (0.521) (0.516) (0.527)
CAPEX 0.340∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
LEVERAGE -0.0475∗ -0.0495∗ -0.0491∗ -0.0431 -0.0451 -0.0446∗ -0.0477∗ -0.0497∗ -0.0492∗
(0.069) (0.071) (0.063) (0.101) (0.105) (0.094) (0.068) (0.070) (0.062)
R&D DUMMY -0.0362∗∗∗ -0.0329∗∗ -0.0323∗∗ -0.0376∗∗∗ -0.0348∗ -0.0336∗ -0.0352∗∗∗ -0.0320∗∗ -0.0313∗∗
(0.005) (0.044) (0.038) (0.010) (0.057) (0.052) (0.007) (0.048) (0.044)
ADRI 0.0299∗ 0.0317∗∗ 0.0301∗
(0.054) (0.041) (0.050)
RULE OF LAW -0.00104 -0.00535 -0.00169
(0.961) (0.818) (0.935)
COMPOSITE 0.00383 0.00361 0.00381
(0.196) (0.272) (0.195)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ρ 0.330 0.399 0.355 0.398 0.454 0.415 0.343 0.406 0.365
Wald χ2 7.451∗∗∗ 9.368∗∗∗ 9.836∗∗∗ 8.676∗∗∗ 7.661∗∗∗ 9.227∗∗∗ 10.52∗∗∗ 11.73∗∗∗ 13.06∗∗∗
No. of Countries 43 45 43 43 45 43 43 45 43
This table shows the firm value regression results using the Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979; Maddala, 1983). The Heckman model is estimated using the Full
Information Maximum Likelihood Model (FIML). Firm value model in Equation 1 and issue-choice model in Equation 2 are jointly estimated to correct for selection bias. Firm
value is measured by industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. DROE is a dummy taking values 1 if firm financial performance (ROE) exceeds industry median financial performance in a given
year, and 0 otherwise. ADR is a dummy that equals 1 if a firm is an ADR-listed firm, and O otherwise. COMPOSITE is ADRI multiplied by RULE OF LAW. For firms with
missing R&D data, R&D is set to zero and an R&D dummy is created and set to 1. Other variables are defined in Table 3. The coefficients on CSRS and its interactions with DROE
(CSRSxDROE) and HIPERF (CSRSxHIPERF) are multiplied by 100. The sample covers the years 2009 and 2011 for which CSR reporting quality data are available. Regressions
include industry and year fixed effects and use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by country. p-values are in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 8: Regression Results For The Year 2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Law Enforce Composite Law Enforce Composite Law Enforce Composite Law Enforce Composite
CSRS 0.106∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.00187 0.0254 0.0152 -0.198∗∗ -0.169∗∗ -0.188∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.000) (0.001) (0.976) (0.689) (0.790) (0.012) (0.027) (0.016) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
CSRSxSIN 0.364∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CSRSxHIPERF 0.119∗∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.113∗∗ -0.0628 -0.0600 -0.0661
(0.035) (0.034) (0.036) (0.379) (0.404) (0.343)
CSRSxDROE 0.482∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HIPERF 0.0578∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗ 0.0607∗∗∗ 0.0493∗∗∗ 0.0519∗∗∗ 0.0526∗∗∗ 0.0411∗∗∗ 0.0451∗∗∗ 0.0442∗∗∗ 0.0453∗∗∗ 0.0492∗∗∗ 0.0487∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIN 0.0189 0.0191 0.0172 0.0551 0.0530 0.0527 0.0418 0.0397 0.0396 0.0416 0.0396 0.0394
(0.576) (0.557) (0.609) (0.153) (0.139) (0.153) (0.235) (0.229) (0.243) (0.234) (0.228) (0.242)
ADR -0.116∗∗ -0.108∗∗ -0.109∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.0713∗∗ -0.0631∗ -0.0652∗ -0.0672∗ -0.0591 -0.0608
(0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.047) (0.098) (0.075) (0.065) (0.130) (0.107)
INV OPP 0.129∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D 0.701∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗ 0.696∗∗∗ 0.710∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗ 0.696∗∗∗ 0.707∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗ 0.703∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIZE -0.00432 -0.00361 -0.00261 -0.00312 -0.00245 -0.00145 -0.00204 -0.000864 -0.000272 -0.00262 -0.00140 -0.000881
(0.340) (0.432) (0.619) (0.464) (0.580) (0.774) (0.628) (0.845) (0.956) (0.527) (0.761) (0.860)
ROE 0.0192∗∗∗ 0.0188∗∗∗ 0.0191∗∗∗ 0.0190∗∗∗ 0.0186∗∗∗ 0.0190∗∗∗ 0.0138∗∗∗ 0.0136∗∗∗ 0.0139∗∗∗ 0.0139∗∗∗ 0.0136∗∗∗ 0.0139∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAPEX 0.324∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LEVERAGE -0.113∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗ -0.114∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗ -0.114∗∗
(0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014)
R&D DUMMY -0.0273∗∗∗ -0.0276∗∗∗ -0.0267∗∗∗ -0.0230∗∗∗ -0.0235∗∗ -0.0224∗∗ -0.0225∗∗∗ -0.0228∗∗∗ -0.0219∗∗∗ -0.0230∗∗∗ -0.0233∗∗∗ -0.0224∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.003) (0.009) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) (0.005)
ADRI 0.0156 0.0158 0.0188 0.0187
(0.507) (0.505) (0.438) (0.441)
RULE OF LAW -0.0474∗∗ -0.0488∗∗ -0.0436∗∗ -0.0433∗
(0.037) (0.029) (0.049) (0.053)
COMPOSITE -0.000669 -0.000734 -0.0000931 -0.0000874
(0.835) (0.816) (0.978) (0.979)
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ρ 0.426 0.450 0.455 0.419 0.442 0.449 0.390 0.428 0.421 0.391 0.430 0.424
Wald χ2 5.519∗∗∗ 4.447∗∗∗ 5.300∗∗∗ 5.765∗∗∗ 4.651∗∗∗ 5.370∗∗∗ 5.950∗∗∗ 5.050∗∗∗ 5.704 ∗∗∗ 5.706∗∗∗ 4.923∗∗∗ 5.526∗∗∗
No. of Countries 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
This table shows the firm value regression results for the year 2009 using the Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979; Maddala, 1983). The Heckman model is estimated using the Full Information Maximum Likelihood Model
(FIML). Firm value is measured by industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. DROE is a dummy taking values 1 if firm financial performance (ROE) exceeds industry median financial performance in a given year, and 0 otherwise. ADR is a
dummy that equals 1 if a firm is an ADR-listed firm, and O otherwise. COMPOSITE is ADRI multiplied by RULE OF LAW. For firms with missing R&D data, R&D is set to zero and an R&D dummy is created and set to 1. Other
variables are defined in Table 3. The coefficients on CSRS and its interactions with SIN (CSRSxSIN), HIPERF (CSRSxHIPERF), and DROE (CSRSxDROE) are multiplied by 100. Regressions include industry fixed effects and use
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by country. p-values are in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 9: Regression Results For The Year 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Law Enforce Composite Law Enforce Composite Law Enforce Composite Law Enforce Composite
CSRS -0.0997 -0.0983 -0.112∗∗ -0.254∗∗∗ -0.296∗∗∗ -0.294∗∗∗ -0.343∗∗∗ -0.343∗∗∗ -0.351∗∗∗ -0.430∗∗∗ -0.471∗∗∗ -0.474∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.120) (0.041) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CSRSxSIN 0.231∗ 0.284∗∗ 0.279∗∗
(0.077) (0.038) (0.029)
CSRSxHIPERF 0.191∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.107 0.167∗∗ 0.159∗∗
(0.011) (0.001) (0.001) (0.210) (0.013) (0.018)
CSRSxDROE 0.410∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HIPERF -0.0610∗∗ -0.0542∗∗ 0.0765∗∗∗ -0.0835∗∗∗ 0.0646∗∗∗ 0.0533∗∗∗ -0.0675∗∗∗ -0.0609∗∗ -0.0624∗∗∗ -0.0797∗∗∗ 0.0552∗∗∗ 0.0443∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.045) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.014) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIN -0.0151 -0.0232 0.0302 0.0328 0.0971∗∗∗ 0.0892∗∗∗ 0.0159 0.0182 0.0195 0.0171 0.0775∗∗ 0.0697∗∗
(0.738) (0.640) (0.497) (0.373) (0.002) (0.002) (0.643) (0.655) (0.597) (0.610) (0.010) (0.017)
ADR -0.151∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗ -0.0253 -0.151∗∗∗ -0.00815 -0.0226 -0.144∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗∗ -0.0136 -0.0276
(0.000) (0.000) (0.568) (0.000) (0.835) (0.568) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.679) (0.404)
INV OPP 0.189∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.122∗ 0.135∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.017) (0.003) (0.001) (0.009) (0.000) (0.001) (0.082) (0.028)
R&D 0.751∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗ 1.047∗∗∗ 0.741∗∗∗ 1.061∗∗∗ 1.043∗∗∗ 0.738∗∗∗ 0.713∗∗∗ 0.724∗∗∗ 0.737∗∗∗ 1.033∗∗∗ 1.016∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
SIZE -0.0328∗∗∗ -0.0344∗∗∗ -0.000916 -0.0310∗∗∗ 0.00494 0.00192 -0.0299∗∗∗ -0.0313∗∗∗ -0.0283∗∗∗ -0.0287∗∗∗ 0.00470 0.00183
(0.002) (0.000) (0.905) (0.002) (0.510) (0.802) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.487) (0.785)
ROE -0.00333∗∗ -0.00403∗∗ -0.00172 -0.00313∗∗ -0.00169 -0.00145 -0.00453∗∗ -0.00518∗∗ -0.00490∗∗ -0.00439∗∗ -0.00297 -0.00277
(0.017) (0.039) (0.463) (0.021) (0.537) (0.536) (0.019) (0.038) (0.033) (0.018) (0.345) (0.317)
CAPEX 0.439∗ 0.390∗ 0.602∗∗ 0.431∗ 0.615∗∗ 0.598∗∗ 0.319 0.273 0.336 0.321 0.497∗∗ 0.479∗∗
(0.065) (0.089) (0.010) (0.069) (0.011) (0.010) (0.110) (0.146) (0.123) (0.110) (0.016) (0.016)
LEVERAGE -0.0138 -0.0128 0.0335 -0.0145 0.0354 0.0336 -0.0272 -0.0255 -0.0251 -0.0275 0.0196 0.0170
(0.753) (0.752) (0.391) (0.745) (0.419) (0.404) (0.567) (0.564) (0.577) (0.570) (0.604) (0.625)
R&D DUMMY -0.0541∗∗ -0.0653∗∗∗ -0.0412 -0.0517∗∗ -0.0339 -0.0380 -0.0489∗∗ -0.0586∗∗∗ -0.0430 -0.0481∗∗ -0.0316 -0.0353
(0.030) (0.005) (0.132) (0.029) (0.226) (0.135) (0.037) (0.006) (0.102) (0.041) (0.236) (0.153)
ADRI 0.0374 0.0383 0.0351 0.0355
(0.170) (0.159) (0.201) (0.198)
RULE OF LAW -0.0641∗∗∗ 0.0185 -0.0576∗∗∗ 0.0176
(0.004) (0.465) (0.004) (0.458)
COMPOSITE 0.00675∗ 0.00696∗∗ -0.00141 0.00652∗∗
(0.059) (0.041) (0.730) (0.032)
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ρ -0.818 -0.822 0.506 -0.822 0.615 0.531 -0.830 -0.833 -0.829 -0.830 0.548 0.459
Wald χ2 211.6∗∗∗ 195.5∗∗∗ 9.577∗∗∗ 193.6∗∗∗ 35.36∗∗∗ 15.31∗∗∗ 269.9∗∗∗ 234.4∗∗∗ 240.3∗∗∗ 255.3∗∗∗ 31.61∗∗∗ 13.10∗∗∗
No. of Countries 43 45 43 43 45 43 43 45 43 43 45 43
This table shows the firm value regression results for the year 2011 using the Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979; Maddala, 1983). The Heckman model is estimated using the Full Information Maximum Likelihood Model
(FIML). Firm value is measured by industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. DROE is a dummy taking values 1 if firm financial performance (ROE) exceeds industry median financial performance in a given year, and 0 otherwise. ADR is a
dummy that equals 1 if a firm is an ADR-listed firm, and O otherwise. COMPOSITE is ADRI multiplied by RULE OF LAW. For firms with missing R&D data, R&D is set to zero and an R&D dummy is created and set to 1. Other
variables are defined in Table 3. The coefficients on CSRS and its interactions with SIN (CSRSxSIN), HIPERF (CSRSxHIPERF), and DROE (CSRSxDROE) are multiplied by 100. Regressions include industry fixed effects and use
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by country. p-values are in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Firm Value, Legal Environment, and
Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Regulations
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reporting has become commonplace across the world. A survey of the
largest 100 firms in 41 countries found that 71% of these firms issued CSR reports in 2013 (KPMG et al., 2013). CSR
reports typically provide nonfinancial information and exhibit large variation in disclosure quality because they are
not subject to nearly as strict standards as financial reports. To ensure adequate disclosure quality, consumer groups,
trade unions, and socially responsible investors have called for introducing CSR reporting regulations. They expect
CSR reporting regulation to increase firm value by inducing more transparency and managerial accountability that
will improve a firm’s standing with its stakeholders who influence the success (or failure) of firms on different fronts.
Firms and industry groups, on the other hand, favor keeping CSR disclosures voluntary. They contend that unlike the
one-size-fits-all approach of disclosure regulations, voluntary disclosure can be tailored to the specific needs of firms,
allowing firms to maintain a level of transparency that improves firm value (KPMG & United Nations Environment
Programme, 2006). To shed light on this debate, I examine whether CSR disclosures made under regulations benefit
firm value when considered in connection with the resulting CSR transparency.
Opponents of regulating CSR disclosures posit that if disclosures benefit a firm, then the firm would make
those disclosures voluntarily anyway (e.g., Ross, 1979). Disclosure regulations diminish a firm’s discretion, which may
sometimes call for choosing less transparency to protect firm value. Considering also the costs of compliance, firm value
may decline with regulated disclosure. These views against disclosure regulations rest on voluntary disclosures always
being truthful–an assumption that is unrealistic unless there is a strong legal system that deters misleading disclosures.
Otherwise, voluntary disclosures may not have the hypothesized credibility. Even if a firm truthfully discloses its
CSR performance, other less CSR conscientious firms may make similar disclosures without much fear of punishment
thereby reducing the credibility of the truthful firm as well.
I hypothesize that weaker legal systems favor regulating CSR disclosures, which typically entail firms to comply
with a set of rules. The presence of rules reduces uncertainty for courts in deciding whether a firm is in compliance with
regulations making it easier for stakeholders to initiate litigation (Shleifer, 2005). In fact, rules reduce the discretion
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courts can exercise in deciding a case, allowing potential litigants to partly circumvent the weaknesses embedded in the
judicial system (Hay & Shleifer, 1998). By facilitating legal enforcement in this way, disclosure regulations provide
better incentives for managers to avoid issuing misleading CSR reports when such incentives are most needed.
In contrast, strong legal systems already foster credible disclosures. As agency problems are also less
pronounced in such systems (Shleifer & Wolfenzon, 2002), managers are more likely to make disclosure choices that
protect firm value. Introducing regulations limits those choices, at least partly disallowing firms to exploit managerial
acumen in choosing disclosure quality. I thus expect a negative relation between average firm value and CSR disclosure
regulations considered in connection with the disclosure quality they entail in strong legal systems.
To test these hypotheses, I calculate a legal score for each country as the product of a de jure investor protection
index and an enforcement index. I divide my sample into countries with strong and weak legal systems using the
median legal score as the cutoff. I also identify the countries with CSR disclosure regulations in place from Carrots and
Sticks 2013 (KPMG et al., 2013) and Global CSR Disclosure report of Initiative for Responsible Investment at Harvard
Kennedy School (Initiative for Responsible Investment [IRI], 2015). I use a composite scoring system to calculate a
CSR disclosure quality index for each CSR report issued by firms as explained in the methodology section.
The results largely corroborate my hypotheses. In countries with weak legal systems, firm value increases with
CSR disclosure quality only when there is regulation. This result is consistent with disclosure regulation compensating
some of the deficiency in a legal system to make CSR transparency matter for firm value in a positive way. In stark
contrast, in countries with strong legal systems firm value decreases with CSR disclosure quality when there is regulation.
In a strong legal system, regulation induced transparency seems on average to impair firm value. Without disclosure
regulations, a firm could choose a judicious level of transparency that suits its unique circumstances vis-à-vis its
customers, competitors, employees, investors, and stakeholders in general. Imposing disclosure regulations can frustrate
such efforts in a strong legal environment.
My results also show that when there is no regulation, CSR disclosure quality is statistically significant and
positive in explaining firm value in strong legal systems, and is insignificant in weak legal systems. Hence, I provide
evidence that CSR disclosure regulation along with legal system strength does matter for the sign of the impact of CSR
transparency on firm value. While improving average firm value may not be the sole objective of a governing body, this
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evidence provides guidance on the potential consequences of regulating CSR disclosures for public firms operating in
different legal environments.
The implications of this paper extend to several areas. Whether there is need for disclosure regulation has
been debated since the enactment of Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934. To inform the
debate, researchers extensively studied economic consequences of mandatory financial reports (e.g., Coffee Jr, 1984;
Easterbrook & Fischel, 1984). As some countries have already adopted CSR disclosure regulations while others have
not, a cross-country examination of regulated versus voluntary CSR reports offers a unique context to study the merits of
disclosure regulation, if any. While this is an inquiry of scholarly importance, its results also have practical implications.
Regulators across the world consider making CSR disclosures mandatory. For example, the EU issued an amended
directive in December 2014 asking member states to transpose mandatory CSR reporting into law in two years. Public
interest entities with more than 500 employees are expected to start issuing CSR reports in 2018 covering the fiscal year
2017-2018. My results imply that this law may improve CSR transparency at the expense of firm value in countries
with stronger legal systems but may benefit firm value in countries with weaker legal systems. One-size-fits-all type
regulation may do more harm than good in some settings.
Recent studies on disclosure regulation have focused on country-level IFRS adoptions for financial reporting.
These studies find that IFRS, which is considered an enhanced reporting system compared to local GAAP, benefit
primarily firms in countries with strong legal institutions (Daske et al., 2008) and those that make concurrent changes
to their legal enforcement regimes (Christensen, Hail, & Leuz, 2013). These studies compare reporting before and
after IFRS and conclude that improvements in financial reporting standards benefit firms if the legal and institutional
infrastructure is strong enough to support their implementation. By contrast, I study nonfinancial disclosure regulations
under which firm value benefits from CSR reporting transparency only in weaker legal environments—a result that is
consistent with Hay and Shleifer (1998). My study, however, is cross-sectional covering years 2009, 2011, and 2012
(for which I have CSR disclosure quality data) and comparing the firms in countries with and without CSR disclosure
regulations during these years.
The papers that are most related to mine are Bruno and Claessens (2010), Ioannou and Serafeim (2014),
Matsumura et al. (2014), and Dhaliwal et al. (2011). Bruno and Claessens (2010) find that better governance practices
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and transparency benefit (impair) firm performance in countries with weaker (stronger) legal systems. Their contention
is that a strong legal regime engenders excessive monitoring of firms (i.e., beyond an optimal level) to harm managerial
initiatives that foster operational efficiency. These results are consistent with mine demonstrating that imposing on
firms to provide more transparency may be excessive in a strong legal system. Ioannou and Serafeim (2014) examine
how mandating CSR disclosures affects firm value, CSR disclosure frequency, and propensities to obtain disclosure
assurance and adopt reporting guidelines in four countries that include China, Denmark, Malaysia, and South Africa.
While theirs is an event-study over 4 countries, mine is a cross-sectional study covering 46 countries, which allows me
to compare regulated and non-regulated disclosure regimes. Matsumura et al. (2014) use a sample of U.S. firms to
examine the firm value impact of the act of voluntarily disclosing carbon emissions, which can be considered as part of
CSR reports. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) use the act of disclosing a CSR report as a binary variable to examine its impact on
cost of capital for U.S. firms. My study, on the other hand, uses a disclosure quality score on CSR reports to distinguish
more or less transparent disclosing firms. These data allow me to infer the firm value impact of more transparency
under different disclosure and legal regimes also taking advantage of the multi-country data.
Background and Hypotheses Development
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reports typically disclose a firm’s environmental, social, and governance
(ESG) activities and performance. Examples of information reported in CSR reports include a firm’s energy efficiency,
environmental impact, product safety initiatives, social projects undertaken in localities the firm has a presence,
workforce diversity, labor practices including those of overseas suppliers, and governance measures implemented to
prevent potential agency problems. As most of the information is nonfinancial in nature, CSR reports provide a view
of operations of firms that is largely missing from financial reports. Stakeholders, whose welfare in part depends on
the firm’s stance on ESG, value CSR information particularly highly. As stakeholder activism initiated by customers,
employees, and community can influence a firm’s success or failure, their positive actions constitute opportunities
for firms and adverse actions constitute potential risks. Providing high quality CSR information to keep stakeholders
informed has become paramount for firms aiming to stay in good terms with them. Other prominent users of CSR
information include investors aiming to limit their holdings to socially responsible firms as well as those interested in
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knowing the risks and opportunities facing their potential investment targets (Dhaliwal et al., 2012). To illustrate the
investor appetite for CSR information, a report prepared by Ernst & Young has revealed that 46% of all shareholder
proposals submitted in 2014 and 52% of all shareholder proposals submitted by April 2015 concerned environmental
and social issues facing firms (Ernst & Young, 2015).
Given the importance placed on CSR information, firms aiming to reduce information asymmetry can issue
CSR reports. The quality of CSR reports determines the firm’s level of transparency to its stakeholders. In addition to
fostering better stakeholder relations, more transparency offers investors a level playing field vis-à-vis the firm and
better-informed large investors thereby reducing the need for regular investors to discount the firm’s stock to protect
themselves (Diamond, 1985). Moreover, transparency allows investors to better assess the covariance of the firm’s
stock with other stocks, reducing investors’ information risk and the firm’s cost of capital (Lambert et al., 2007). Better
knowledge of the firm’s CSR agenda allows the firm to additionally tap into socially responsible investors. Dealing with
agency problems also becomes easier with transparency especially because managers or controlling shareholders are
accountable for preventing CSR risks that threaten sustainability and longevity of firms. More transparency allows
better monitoring of CSR efforts, encouraging managers to reduce CSR risks and tap CSR opportunities rivals miss.
These benefits of transparency contribute to improving firm value.
CSR transparency is not without costs. CSR information mostly concerns operational activities. There are
direct costs such as collecting the information, preparing the report and disseminating it in addition to indirect costs
such as revealing strategically sensitive information to competitors, unions, and regulators who may use the information
to take advantage of the firm (Özbilgin & Penno, 2005). More disclosure can also increase costs of compensating
managers because additional disclosures increase managerial risk for reporting less than favorable results causing
risk-averse managers to demand more pay (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2012). Additionally, more disclosure increases a
firm’s exposure to litigation risk, textitceteris paribus, by increasing the likelihood of errors of omission or commission
(Enriques & Gilotta, 2014). If the aggregate impact of these costs falls below (exceeds) that of the benefits, firm value
will increase (decrease) with higher quality CSR disclosures. Whether costs of higher quality CSR disclosures dominate
their benefits appears to be an empirical question.
Firms reveal CSR information voluntarily, if their managers expect such information to benefit themselves.
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For example, if a firm’s production process pollutes the environment, its labor practices are harsh on workers, or
its products lack the requisite level of safety or quality, displaying such information in a CSR report would not suit
managers. Instead of remedying these problems, managers may find it easier to conceal such information and issue
reports that paint a misleading picture about important aspects of CSR. Agency problems make it difficult to induce
managers to voluntarily issue CSR reports that cover the full range of a firm’s CSR issues. Instead, managers may
disclose information “green-washing” the firm’s CSR efforts if any and selectively releasing information that casts
those efforts in the best light. For outsiders, such practices reduce credibility of CSR disclosures of not just the firms
overstating their CSR but also those of the firms that have a genuine CSR agenda. Unless a strong legal system exists, it
is difficult to discern cunning firms from truthful ones among voluntary disclosers. One way for firms invested in CSR
to stand out is to engage in signaling which involves significant costs (Enriques & Gilotta, 2014). Competitive and
reputational forces are usually slow and ineffective in eliciting truthful disclosures (Shleifer, 2005). Depending on its
strength, legal system is usually the most effective conduit in preventing misleading voluntary disclosures (Djankov,
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008). Usually giving top priority to minority shareholder protection, a strong
legal system designs and enforces strict laws emphasizing corporate transparency. As such, a strong legal system backs
voluntary disclosures that are truthful in order to monitor proper use of investor funds. A firm whose best interests call
for volunteering information on its successful CSR program can do so credibly as potential mimickers are deterred by
the legal system. With the benefit of curtailed agency problems in strong legal systems, the firm can choose a judicious
level of CSR transparency that balances the costs and benefits. Imposing CSR reporting regulations strips firms off this
choice, more likely leading to too much transparency. I thus expect firm value to decrease with CSR disclosure quality
when there is CSR reporting regulation in a stronger legal system.
HYPOTHESIS 1: In countries with stronger legal systems, higher quality CSR reporting results in lower firm
value when CSR reporting is regulated.
In weaker legal systems, however, ensuring disclosure credibility is problematic. Regulating CSR disclosures
entails that disclosures conform to a set of rules or principles. Presence of rules makes it easier for potential plaintiffs to
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establish that a firm is not in compliance, in part reducing judicial discretion in decision making (Hay & Shleifer, 1998).
Furthermore, imposing disclosure regulations acts as a low cost commitment device for continued periodic disclosures
that private contracting may not achieve in a weak legal system (Leuz & Wysocki, 2008). More efficient commitment to
issue periodic CSR reports allows a firm to appease investor and stakeholder fears that the firm may stop disclosing
after entering into a contract with them. A firm gaining the ability to enter into contracts with less cost experiences
benefits ranging from raising less costly capital and hiring more talented employees to having better public relations and
expanding its customer base. Hence, I predict firm value to increase with CSR reporting quality when there is CSR
reporting regulation in effect in a country with a weaker legal system.
HYPOTHESIS 2: In countries with weaker legal systems, higher quality CSR reporting results in higher firm value
when CSR reporting is regulated.
One can argue that even in stronger legal systems agency problems remain unsolved, and managers may not
have sufficient incentives to be so forthcoming as to voluntarily and truthfully disclose CSR information. Disclosure
regulations backed by strong legal enforcement may be necessary for eliciting a healthy amount of transparency from
firms to control agency problems and improve firm value. This argument predicts a positive impact for CSR disclosure
quality to have on firm value when there is regulation and a strong legal system in a country. Such an argument views
disclosure regulation as a futile effort in weak legal systems lacking sufficient enforcement. This argument, generally
favored in the disclosure regulation literature (Leuz & Wysocki, 2016), goes against my hypotheses, and resolving the
differences is largely an empirical matter which I take up in this paper.
Methodology
Regression Specification
I test these hypotheses by regressing firm value proxied by the market value of common equity on mea-
sures of CSR disclosure quality (CSRS), CSR reporting regime (REGULATION) where REGULATION=1 if there
is CSR disclosure regulation and REGULATION=0 if CSR disclosure is not regulated, interaction of these two
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(CSRS*REGULATION), and a set of firm and country level controls, Z, along with industry, d, and year dummies, y :
VALUEcj,t =α + β1 ∗ CSRScj,t + β2 ∗ REGULATIONc + β3 ∗ (CSRScj,t ∗ REGULATIONc)
+
K∑
k=1
δk ∗ Zck, j,t−1 +
T−1∑
t=1
yt +
I−1∑
i=1
di + cj,t (3)
VALUE is measured by the natural logarithm of the market value of common equity (MKVAL) calculated as
common shares outstanding multiplied by the year-end price; CSRS, CSR reporting quality score; REGULATION, a
dummy for the presence of mandatory CSR reporting regulations in a country (KPMG et al., 2013); CSRS*REGULATION
measure the interaction of CSR reporting quality score with regulation dummy; Z, firm- and country-level control
variables; y, year dummy; d, industry dummy; c, country; i, industry; j, firm; t, year; K, the number of control variables;
T, the number of years, and I, the number of industries; α, a constant. Robust standard errors are estimated using the
Huber/White/Sandwich estimation procedure.
I partition the sample into two groups based on whether a company operates in a country with strong or
weak legal regime. This partition allows me to examine the hypothesized differential impact of disclosure regulations
across legal regimes. I classified the countries into strong and weak legal system groups using the median value of the
product of the revised Anti-Director Rights index of Djankov et al. (2008) and the Rule of Law index provided by the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) through Lexis-Nexis.24 I then estimate Equation 3 separately for these two
subsamples to better capture variations in the key variables across strong and weak legal regimes.
Data
The CSR-Sustainability (CSR-S) monitor. I use the data provided by the CSR-S Monitor (Weissman Center
for International Business, 2014) for CSR disclosure quality. The CSR-S Monitor provides an assessment of the quality
of CSR reports published by companies worldwide. These companies are selected based on large size and their presence
24http://w3.nexis.com/sources/scripts/info.pl?10896
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on multiple global indices. This generated an initial sample of 2524 company-years from 24 industries and 46 countries
in the years 2009, 2011, and 2012. Out of this initial universe of companies, a company is included in the CSR-S
Monitor if the company either issued a stand-alone CSR report or included a sizeable CSR reporting segment as part of
its annual report.
The CSR-S Monitor assesses nonfinancial reporting quality based on 11 key CSR performance attributes
including environment and sustainability, corporate governance, bribery and corruption, and integrity assurance that
are identified as the most relevant areas in corporate social responsibility (see the Appendix for details). The CSR-S
Monitor analyzes the content of a CSR report for each attribute based on comprehensiveness, specificity of detail,
quality, and reporting accuracy. As such, each category is scored with respect to (1) the acknowledgment of problems
related to the particular attribute, (2) the material and specific activities undertaken to address these problems, (3) the
publication of measurable results, and (4) whether independent verification and assurance of these results were included
in the report. The scores on these categories are then weighted to provide a total score ranging from 0 to 100, where a
higher score indicates higher quality of report.
What makes the CSR-S Monitor unique as compared to other CSR scoring frameworks is that it integrates
independent third-party assurance to the scoring process, a section that is not present in other CSR scoring frameworks
(Sethi et al., 2015a, 2015b). In the data, assurance measures the degree to which third party validation was part of the
report. Unlike financial reporting, lack of standardization in sustainability reporting raises concerns about the reliability
of these reports. Thus, providing an independent assurance of a CSR report partly allays these concerns.
There is considerable research on the relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) and financial
performance (CFP). Despite the overall positive yet small relationship documented by Margolis et al. (2007), I included
the CSR performance variable in the regressions to avoid a possible missing variable bias. I use the CSR performance
scores provided by Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG database (Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG, 2002-2012).25 ASSET4
ESG database provides annual CSR performance information for about 3400 listed companies worldwide. Its measure
reflects CSR performance of companies in eighteen subcategories of the four main aspects of CSR: environmental,
social, corporate governance, and economic. The scores on each of these eighteen categories range between 0 and 1,
25http://im.thomsonreuters.com/solutions/content/asset4-esg/
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with high scores indicating strong performance in a given category. These scores on each sub-category are then added
to create an equally-weighted aggregate CSR performance score ranging from 0 to 100.
The data on CSR reporting regime is provided in KPMG et al. (2013) and Global CSR Disclosure report of
Initiative for Responsible Investment at Harvard Kennedy School (Initiative for Responsible Investment [IRI], 2015).
The countries that have CSR disclosure regulations in place during the sample period are Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.
The dummy variable REGULATION equals one if a country has CSR reporting regulations in effect and equals zero
otherwise.
Firm variables. The dependent variable, Value, is measured by the natural logarithm of the market value of
common equity (MKVAL) calculated as common shares outstanding multiplied by the year-end price. I exclude firms
with missing financial data from the sample.
Increasing social awareness among investors in the last two decades has shaped economic and social behavior
in capital markets. Accordingly, investors have started applying varying levels of "social screening", which is the process
of selecting companies to invest in based on social and environmental performance in addition to a company’s financial
performance. The most common type of social screening is to avoid alcohol, tobacco, or gambling industries, which are
defined as "sin industries". The products offered by these firms are against common societal norms or harmful to the
environment, which can have implications on their valuations. Following Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), I identify three
groups of such stocks and create the variable SIN, which takes value 1 for sin stocks such as alcohol (SIC 2100-2199),
tobacco (SIC 2080-2085), and gaming (NAICS 7132, 71312, 713210, 71329, 713290, 72112, and 721120) companies
and 0, otherwise.
Research and development intensity (R&D) emerged as a major factor in CSR research (Padgett & Galan,
2010). The measure for research and development intensity (R&D) is research and development expenses scaled by
lagged sales. However, not all firms report R&D expenditures in their financial statements. When missing, R&D is set
to zero and following Himmelberg et al. (1999), an R&D dummy, R&DDUMMY, is created and set to 1. This is to
eliminate the possibility of any bias toward technology-oriented firms.
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I defined firm size, SIZE, as the logarithm of sales. This choice is motivated by the nature of the cross-country
data and to mitigate possible problems due to different accounting practices across countries in calculating other firm
size proxies such as total assets. As robustness check, I tried the logarithm of the number of employees and assets to
proxy for size. With these proxies I obtained estimates that were consistent with the initial results.
I used firm return on assets, ROA, for profitability. For robustness, I also tried return on equity that gave
similar results. To eliminate a potential omitted variable bias at the country level, I included the natural logarithm of the
per-capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), GDP, in the regressions. I used a proxy for the level of financial constraints,
LEVERAGE, measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. There is still debate about whether (and how)
leverage affects firm value (Fama & French, 1998). Hence, it is difficult to have any priors on the direction of its impact.
As it is not a variable of interest in the current setup, I just included leverage as a control variable.
Industry dummies (di) are added based on a company’s primary two-digit SIC code. These dummies account for
differences in accounting practices, business structure, industry-specific performance, and regulations across industries.
Year dummies are included to control for year specific factors in the data. I use lagged values for each of the control
variables to circumvent endogeneity problems. Private companies, family-owned, and state-owned enterprises are
excluded as they are not required to issue financial reports to the public. Financial firms (two-digit SIC code 60-69) are
excluded due to their fundamentally different business models.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 10 shows the number of firm-years in each country that issue or do not issue CSR reports. CSR
disclosure regulations allow companies that satisfy certain criteria–such as size as measured by sales revenue or number
of employees–the option to “report or explain”. That is, firms with legitimate reasons to not reveal their CSR activities
are asked to provide a satisfactory explanation for not issuing a CSR report. As such, there are firms that do not report
even in countries with CSR disclosure regulations. As Table 10 shows, although CSR disclosures are not regulated in
Japan, a majority of firms issue formal CSR reports, demonstrating the power of markets and reputation for well-known
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firms to voluntarily share CSR information. A similar case can be made for Canada and the USA. It is interesting to
note that although CSR regulations are present in India and Malaysia, the percentage of firms issuing CSR reports is
very low (0% for Malaysia) implying that firms used their option to explain why they do not report their CSR activities.
[Table 10 about here.]
Table 11 provides the breakdown of reporting and non-reporting firms by industry. Basic Industry, Other
Industries, and Transportation are the industries with the highest percentage of firms issuing CSR reports. Services,
Textile and Trade, and Consumer Durables are the industries with the lowest percentage of firms issuing CSR reports.
[Table 11 about here.]
Table 12 provides the summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables for the full sample in
Panel A. The mean and median MKVAL for the sample are 21,297.40 and 8,642.03, respectively. My measure of CSR
disclosure quality, CSRS, ranges from 0 to 100 by design, and the mean CSRS value is 37.97, while the median CSRS
value is 37.00, for the firms that issued CSR reports. 20% of the firm-year observations are subject to CSR disclosure
regulation. 3% of the firm-year observations are from sin industries. Average and median profitability (ROA) for my
sample of firms are 13% and 12%, respectively.
[Table 12 about here.]
Panel B of Table 12 provides the breakdown of the descriptive statistics by whether firm-year observations are
subject to CSR disclosure regulation. Firms that are subject to disclosure regulation on average issue higher quality
CSR reports than those that are not subject to disclosure regulation while also exhibiting higher CSR performance.
Average and median market values for regulation firms are more than those of no regulation firms. Panel C shows the
breakdown of the sample based on legal system strength. Average and median market values are similar in these legal
systems. However, mean CSR disclosure quality is lower in strong legal systems than in weak legal systems. Moreover,
CSR disclosure regulation is more prevalent in weak legal systems (42%) than in strong legal systems (17%), indicating
an effort by countries with weak legal systems to introduce structure into CSR reports to mitigate inadequate legal
support for credible disclosures. In weak legal systems, CSR performance is also significantly better on average. The
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significance tests also show that the mean and median values of the variables are largely different between the two
groups with the exception ofMKVAL, CSR_DUMMY, ROA, and SIN. Interestingly, however, mean value of CSRS is
greater in weak legal environments, implying a greater need for firms operating in weak legal environment to provide
more transparency. Another interesting statistic is the difference in the pervasiveness of CSR disclosure regulations
between these samples. In strong legal environments, only 17% of firms face CSR disclosure regulations, while in weak
legal environments, 42% of firms face them. Regulation has a more important role to play in a weak legal environment,
where there is more need for structure in disclosures to partly make up for the deficiency in the legal system. As such,
regulation is more pervasive in weak legal environments, consistent with my hypotheses.
[Table 13 about here.]
Table 13 provides the correlation matrix for the dependent and independent variables. My independent
variable of interest, CSRS, has a significantly positive correlation with market value. CSRS has also a significantly
positive correlation with REGULATION, CSRPERF, and SIZE, and a negative correlation with GDP for both Pearson
and Spearman rank correlations. The positive CSRS-REGULATION correlation confirms the descriptive statistics in
Panel B of Table 12 that REGULATION is associated with higher CSR disclosure quality. That CSRS has a positive
correlation with CSRPERF is intuitive and is consistent with the result in Titman and Trueman (1986) that firms with
more favorable information report it with more precision. Firm size, SIZE, also plays a positive role in CSR reporting
quality owing to the reputation concerns of larger firms that have more at stake in their relations with their stakeholders.
Regression Analyses
Table 14 presents the regression results using firm value as the dependent variable. Columns (1)-(4) show
the results for the baseline regressions. Columns (5) and (6) show the results for the full model. The independent
variables are CSR disclosure quality score (CSRS), CSR disclosure regulation dummy (REGULATION), interaction
term of CSRS with REGULATION, CSR performance scores (CSRPERF), R&D expenditures (R&D), firm size (SIZE),
per-capita GDP (GDP), profitability (ROA), level of risk (LEVERAGE), absence of R&D reporting (R&DDUMMY),
capital expenditures (CAPEX), and sin industry membership (SIN), along with industry and year dummies.
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[Table 14 about here.]
The sample is split into two groups based on the strength of legal system, and regressions are run separately
for each subsample. In countries with strong legal systems, on average, CSR disclosure quality has a significantly
negative association with firm value only when CSR disclosures are regulated. When CSR disclosures are not regulated
the association is positive and significant. By contrast, in countries with weak legal systems, CSR disclosure quality
has a significantly positive association with firm value only when CSR disclosures are regulated. The association is
insignificant when CSR disclosures are not regulated (i.e., voluntary).
These results are consistent with my hypotheses. That CSR disclosure quality has no material impact on
firm value in weak legal systems with voluntary CSR disclosures seems to suggest costs of disclosure quality level off
its benefits. The reason may be that mimicking by less CSR conscientious firms renders the expenditures spent on
disclosure quality rather useless.
R&D and SIN have significant and positive association with firm value only for countries with strong legal
systems. They are insignificant for countries with weak legal systems. REGULATION has significant and negative
association with firm value only for countries with weak legal systems. SIZE has statistically significant and positive
coefficients, and LEVERAGE has statistically significant and negative coefficients in both legal systems. The coefficient
for ROA is positive and significant only in weak legal systems, and the coefficients for CSRPERF and CAPEX are
insignificant regardless of the legal system strength. Lack of R&D information has a negative coefficient for countries
with strong legal systems, but a positive yet insignificant coefficient for countries with weak legal systems. Per capita
GDP has mostly insignificant association with firm value.
To correct for selection bias, I estimate the regression using the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML)
method as reported in Table 15. In the FIML method, the firm-value model and the CSR report issue-choice model
are jointly estimated using the maximum likelihood approach. In the issue-choice model, I use “National Corporate
Responsibility Index (National CSR Index)” provided by AccountAbility (2005) as the exclusion restriction variable,
because National CSR Index positively impacts CSR reporting choice through peer and market pressure but is not
expected to impact firm value by itself. Table 15 shows that indeed National CSR Index is positive and significant in
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all of the model specifications. The exclusion of National CSR Index in the firm-value model serves also to avoid
multicollinearity in the firm-value model (Lennox, Francis, &Wang, 2011). CSR_DUMMY, as reported in the firm-value
model, represents the predicted CSR disclosure choice from the issue-choice model. CSR_DUMMY loads significantly
in the firm-value model for both strong and weak legal systems implying that self-selection into disclosing CSR is
potentially an issue for all firms regardless of their facing strong or weak legal systems.
[Table 15 about here.]
In Table 15, the sign and significance of the coefficient of CSRS and REGULATION interaction remains
unchanged in support of my hypotheses. The coefficients of REGULATION and CSR performance are significant and
positive for only strong legal systems indicating their favorable reception in environments with less pronounced agency
problems.
In Table 16, I report the regression results using two-stage least squares. The results of my analysis using the
OLS framework could be misleading in presence of potential endogeneity problems related to firms’ decisions regarding
reporting quality. Although this approach limits our sample of firms only to those that publish CSR reports, it allows a
more focused analysis of the interaction of CSR disclosure quality and regulation when potential endogeneity issues
of CSR disclosure quality are accounted for. I use industry-median CSRS scores as the exclusion restriction variable,
because industry-median CSR disclosure quality can impact firm value only through its influence on individual firm’s
CSR reporting quality due to peer pressure. The results in Table 16 confirm those in Table 14. In that, CSR disclosure
quality impact firm value negatively in strong legal systems when CSR disclosure regulations exist. The impact is
positive in weak legal systems with CSR disclosure regulation.
[Table 16 about here.]
In Table 17, I report the firm value regressions for ADR firms with strong and weak home-country legal
systems. This analysis addresses the question of whether having its stock listed in the US that has a strong legal system
alter how a firm’s CSR disclosure quality impact firm value especially if the firm’s home country has a weak legal
system. I find that ADR-status of a firm does not change the main tenor of the results. Firms facing weak home-country
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legal systems benefit from issuing high quality CSR reports when there is regulation in their home countries, and
significantly more so when the firms do not have ADRs. Non-ADR firms facing strong home-country legal systems
experience a decline in firm value when they issue high quality CSR only under disclosure regulation. ADR firms facing
strong home-country legal systems do experience a decline in firm value when they issue high quality CSR reports per
se but not due to disclosure regulation.
[Table 17 about here.]
In Table 18, I report regression results using CSRS variable adjusted for integrity assurance. The idea of
defining countries based on the strength of their legal systems is to test my argument that CSR disclosure regulation can
make up for lack of adequate legal system strength and, thus, enhance the credibility of such reports and the reliability of
the information therein. Unfortunately, a company’s self-assessment of the quality of its CSR report carries a measure
of public skepticism (Sethi et al., 2015a). Accordingly, firms tend to adopt voluntary integrity assurance on their CSR
reports from a third-party organization attesting to the truthfulness of the information provided in the report. Although
such feature of a CSR report helps improve credibility of the CSR information and enhance stakeholder confidence,
third party content verification can also serve as a low-cost substitute to disclosure regulations and mitigate the influence
of such regulations on disclosure quality. To address this potential issue, I adjusted the CSR disclosure quality variable
(CSRS) for assurance by subtracting the assurance component from the overall disclosure quality score and redid the
analysis using this adjusted CSR disclosure quality variable (adjCSRS). The results in Table 18 provide strong support
to those in Table 14. Specifically, CSR disclosure quality impact firm value negatively in strong legal systems, whereas
the impact is positive in the case of no such regulations in effect. The impact is strongly positive in weak legal systems
with CSR disclosure regulation.
[Table 18 about here.]
Conclusions
CSRhas gained prominence after scandals broke revealing corporate actions that are harmful for the environment,
investors, employees, customers, communities, and the society at large. Since CSR accountability demands informative
CSR DISCLOSURE REGULATIONS AND LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 54
disclosures, corporations increasingly issue CSR reports to appease stakeholder and investor concerns over CSR risks
facing firms. These reports typically contain nonfinancial operational data that are not subject to the type of strict
standards that financial reports are subject to. Some companies take advantage of this situation to issue CSR reports that
paint an overstated and misleading picture of their CSR activities, which results in less CSR transparency. While CSR
transparency has costs and benefits, it is important to identify settings in which the benefits exceed the costs and vice
versa to gain insights into CSR reporting. The settings I study in this paper include countries with strong or weak legal
systems that mandate or do not mandate CSR disclosures. I use firm value as a dependent variable to assess whether
CSR transparency has a positive or negative impact in each of these settings. Furthermore, the presence/absence of CSR
disclosure regulations across countries provides a unique context to study the relative efficacy of corporate disclosure
regulations in general.
My results show that in countries with strong legal systems CSR transparency has a statistically significant
negative impact on firm value when CSR disclosures are regulated. Otherwise, I find significant and positive impact.
On the contrary, in countries with weak legal systems, CSR disclosure quality has a statistically significant positive
impact when CSR disclosures are regulated. In these countries, depending on the estimation method, the impact is
either insignificant or significant and positive when CSR disclosures are voluntary.
These results call into question the efficacy of disclosure regulations in countries that can promote credible
voluntary disclosures by virtue of their strong legal systems. Nevertheless, CSR disclosure regulations seem to benefit
firm value in those countries that lack adequate legal strength. In these countries, disclosure regulations and the rules
that they involve may allow stakeholders to circumvent weaknesses in the legal system to enforce informative CSR
disclosures that come with benefits that improve average firm value.
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Table 10: CSR Report Status and Regulation by Country
Report Status
No Yes Total % Reporting CSR DisclosureRegulation
Australia 12 15 27 56% No
Austria 6 6 12 50% No
Belgium 3 6 9 67% No
Bermuda 3 0 3 0% No
Brazil 23 6 29 21% No
Canada 25 28 53 53% No
Chile 6 0 6 0% No
China 22 6 28 21% No
Colombia 0 3 3 100% No
Czech Republic 3 0 3 0% No
Denmark 4 9 13 69% Yes
Egypt 6 1 7 14% No
Finland 5 16 21 76% Yes
France 25 72 97 74% Yes
Germany 21 54 75 72% Yes
Greece 3 4 7 57% No
Hong Kong 6 5 11 45% No
Hungary 9 3 12 25% No
India 30 3 33 9% Yes
Indonesia 1 5 6 83% Yes
Ireland 9 8 17 47% No
Israel 6 2 8 25% No
Italy 5 15 20 75% Yes
Japan 67 169 236 72% No
Malaysia 4 0 4 0% Yes
Mexico 12 11 23 48% No
Netherlands 11 22 33 67% Yes
New Zealand 9 3 12 25% No
Norway 4 11 15 73% Yes
Pakistan 3 0 3 0% Yes
Poland 15 3 18 17% No
Russia 3 3 6 50% No
Saudi Arabia 3 3 6 50% No
Singapore 3 3 6 50% No
South Africa 9 14 23 61% Yes
South Korea 9 16 25 64% No
Spain 6 22 28 79% Yes
Sri Lanka 4 5 9 56% No
Sweden 3 21 24 88% Yes
Switzerland 9 15 24 63% No
Thailand 15 7 22 32% No
Turkey 0 3 3 100% No
United Arab Emirates 6 0 6 0% No
United Kingdom 19 83 102 81% Yes
United States of America 923 471 1,394 34% No
Venezuela 2 0 2 0% No
Total 1,372 1,152 2,524 46%
The sample period includes years 2009, 2011, and 2012. Report status shows the firm-years with either a
standalone CSR report or a sizeable CSR reporting segment in annual report (treatment group) and without
such a report (control group) in each country. Countries with CSR disclosure regulation are identified from
Global CSR Disclosure report of Initiative for Responsible Investment at Hauser Institute for Civil Society at
Harvard Kennedy School (Initiative for Responsible Investment [IRI], 2015), and Carrots and Sticks 2013
(KPMG et al., 2013), a publication of the U.N. Environment Programme and KPMG.
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Table 11: CSR Report Status by Industry
Report Status
No Yes Total % Reporting
Basic industry 142 189 331 57%
Capital goods 113 107 220 49%
Construction 71 72 143 50%
Consumer durables 295 174 469 37%
Food and tobacco 84 104 188 55%
Leisure 43 40 83 48%
Other 11 24 35 69%
Petroleum 88 90 178 51%
Regulated utilities 108 107 215 50%
Services 141 52 193 27%
Textiles and trade 153 57 210 27%
Transportation 39 58 97 60%
Unregulated utilities 84 78 162 48%
Total 1,372 1,152 2,524 46%
Firm-years with and without CSR report in 46 countries are classified by
industry using primary two-digit SIC codes.
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Table 12: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Full-Sample (N=2,524)
Mean LowerQuartile Median
Upper
Quartile St. Dev.
MKVAL 21,297.40 3,572.19 8,642.03 20,968.83 43,918.60
CSRSxCSR_DUMMY 37.97 25.75 37.00 49.00 15.87
CSR_DUMMY 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50
REGULATION 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40
CSRPERF 0.67 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.47
R&D 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.13
SIZE 10.06 8.63 9.52 10.83 2.28
GDP 29.32 28.52 30.26 30.34 1.37
ROA 0.13 0.08 0.12 0.17 0.20
LEVERAGE 0.27 0.16 0.25 0.37 0.17
CAPEX 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.10
SIN 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18
Panel B: Breakdown of Sample by CSR Disclosure Regime
Regulation (N=497) No Regulation (N=2,027)
Mean Median Mean Median t-testp-values
Wilcoxon
p-values
MKVAL 25,490.12 12,826.36 20,269.38 8,013.42 0.02 0.00
CSRS 29.90 32.50 14.25 0.00 0.00 0.00
CSR_DUMMY 0.70 1.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00
CSRPERF 0.81 1.00 0.64 1.00 0.00 0.00
R&D 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.25 0.00
SIZE 10.19 10.01 10.02 9.37 0.15 0.00
GDP 28.03 28.41 29.63 30.26 0.00 0.00
ROA 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.81 0.00
LEVERAGE 0.25 0.23 0.28 0.26 0.01 0.00
CAPEX 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.82 0.29
SIN 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.13 0.13
Panel C: Breakdown of Sample by Legal System Strength
Strong Legal System (N=2,225) Weak Legal System (N=299)
Mean Median Mean Median t-testp-values
Wilcoxon
p-values
MKVAL 21,166.55 8,718.13 22,271.06 7,696.09 0.68 0.24
CSRS 16.78 0.00 21.39 0.00 0.00 0.34
CSR_DUMMY 0.45 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.24 0.24
REGULATION 0.17 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00
CSRPERF 0.66 1.00 0.76 1.00 0.00 0.00
R&D 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00
SIZE 9.97 9.40 10.69 10.54 0.00 0.00
GDP 29.53 30.26 27.74 28.11 0.00 0.00
ROA 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.22 0.30
LEVERAGE 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.03 0.16
CAPEX 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.00
SIN 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.87 0.87
Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for the full sample. Panel B breaks down the sample based on whether or not firms are subject to CSR
disclosure regulations in their respective countries. Panel C breaks down the sample based on whether or not firms face a strong legal system
in their respective countries. Legal system strength is measured by the product of the revised Anti-Director Rights index from Djankov et al.
(2008) and the Rule of Law index from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) available in Lexis-Nexis. Countries with strong (weak)
legal systems are those with above- (below-) median legal system strength scores. MKVAL is market value of equity measured as common
shares outstanding multiplied by the year-end price (reported in USD millions). CSRS is CSR reporting quality provided by the CSR-S Monitor
(Weissman Center for International Business, 2014) and ranges from 0 to 100. REGULATION is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a country has
CSR disclosure regulations in effect and equals 0 otherwise. CSRPERF is a dummy variable that equals 1 if CSR performance exceeds annual
industry median CSR performance, and 0 otherwise. R&D is research and development expenses scaled by sales. SIZE is the logarithm of
sales. GDP is the natural logarithm of the per-capita Gross Domestic Product. ROA is income before extraordinary items divided by total assets.
LEVERAGE is book debt over book assets. CAPEX is capital expenditures scaled by book value of total assets. SIN equals 1 for sin stocks
such as alcohol (SIC 2100-2199), tobacco (SIC 2080-2085), and gaming (NAICS 7132, 71312, 713210, 71329, 713290, 72112, and 721120)
companies and equals 0 otherwise (Hong & Kacperczyk, 2009).
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Table 14: Firm Value Regressions - Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
Legal System (LS) Strength in Home Country
Strong LS Weak LS Strong LS Weak LS Strong LS Weak LS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CSRSxREGULATION -0.790∗∗ 1.290∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.006)
CSRS 0.276 1.045∗∗ 0.355 1.230∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗ 0.443
(0.269) (0.022) (0.128) (0.013) (0.005) (0.453)
REGULATION -0.291∗∗ -0.373∗ -0.0889 -0.639∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.052) (0.578) (0.005)
CSRPERF -0.0462 0.131 -0.0229 0.122 -0.0367 0.0684
(0.355) (0.270) (0.687) (0.302) (0.525) (0.572)
R&D 0.939∗∗∗ 0.479 0.927∗∗∗ 1.351 0.924∗∗∗ 1.358
(0.001) (0.777) (0.001) (0.400) (0.001) (0.371)
SIZE 0.864∗∗∗ 1.028∗∗∗ 0.857∗∗∗ 1.024∗∗∗ 0.851∗∗∗ 1.026∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP 0.0102 -0.130∗∗ -0.0346 -0.0977 -0.0352 -0.116∗
(0.688) (0.046) (0.219) (0.141) (0.206) (0.091)
ROA 0.171 3.053∗∗∗ 0.163 3.291∗∗∗ 0.163 3.427∗∗∗
(0.336) (0.002) (0.363) (0.001) (0.365) (0.000)
LEVERAGE -1.810∗∗∗ -0.905∗∗ -1.806∗∗∗ -1.153∗∗∗ -1.795∗∗∗ -1.079∗∗
(0.000) (0.033) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.014)
R&DDUMMY -0.170∗∗∗ 0.238∗ -0.183∗∗∗ 0.163 -0.188∗∗∗ 0.179
(0.003) (0.061) (0.001) (0.193) (0.001) (0.153)
CAPEX 0.768 -1.524 0.743 -1.575 0.721 -1.431
(0.257) (0.312) (0.267) (0.280) (0.274) (0.307)
SIN 1.181∗∗∗ 0.668 1.218∗∗∗ 0.519 1.242∗∗∗ 0.538
(0.000) (0.108) (0.000) (0.240) (0.000) (0.205)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of countries 28 18 28 18 28 18
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions of firm value as measured by market value (MKVAL) on independent variables.
CSRSxREGULATION is the interaction term for CSRS and REGULATION. R&DDUMMY is equal to 1 if a firm does not
report an R&D expense and is 0 otherwise. Other variables are defined in Table 12. p-values are in parentheses. * , **, and
*** denote p<0.1, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively.
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Table 15: Firm Value Regressions - Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) Estimation
Legal System (LS) Strength in Home Country
Strong LS Weak LS Strong LS Weak LS Strong LS Weak LS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm-Value Model
CSRSxREGULATION -0.781∗∗∗ 1.368∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
CSRS 0.317 1.241∗∗∗ 0.375∗ 1.379∗∗∗ 0.669∗∗∗ 0.598
(0.140) (0.007) (0.079) (0.003) (0.004) (0.250)
REGULATION 0.0185 0.0943 0.223∗∗ -0.167
(0.828) (0.600) (0.039) (0.382)
CSRPERF 0.280∗∗∗ 0.234∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.234∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.184
(0.000) (0.077) (0.000) (0.076) (0.000) (0.168)
R&D 1.008∗∗∗ 0.739 1.009∗∗∗ 0.493 1.008∗∗∗ 0.459
(0.000) (0.754) (0.000) (0.837) (0.000) (0.849)
SIZE 0.945∗∗∗ 1.085∗∗∗ 0.947∗∗∗ 1.085∗∗∗ 0.942∗∗∗ 1.090∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP -0.00811 -0.0882 -0.00482 -0.0986 -0.00477 -0.118∗
(0.709) (0.146) (0.855) (0.109) (0.857) (0.059)
ROA 0.154∗∗ 2.905∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗ 2.838∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗ 2.959∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000)
LEVERAGE -1.945∗∗∗ -0.353 -1.947∗∗∗ -0.302 -1.938∗∗∗ -0.183
(0.000) (0.444) (0.000) (0.534) (0.000) (0.701)
R&DDUMMY -0.185∗∗∗ -0.0346 -0.185∗∗∗ 0.000438 -0.190∗∗∗ 0.0115
(0.001) (0.828) (0.001) (0.998) (0.001) (0.941)
CAPEX 0.870∗∗∗ -2.236∗∗ 0.872∗∗∗ -2.182∗∗ 0.851∗∗∗ -2.053∗
(0.001) (0.044) (0.001) (0.049) (0.001) (0.065)
SIN 1.315∗∗∗ 0.882∗∗ 1.314∗∗∗ 0.907∗∗ 1.338∗∗∗ 0.944∗∗
(0.000) (0.040) (0.000) (0.038) (0.000) (0.031)
CSR_DUMMY -1.152∗∗∗ -1.463∗∗∗ -1.193∗∗∗ -1.522∗∗∗ -1.257∗∗∗ -1.536∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Issue-Choice Model
National CSR Index 0.138∗∗∗ 0.0640∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.0340∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.0321∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.017)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of countries 24 18 24 18 24 18
ρ 0.674 0.778 0.701 0.797 0.708 0.830
Likelihood Ratio χ2 (Ho: ρ=0) 7547.0∗∗∗ 1912.6∗∗∗ 7513.8∗∗∗ 1917.7∗∗∗ 7506.2∗∗∗ 1911.2∗∗∗
The firm-value model is jointly estimated with the CSR report issue-choice model using the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML)
method. Firm value is measured by market value (MKVAL). CSRSxREGULATION is the interaction term for CSRS and REGULATION.
CSR_DUMMY is the CSR disclosure choice prediction from the issue-choice model. R&DDUMMY=1 if a firm does not report an R&D
expense and is 0 otherwise. Other variables are defined in Table 12. The CSR report issue-choice model uses National CSR Index
(AccountAbility, 2005) as the exclusion restriction and controls for year and industry fixed effects. ρ is the correlation between the error
terms in the firm-value and the issue-choice models. The likelihood ratio chi-square statistic is a test of the null hypothesis that there is no
self-selection in CSR report issue choice. p-values are in parentheses. * , **, and *** denote p<0.1, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively.
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Table 16: Two Stage Least Squares Regressions
Legal System (LS) Strength in Home Country
Strong LS Strong LS Weak LS Weak LS
Second stage
CSRSxREGULATION -1.877∗∗ 3.521∗∗
(0.040) (0.046)
CSRS -0.929 -0.712 3.973∗∗∗ 3.126∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.221) (0.001) (0.009)
REGULATION -0.595∗∗∗ 0.171 0.258 -1.263
(0.000) (0.660) (0.223) (0.110)
CSRPERF 0.333∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.0104 -0.0387
(0.001) (0.001) (0.947) (0.830)
R&D 6.340∗∗∗ 6.516∗∗∗ -3.823∗ -5.881∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.064) (0.046)
SIZE 0.866∗∗∗ 0.871∗∗∗ 0.995∗∗∗ 1.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP -0.103∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗ -0.127 -0.121
(0.001) (0.001) (0.175) (0.243)
ROA 0.385 0.366 5.580∗∗∗ 6.515∗∗∗
(0.521) (0.543) (0.002) (0.001)
LEVERAGE -1.097∗∗∗ -1.065∗∗∗ -1.002 -0.940
(0.000) (0.000) (0.119) (0.222)
R&DDUMMY 0.0336 0.0321 0.648∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗
(0.620) (0.650) (0.001) (0.004)
CAPEX -0.211 -0.197 1.831 2.245
(0.836) (0.847) (0.172) (0.136)
SIN 1.563∗∗∗ 1.621∗∗∗ 0.747∗ 0.801
(0.000) (0.000) (0.097) (0.166)
First stage
Ind.-Median CSRSxREGULATION 0.775∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Ind.-Median CSRS 0.641∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗ 0.884∗∗∗ -0.173
(0.000) (0.030) (0.000) (0.224)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Underidentification test (p-value) 0.0089 0.0024 0.0111 0.0190
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.0474 0.0234 0.0207 0.0232
Two-stage least squares regressions with market value as the dependent variable for firms domiciled in
countries with strong/weak legal systems. The model is estimated using the 1,152 firm-year observations
for which CSRS reporting quality scores are available. The first stage regressions use industry-median
CSRS scores to instrument CSRS quality scores as the exclusion restriction and relevance criteria hold for
the proposed instrumental variable. R&DDUMMY=1 if a firm does not report an R&D expense and is 0
otherwise. Other variable definitions are provided in Table 12. p-values are in parentheses. * , **, and ***
denote p<0.1, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively.
CSR DISCLOSURE REGULATIONS AND LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 62
Table 17: Firm Value Regressions for ADR and Non-ADR Firms
Legal System (LS) Strength in Home Country - ADR Status
Strong LS &
ADR
Strong LS &
Non-ADR
Weak LS &
ADR
Weak LS &
Non-ADR
CSRSxREGULATION 0.524 -1.113∗∗ 0.974 1.677∗∗
(0.152) (0.028) (0.166) (0.017)
CSRS -0.928∗∗ 0.266 -0.594 0.165
(0.013) (0.478) (0.452) (0.845)
REGULATION -0.667∗∗∗ 0.106 -0.421∗ -0.510∗∗
(0.001) (0.510) (0.072) (0.034)
CSRPERF 0.108 0.183∗∗ 0.439∗∗ -0.0963
(0.421) (0.042) (0.024) (0.482)
R&D 0.621 4.810∗∗ 10.71∗∗∗ -3.919∗∗
(0.623) (0.030) (0.003) (0.036)
SIZE 0.882∗∗∗ 0.958∗∗∗ 1.107∗∗∗ 1.034∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP 0.0690 -0.182∗∗∗ -0.152∗ -0.235∗∗
(0.155) (0.000) (0.088) (0.017)
ROA 5.667∗∗∗ 0.0483 0.897 3.324∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.178) (0.299) (0.001)
LEVERAGE -1.360∗∗∗ -2.561∗∗∗ 0.720 -0.906
(0.000) (0.000) (0.365) (0.149)
R&DDUMMY -0.304∗∗∗ 0.186∗ 0.244 0.249∗
(0.003) (0.066) (0.110) (0.094)
CAPEX -2.636 0.432 2.889 -3.161∗∗
(0.235) (0.254) (0.146) (0.046)
SIN 0.902∗∗∗ 1.368∗∗∗ 2.326∗∗∗ -0.367
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.325)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of countries 17 27 11 17
Firm value OLS regressions with market value as the dependent variable for subsamples of firms domiciled
in countries with strong/weak legal systems and with/without US ADRs. R&DDUMMY=1 if a firm does not
report an R&D expense and is 0 otherwise. Other variable definitions are provided in Table 12. p-values are
in parentheses. * , **, and *** denote p<0.1, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively.
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Table 18: Firm Value Regressions Using CSRS Adjusted for Integrity Assurance
Legal System (LS) Strength in Home Country
Strong LS Weak LS Strong LS Weak LS Strong LS Weak LS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
adjCSRSxREGULATION -0.872∗∗∗ 1.456∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.008)
adjCSRS 0.417∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗ 0.199
(0.002) (0.010) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.611)
REGULATION -0.288∗∗∗ -0.362∗∗ -0.0882 -0.628∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.016) (0.414) (0.001)
CSRPERF -0.0472 0.132 -0.0234 0.125 -0.0366 0.0751
(0.321) (0.230) (0.626) (0.259) (0.450) (0.508)
R&D 0.938∗∗∗ 0.509 0.927∗∗∗ 1.352 0.925∗∗∗ 1.345
(0.002) (0.820) (0.002) (0.549) (0.002) (0.560)
SIZE 0.864∗∗∗ 1.025∗∗∗ 0.857∗∗∗ 1.021∗∗∗ 0.851∗∗∗ 1.024∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP 0.00895 -0.130∗∗ -0.0358∗ -0.0987 -0.0373∗ -0.115∗
(0.621) (0.038) (0.090) (0.106) (0.077) (0.066)
ROA 0.171 3.086∗∗∗ 0.163 3.317∗∗∗ 0.163 3.442∗∗∗
(0.295) (0.000) (0.323) (0.000) (0.325) (0.000)
LEVERAGE -1.813∗∗∗ -0.923∗∗ -1.810∗∗∗ -1.161∗∗∗ -1.798∗∗∗ -1.098∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.030) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.009)
R&DDUMMY -0.170∗∗∗ 0.222 -0.183∗∗∗ 0.150 -0.187∗∗∗ 0.168
(0.003) (0.102) (0.001) (0.298) (0.001) (0.235)
CAPEX 0.771 -1.573 0.748 -1.627 0.730 -1.458
(0.239) (0.291) (0.248) (0.258) (0.252) (0.299)
SIN 1.184∗∗∗ 0.677∗ 1.222∗∗∗ 0.531 1.241∗∗∗ 0.547
(0.000) (0.057) (0.000) (0.145) (0.000) (0.121)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of countries 28 18 28 18 28 18
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions of firm value as measured by market value (MKVAL) on independent variables.
adjCSRS is CSR reporting quality minus score for the integrity assurance contextual element provided by the CSR-S Monitor
(Weissman Center for International Business, 2014). adjCSRSxREGULATION is the interaction term for adjCSRS and
REGULATION. R&DDUMMY is equal to 1 if a firm does not report an R&D expense and is 0 otherwise. Other variable
definitions are provided in Table 12. p-values are in parentheses. * , **, and *** denote p<0.1, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively.
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Does Corporate Responsibility Affect Firm Leverage? The Roles of Environmental Risk Management and Stakeholder
Relations on Capital Structure
Corporate responsibility (CR) has become an integral part of mainstream business activities, with more
than half of Fortune 500 firms now providing regular public statements exclusively discussing CR (Governance and
Accountability Institute, 2012). The increasing public awareness toward CR has come to affect a firm’s success or failure.
Especially, firms with inadequate CR activities expose themselves to significant risks emanating from their stakeholders
and the public at large. Such risks inevitably play a role in determining the fate of a firm’s implicit or explicit contracts
with stakeholders and shaping its capital structure. In particular, risk management through an effective CR policy can
increase a firm’s borrowing capacity by reducing default risk as well as fostering better relations with stakeholders such
as customers, employees, suppliers, and communities.26 There has been research examining the impact of individual,
isolated CR activities on financial leverage, with somewhat conflicting results, but there is lack of research examining
how a firm’s overall approach to CR jointly encompassing its social and environmental activities, which have different
characteristics, affects its financing decisions.27 28 The goal of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature.
It has long been recognized that risk of bankruptcy imposes costs on a firm’s nonfinancial stakeholders. Titman
(1984) shows that firms can implement the ex-ante value-maximizing liquidation policy to ensure that they bear the
liquidation costs imposed on their stakeholders, thereby achieving incentive alignment. Ensuing research documents that
firms putting more emphasis on employee well-being operate with lower debt ratios to mitigate the risk of bankruptcy,
because employees are the party that bears the highest indirect costs of bankruptcy (Berk et al., 2010). Firms aiming to
26For example, more environmentally conscious firms reduce potential risks associated with government sanctions over environmental compliance,
activist protests, and consumer boycotts. In fact, to the extent firms protect the environment, they can receive a more favorable regulatory treatment,
and attract environmentally conscious consumers and investors to grow their operations smoothly. A firm’s social CR activities entail many benefits of
their own as well. To the extent a firm invests in social CR, it can maintain better community, local government, employee, and consumer relations to
help it achieve better profit growth. As examples, a firm investing in a school project at the locality of its manufacturing facilities will likely receive a
more favorable treatment when it has to seek permits for its operations there, or a firm fostering employee and customer satisfaction will likely attract
more qualified employees and have a more loyal customer base. Social CR also helps control the risk that a firm may suffer damages from not having
good relations with stakeholders such as communities, employees, and customers.
27Prior studies, for example, investigate the role of a firm’s reputation for better employee treatment (Bae, Kang, & Wang, 2011; Berk, Stanton, &
Zechner, 2010; Verwijmeren & Derwall, 2010), relations with its customers-suppliers (Kale & Shahrur, 2007; Maksimovic & Titman, 1991; Titman,
1984; Titman & Wessels, 1988), labor union bargaining (Bronars & Deere, 1991), and environmental risk management (Sharfman & Fernando, 2008)
in leverage decisions.
28Firms typically pursue a multidimensional CR policy to address concerns of their stakeholders, which extend well beyond shareholders to
comprise employees, buyers, suppliers, NGOs, pension funds, environmentalists, and regulators (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 2010).
Therefore, management usually strives to balance various incentives between these stakeholders that can have different implications for the optimum
amount of leverage.
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maintain their reputation for high product quality should also limit their use of debt to show their commitment to their
implicit contracts with suppliers (Maksimovic & Titman, 1991). Similarly, firms operating in durable goods industry are
more likely to produce unique products and have higher incentives to maintain low leverage to induce their stakeholders
to undertake relation-specific investments (Banerjee, Dasgupta, & Kim, 2008).
Unlike for social relations, we know very little about the role environmental risk management plays in a
firm’s financing decisions. The extant research on environmental management mainly focuses on its risk and cost of
capital implications. For example, poor environmental risk management escalates the uncertainties inherent in a firm’s
future activities that could result from extreme environmental events (e.g., the Exxon Valdez oil spill) and increases the
volatility in future cash flows resulting from potential liabilities related to regulatory, compliance, and litigation risks
and cleanup costs (Gao & Connors, 2011; Sharfman & Fernando, 2008), which collectively leads to higher cost of
capital (R. Bauer & Hann, 2010; Chava, 2014; El Ghoul et al., 2011).29 In contrast, better risk management through
proactive environmental strategies leads to lower perceived risk (Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Bouslah, Kryzanowski, &
M’Zali, 2013; Feldman, Soyka, & Ameer, 1997), increases a firm’s optimal debt ratio (Leland, 1998), improves the
assessed quality of its debt, and leads to a strategic switch from equity to debt financing (Sharfman & Fernando, 2008).
As prior research focuses primarily on stakeholder relations (i.e., social perspective), it falls short of making
clear theoretical predictions as to how broader CR engagement impacts the leverage choice in firms. This lack of
evidence is particularly problematic given the potential for environmental risk management to moderate, if not entirely
avert, the relation between stakeholder engagement and leverage. In particular, if stakeholders, deciding on their
firm-specific investments, consider the financial distress associated with financial leverage as a negative proxy for a
firm’s commitment to honor its implicit contracts, then firms that pursue stakeholder-oriented policies should rely less
on debt financing to assure incentive alignment. There are potentially two arguments for how a firm’s environmental
management can moderate this relationship. First, a strong environmental commitment leads to lower perceived risk
of financial distress.30 Accordingly, if stakeholders evaluate environmentally sound firms as more likely to maintain
29Instrumental stakeholder theory (Donaldson & Preston, 1995) and good management theory (Waddock & Graves, 1997) argue that better CR
performance will result in lower financial risk. Firms that respond to claims from stakeholders face lower probability of legal proceedings and
regulatory intervention by governments (Orlitzky & Benjamin, 2001). In line with these theories, Orlitzky and Benjamin (2001) in their meta-analytic
review of the literature document a negative relationship between a firm’s commitment to CR and its financial risk.
30Good environmental management mitigates perceived riskiness through less volatile future cash flows, reduced costs of litigation, legal and
regulatory compliance, lower information asymmetry and better risk assessment by stakeholders through disclosure, and higher reputation and
enhanced loyalty of stakeholders such as employees, customers, and suppliers (Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Bouslah et al., 2013; Feldman et al., 1997).
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the terms of trade and honor their implicit contracts with them, then bankruptcy risk becomes less of a concern for
stakeholders to make relation-specific investments. As risk management thus substitutes leverage adjustments to address
stakeholder concerns about bankruptcy risk, there will be less of an incentive for a firm to resort to debt reduction to
ease stakeholder concerns.
Second, proactive environmental stance can also serve as a signal of a firm’s reputation and attractiveness as a
responsible employer (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Greening & Turban, 2000; Turban & Greening, 1997). Hence, firms
with an active environmental program become more attractive to prospective employees than their nonactive counterparts
(T. N. Bauer & Aiman-Smith, 1996), allowing them to hire and retain highly talented employees. According to social
identity theory, a firm’s actions on environmental and social issues influence an individual’s self-image as to what it
would be like to be associated with that organization (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994).
Hence, stakeholders’ identification with a positive environmental profile can lead to a higher organizational commitment
(Dutton et al., 1994), job satisfaction (Wheeler, Richey, Tokkman, & Sablynski, 2006), higher reputation, and enhanced
loyalty (Berman et al., 1999). This establishes a bonding mechanism with the organization that can then positively
influence the stakeholder’s perception of the firm’s commitment to its implicit contracts even when the firm holds high
leverage.
Better risk management through proactive environmental management also results in a lower cost of debt and
higher credit ratings (R. Bauer & Hann, 2010; Chava, 2014; Goss & Roberts, 2011), broader investor base (Bansal,
2005; Heinkel et al., 2001), and better access to finance, as these firms will attract more investors (Cheng et al., 2014).
These potential benefits could further incentivize firms to increase leverage without necessarily stirring stakeholder
concerns.31 The opposite could also be true: firms with inadequate environmental CR activities could move away from
debt financing due to several negative externalities associated with poor risk management, such as higher perceived
riskiness and negative environmental screens by norm-constrained investors (Heinkel et al., 2001; Hong & Kacperczyk,
2009). This points to another potential source of variation in firm leverage, especially within firms that, for example,
Consequently, a better environmental profile can positively influence the attitudes of stakeholders toward the firm regarding its ability to fulfill its
implicit contracts with stakeholders. This suggests that a firm can utilize environmental risk management as a substitute to its leverage policy to
address stakeholder concerns about the firm’s potential liquidation risk.
31I follow Sharfman and Fernando (2008) and use environmental and social performance scores as proxies for environmental risk management and
stakeholder relations, respectively, where higher scores indicate better risk management and higher stakeholder well-being, respectively.
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have better reputation for treating employees fairly or produce unique products. Overall, better environmental risk
management not only lowers the perceived risk of financial distress and increases debt capacity, but also provides a
strong signal to stakeholders about a firm’s organizational norms, values, and reputation for maintaining the terms of
trade with its stakeholders.
I examine the impact of a firm’s commitment to environmental and social actions on its capital structure using
a sample of 4,741 firm-year observations for US firms for which CR scores are available for the period 2002-2012.
I find that firms with a higher score on environmental CR maintain higher leverage, while those with higher scores
on social CR activities tend to use lower debt. However, overall CR score has no statistically significant impact on
leverage, masking the significance of its environmental and social components. I also find that the variation in leverage
is driven mostly by the across-industry differences in the environmental and social indices. Taken together, these
results have two important implications. First, they provide supporting evidence that both environmental management
and social engagement influence leverage decisions, though the extent of these relations is subject to change with
both within-industry and across-industry variations in incentives to pursue a particular policy, e.g., a more active
environmental risk management policy in oil and gas industry or an employee well-being policy in knowledge-intensive
industries such as high-technology, financial services, the legal and healthcare professions, and business management.
Second, by examining CR on a disaggregated level, I can also assess how these variations in incentives may serve as
mitigating factors in the link between a firm’s treatment of its nonfinancial stakeholders and leverage by decreasing the
probability of financial distress, in particular through environmental risk management.
I first examine my dual model by dividing the sample into two components: firms with above-overall-median
and below-overall-median CR performance. The leverage choice of superior CR performers will reflect the influence
of both environmental and social attributes and this sample will help examine how firms determine capital structure
when confronted by potentially conflicting incentives for financing entailed by these two groups of activities. I also
report for each subsample the number of firms with above category-median scores to ensure I have a balanced sample of
firms with high environmental and social CR performances in each group. The results support my main predictions. In
particular, among the superior CR performers, capital structure is solely determined by environmental risk management,
while social relations determine leverage decisions only for below-median performers. In addition, both subsamples
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are balanced in the number of above-median performers in each category. These results attest to the dominant role of
environmental risk management in leverage decisions even when incentives associated with environmental and social
attributes coexist. They also provide counter-evidence on the proposed interaction between a firm’s social engagement
and corporate financing decisions by underscoring the moderating role of environmental risk management on the
proposed link.
Second, I examine whether the implications of a firm’s environmental risk management for the stability in cash
flows induce a difference in the firm’s financing policy. According to the trade-off theory, uncertainty in a firm’s future
cash flows and the associated default risk disfavor debt financing in order to safeguard the firm from bankruptcy. To
avoid bankruptcy, these firms will be less likely to use debt, suggesting a negative relation between cash flow volatility
and leverage. A proactive environmental program reduces the risk of potential liabilities resulting from regulatory issues,
noncompliance, and potential litigation costs (Barth & McNichols, 1994). A firm’s commitment to its environment thus
mitigates unsystematic risk driven by negative environmental events, avoids lumpy cash payments and ensures stable
cash flows, the lack of which compromises the firm’s ability to pay off its debt and eventually leads to default (Lubatkin
& Chatterjee, 1994). Accordingly, I expect firms with strong environmental commitment to use more debt and this
positive relation to be more pronounced for firms with higher cash flow volatility, even after controlling for social CR
performance. Strikingly, environmental management alone determines leverage decisions, while social relations has
no material influence on debt ratio for this particular sample of firms associated with highly volatile cash flows. The
observed balance in the number of superior environmental and social performers in the sample further confirms the lack
of a potential one-sided influence of a particular dimension of CR.
Third, I test another prediction of the trade-off theory, which emphasizes the balance between tax benefits and
distress costs of debt. In particular, higher taxable income incentivizes firms to increase debt to take full advantage of
tax benefits. To the extent that discretionary investments, particularly environmental activities, reduce firm risk and
increase optimal leverage, firms that credibly commit themselves to sound environmental management practices can
maintain higher leverage, which, in turn, maximizes tax-saving benefits, given their commitment to social engagement.
This also suggests a stronger positive relation between environmental management and leverage for firms with higher
taxable income than their less profitable counterparts. I find results supporting this argument.
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In the last set of analyses, following Bae et al. (2011), I investigate the empirical validity of the arguments
provided by Maksimovic and Titman (1991) as to whether the impact of stakeholder concerns on leverage differs with
different firm characteristics. Specifically, I control for environmental commitment and, first, test whether the predicted
negative relation between the extent of a firm’s commitment to its stakeholders and its leverage is stronger for firms
in financial distress than for their financially sound counterparts. The results only partially support their predictions.
Socially active firms tend to maintain lower leverage, yet, contrary to the predictions, financially distressed firms do
not significantly overreact relative to nondistressed firms.32 More strikingly, financially distressed firms tend to use
more debt with better environmental risk management, consistent with the risk reduction benefits from environmental
commitment. One explanation supporting my risk management argument is that better environmental risk management
reduces the level of default risk that a firm presents to the debt markets (Sharfman & Fernando, 2008), the implications
on firm debt (e.g., enhanced quality of debt and optimal leverage) of which apply disproportionately to financially
distressed firms and thus bring two groups closer together in terms of the firm leverage impact of social relations.
Second, I test another prediction of Maksimovic and Titman (1991) that unique products and firm-specific
assets (proxied by R&D intensity) will provide higher incentives for firms to use less debt to maintain their reputation
for good stakeholder treatment. The results provide only limited support for their prediction. Firms with a reputation for
treating stakeholders fairly (higher social CR score) maintain lower leverage even after introducing environmental CR
performance to the model, but only for the high R&D group. Though this relation vanishes for the low R&D group,
the difference between the two groups is insignificant and thus does not reflect a connection with product specificity.
Conversely, better environmental performance is associated with higher leverage for the low R&D group. Overall,
these results provide evidence that a firm’s reputation for both sound environmental risk management and good social
relations together (but not singly) determine firm leverage, yet the extent of these relations varies considerably with
incentives entailed by different firm and industry characteristics.
This study overcomes some of the limitations of the previous research in making a contribution to the literature.
First, it extends the literature on the traditional determinants of capital structure by focusing on one of the emerging
32I use two different proxies for financial distress. The difference in coefficients on social attributes between two groups turns significant only when
I use firm size. I observe no significant difference between two groups when using the proportion of firms with negative earnings before interest and
taxes (EBIT) in the industry as my financial distress proxy.
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concepts in business. CR has gained significant momentum, especially in the last decade, with the increase in awareness
of ethical, social, and environmental matters. Over time, a growing number of firms have adopted sustainable practices
as part of their business models to address increasing concerns from various stakeholders over their environmental
and social impact (Jo & Harjoto, 2011). Despite the emergence of CR in the business world, little is known about
its implications on capital structure decisions. This paper sheds a light on the link between commitment to CR and
financing decisions for a sample of US firms.
Second, motivated by previous studies on CR performance (e.g., Goss & Roberts, 2011; Jiao, 2010), I treat CR
performance and its components as endogenous and apply the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation technique to
address potential endogeneity problems. Specifically, I use industry-median performance scores to instrument for the
main variables of interest in the regression models and estimate a system of equations to investigate their impact on
leverage. This helps isolate and accurately identify the influence of firms’ environmental and social policies and, thereby,
overcome an important limitation of previous research dealing either with an aggregate CR measure or a disaggregated
version of it.
Third, the current study differs from other studies in that I control for all main aspects of a firm’s overall CR
policy rather than focusing on a single, isolated aspect of it (e.g., a firm’s attitude toward its employees only). Such
an approach has its merits: stakeholders may find it difficult to process complex information disclosed by firms and
derive precise relations between CR performance and leverage (Berk et al., 2010). In this case, their second-best
alternative is publicly available CR rankings or ratings that are mostly in aggregate forms.33 Moreover, although the
effect on corporate decisions may vary across various aspects of CR, firm managers are responsible to a diverse group
of stakeholders, urging them to be more attentive to their varying interests and concerns on a wider array of activities
ranging from human rights, philanthropy, and community relations to bribery and corruption. Focusing too much on
these individual aspects may lead one to fail to see the big picture and how these individual components relate to each
other as well as to managerial decisions. Therefore, using an aggregate rather than an aspect-specific CR performance
measure provides a more complete picture of these competing factors and validates the explanatory power of the analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I review the methodology and the
33The most well-known examples for publicly available CR rankings/ratings are the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, the FTSE4Good Index, and
The 100 Best Corporate Citizens by CR Magazine.
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details of the model as well as the data used for the analysis. Section 3 presents the empirical results, followed by
robustness checks. Lastly, I provide a summary of the findings and conclude the paper.
Data and Summary Statistics
Regression Specification
I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to analyze the effect of CR performance on firm leverage. CR
performance, on the other hand, is subject to endogeneity issues, as a firm’s financial choices and CR activities could be
jointly determined (e.g., Jiao, 2010). Therefore, I also apply instrumental variables (IV) analysis to address potential
endogeneity of a firm’s commitment to CR, using industry-median CR/environmental/social performance variables
that do not affect leverage decisions directly (El Ghoul et al., 2011). I report the results of both OLS (in Table 21
using Equation 4 below) and IV (in Table 27 using Equation 4 and Equation 5 below) analyses separately. I control
for firm characteristics and industry effects in the regressions as well. Using industry-median CR performance as my
instrumental variable, I estimate the following system of equations using the IV model:
Dit =α1 + βCRPit + γ1Xit + δt + dj + 1it (4)
CRPit =α2 + θZit + γ2Xit + δt + dj + 2it (5)
In Equation 4, Dit is the leverage ratio of firm i in year t. α1 is a constant; CRPit is the overall CR performance
score combining firm i’s performance in environmental and social aspects of CR in year t. I use overall CR scores as
well as the scores on environmental and social pillars of CR separately in the analysis. Hence, CRPit is replaced by
Environmentit and Socialit when environmental and social activities are considered, respectively. Xit are firm-level
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control variables (detailed in Other variables section); δt are year dummies; dj are industry dummies based on three-digit
standard industry classification (SIC) codes; β and γ1 are the estimated coefficients for the second stage; j, industry; i,
firm; t, year.
In Equation 5, I treatCRPit as an endogenous variable and estimate it with α2, a constant; Xit , control variables;
δt , year dummies; dj , industry dummies; and Zit , an instrumental variable. Industry-median CR performance is used to
instrument firm CR performance (CRP) in the first stage and fitted values for the CR performance from the first-stage
regression are used in the second-stage regressions in Equation 4. θ and γ2 are the estimated coefficients of the first
stage.
Regression Variables
Measuring a firm’s CR performance. To measure the extent to which firms commit to CR, I use environ-
mental and social performance scores provided by Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG database (ASSET4 ESG) (Thomson
Reuters ASSET4 ESG, 2002-2012).3435 Using data collected only from publicly available resources (e.g., sustainability
reports, NGO websites, annual reports, etc.), the ASSET4 ESG database provides annual sustainability performance
information for 4,000+ companies worldwide. Its measure reflects CR performance of companies in the three broad
pillars of CR: environmental, social, and corporate governance. The ASSET4 ESG database collects information on CR
practices that spans 750+ ESG data points and 280+ key performance indicators (KPIs) that are then grouped into 18
categories of ESG engagement. These 18 categories of CR include information on a firm’s practices/policies related to,
for example, resource reduction, product innovation, emission reduction, employment quality, health and safety policies,
diversity, community relations, shareholder rights, board structure, and compensation policy. The scores on each of
these 18 categories range between 0 and 1, with high scores indicating stronger performance in a given category. The
scores on each subcategory are then added to create an equally weighted aggregate CR performance score ranging from
0 to 100 as well as scores on each individual pillar.36
The overall CR performance score used in this study (CRPit ) is the total of environmental and social index
34http://im.thomsonreuters.com/solutions/content/asset4-esg/
35ESG stands for environmental, social, and corporate governance.
36Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG database is used in other studies as well (e.g., Cheng et al., 2014; Eccles et al., 2014; Rees & Rodionova, 2015;
Stellner, Klein, & Zwergel, 2015).
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scores. To overcome potential misspecification problems from using aggregate measures of CR performance due
to variations in effects on managerial decisions across subcomponents of CR, which would largely be shadowed by
aggregation (Hillman & Keim, 2001; Verwijmeren & Derwall, 2010), I redo the analysis using disaggregate measures
of CR performance as well. Information on environmental factors includes, for example, energy use, water recycled,
waste recycled, CO2 emission levels, and energy efficiency policy; and on social factors includes employment policy,
total training expenditures, human rights policy, total injury rate, trade union representation, and total donations.37
This information is collected by 120+ analysts and then systematically converted into quantifiable measures to enable
detailed analysis of this qualitative data.
Other variables. Firm leverage is taken at the end of the fiscal year, whereas CR-related variables and the
control variables are taken at the beginning of the fiscal year. The control variables included in the analysis are drawn
from earlier studies on capital structure.38 I include the following variables in the analyses:
Regression Variables
• Firm leverage: The ratio of total short- and long-term debt to book value of total assets.
• CR performance score: The ASSET4 ESG database’s evaluation of a firm’s corporate responsibility performance.
The variable is formed by taking the average of the firm’s environmental and social scores out of a possible 100
points, a higher score indicating better corporate responsibility performance.
• Environmental performance score: The ASSET4 ESG’s assessment of a firm’s environmental performance on
dimensions, including energy use, water recycled, waste recycled, CO2 emission levels, and energy efficiency
policy.
• Social performance score: The ASSET4 ESG’s assessment of a firm’s social performance on dimensions,
37See the Appendix for more detailed descriptions of the environmental and social dimensions of CR.
38e.g., Bae et al. (2011); Jiao (2010); Lipson and Mortal (2009); Rajan and Zingales (1995); Verwijmeren and Derwall (2010).
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including employment policy, total training expenditures, human rights policy, total injury rate, trade union
representation, and total donations.
• Industry-median CR / Environmental / Social performance score (IV): Industry-median CR / Environmental /
Social performance score in a given year where industry is defined by three-digit SIC code.
• Corporate governance performance score: The ASSET4 ESG’s assessment of a firm’s corporate governance
performance on dimensions, including board structure/policy, compensation policy, board member diversity,
voting rights, and stock option programs. This variable is used as a control variable in the analyses.
• R&D expenses: Research and development (R&D) expenses scaled by sales.
• Selling expenses: Selling, general, and administrative expense scaled by sales.
• Tangible assets: Net property, plant, and equipment divided by book value of total assets.
• Firm size: The natural log of total assets (in USD billions). As a robustness check, natural log of the number of
employees and that of total sales are used to proxy size. Estimates using these alternative measures are consistent
with the main results.
• Market-to-book ratio: The market value of equity plus book value of debt, all divided by book value of total
assets. A dummy is created and set to 1 if firm market-to-book ratio is greater than median market-to-book ratio
of the entire sample, and 0 otherwise. Following earlier studies of capital structure, it is included to control for
growth opportunities and market mispricing. Firms with higher market-to-book ratios are also more likely to
invest in CR.
• Depreciation expense: Depreciation and amortization expenses scaled by book value of total assets at the
beginning of the fiscal year.
• Dividend dummy: A dummy variable that takes value 1 if a firm pays dividends in a given year, and 0 otherwise.
• Profitability: Operating income before depreciation divided by total book assets at the beginning of the fiscal year.
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• Financial slack: The total of cash and short-term investments divided by total assets.
• Asset growth: Total book assets scaled by lagged total book assets minus one.
• Earnings volatility: Standard deviation of a firm’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization
(EBITDA) scaled by year-beginning total assets over the past 5 years.
• Sin stocks: A dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is operating in one of the "sin industries” (Hong &Kacperczyk,
2009), and 0 otherwise. The most common type of social screening is avoiding alcohol, tobacco, or gambling
industries, which are defined as sin industries. Companies operating in these industries are considered sinful, as
the products/services they offer are against common societal norms. Extending Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), I
identify four groups of such companies as those (or their subsidiaries) operating in alcohol (SIC 2100-2199),
tobacco (SIC 2080-2085), gaming (NAICS 7132, 71312, 713210, 71329, 713290, 72112, and 721120), and
weaponry industries (SIC 3480-3489, 3760-3769, 3795).
• R&D dummy: A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if R&D expenses is missing for a firm, or 0 otherwise.
As firms are not required to report their R&D expenditures, when missing, R&D expenses is set to 0 and following
Himmelberg et al. (1999), R&D dummy is set to 1. This is to eliminate the possibility of any bias toward
technology-oriented firms and to avoid a significant reduction in sample size (Woidtke, 2002).
• Year dummies: Included to control for year-specific factors in the data.
• Industry dummies: Based on a company’s primary four-digit SIC code, unless stated otherwise. These dummies
account for differences in accounting practices, business structure, industry-specific performance, and regulations
across industries.
Firm and Industry Characteristics
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• Cash flow volatility: The standard deviation of the firm’s cash flows over the past 5 years, where free cash flow is
[operating income before depreciation - interest expense - (income taxes - increase in deferred tax and investment
tax credit) - dividends on preferred stocks - dividends on common stocks] scaled by total book assets. A dummy
is created and set to 1 if firm cash flow volatility exceeds annual industry median where industry is defined by
two-digit SIC code, and 0 otherwise.
• Taxable income: Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) scaled by total assets. A dummy for whether the firm
has higher-than-median taxable income of the entire sample in a given year is set to 1, and 0 otherwise.
• Total sales: Firm total sales in year t is used to proxy the likelihood of financial distress (Bae et al., 2011).
• EBIT: Earnings before interest and taxes. Following Bae et al. (2011), I use the proportion of firms with a negative
EBIT in a two-digit SIC industry in a given year to proxy financial distress. A dummy variable is created and set
to 1 if an industry has lower proportion of financially distressed firms than overall median, and 0 otherwise.
• R&D intensity dummy: Research and development expenditures (R&D) scaled by total assets. A dummy is set to
1 for above-industry-median R&D intensity, and 0 otherwise (i.e., high vs. low asset specificity). Used as a proxy
for alternative uses of assets.
The extent to which R&D expenditures present future investment opportunities or product uniqueness/reputation
will indicate its relation to leverage, as firms producing unique products or concerned about their product reputation
should have less debt (Titman, 1984). Selling expenses could also be considered a proxy for product uniqueness in that a
firm producing a unique product will spend more on its advertisement. Such firms are also highly likely to require more
specialized labor and unique suppliers and thus impose higher liquidation costs on these groups. Hence, I expect a firm
making large discretionary expenditures such as R&D and selling expenses to have lower leverage to align incentives
across its various internal and external stakeholders.
Tangible assets are easier to value than intangibles, thus lowering distress costs and limiting shareholders’
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY ON CAPITAL STRUCTURE 77
appropriation of assets and thus mitigating potential agency conflicts (Frank & Goyal, 2009). They could also be
pledged as collateral for debt financing. Accordingly, I expect a positive relation between the level of tangible assets and
firm leverage.
Firm size proxied by logarithm of total assets is expected to be positively associated with leverage, as these
assets could be used as collateral for debt financing. To the extent that more assets represent the diversity of a firm’s
operations, firm asset size will also be associated with higher debt ratios. Larger firms also are less volatile and incur
lower risk of bankruptcy, and thus are expected to hold higher debt (Frank & Goyal, 2009).
I expect a negative relation between growth opportunities proxied by market-to-book ratio and leverage ratio.
There are a number of reasons to expect such relationship. First, the risk (and costs) of financial distress will be more
severe for firms with higher growth prospects. Second, agency problems could also be more severe for firms with
higher growth opportunities, in that riskier undertakings by managers of such firms could easily elevate conflicts in the
alignment of incentives between lenders and shareholders (Myers, 1977). From the lenders’ perspective, they would be
less willing to invest in such firms pursuing risky investment projects due to difficulties in fully mitigating agency-related
risks (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). All these would lead to lower use of debt (Jensen, 1986), which results in a negative
association between leverage and growth opportunities. Higher leverage will also limit managerial flexibility when
operating in high-growth business environments where flexibility and managerial discretion could be vital for survival
and success.
Profitability should be evaluated with caution, as different theories of capital structure have conflicting
predictions on its relation with leverage. Either-directional inferences between debt ratio and profitability could be
based on several grounds. First, tax benefits of debt financing would be realized the most for firms with higher profits,
implying a positive relation between leverage and profitability, as suggested by the standard trade-off theory. From the
agency theory perspective (Jensen, 1986), debt could be utilized by principals as a tool to mitigate potential agency
problems resulting from suboptimal, opportunistic managerial behavior driven by the availability of financial resources.
Profitability, on the other hand, could also limit the use of external financing including debt, as proposed by the pecking
order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984). This implies lower leverage for more profitable firms. Empirical support for
this hypothesized negative relation between leverage ratio and profitability is provided by Fama and French (2002).
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Considering the variety of opinions, such relation is more of an empirical question, and I do not have any priors on the
direction of the relationship.
I expect firms that pay dividends to hold lower debt, as these firms are usually less financially constrained. In
a similar vein, I expect firms with higher financial slack resources to be less constrained and thus rely less on debt,
according to the predictions of the pecking order theory. Hence, a negative relation between the level of slack resources
and leverage ratio is expected. Whereas the traditional trade-off theory predicts lower leverage for growing firms as
growth elevates financial distress costs along with agency problems between shareholders and debt holders, the pecking
order theory suggests more use of debt for such firms to finance investments. In line with the latter, I expect firms with
higher asset growth rates to have higher debt ratio. Non-debt tax shields including depreciation expense mitigate the
interest tax benefits of debt, and thus should lead to lower leverage. Volatility in earnings poses financial risks to firms
and reduces potential tax benefits from debt; hence, it should lead to lower leverage as well. In contrast, according
to pecking order theory, earnings volatility could also exacerbate adverse selection problems that would lead to a
preference for debt over equity, given the need to access capital markets for external financing. As a result of negative
social screening, firms operating in socially controversial industries (sin stocks) such as alcohol, tobacco, and gambling
maintain lower leverage (Hong & Kacperczyk, 2009). I expect sin industry firms in the sample to exhibit similar capital
structure as well, and predict a negative association between sin industry membership and leverage.
Summary Statistics
Table 19 provides the summary statistics for firm leverage, CR performance variables, and other firm
characteristics for the sample firms. The sample comprises all firms covered by the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG
database over the years 2002-2012, conditional upon availability of financial and accounting data. I obtain annual
firm-level financial and accounting data from the Compustat North America database (Standard & Poor’s/Compustat,
2002-2013). I match the data on environmental and social performance with that on various firm characteristics collected
from Compustat. I truncate outliers for all control variables at the top and bottom 1 percentiles to eliminate the potential
influence of extreme observations, though the results do not change qualitatively when I include these observations.
Financial firms (two-digit SIC codes 60-69) are excluded due to their fundamentally different business models and
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capital structures. These preliminary screenings left us with a final sample of 4,741 firm-year observations.
[Table 19 about here.]
Panel A of Table 19 shows leverage statistics. Debt (both short- and long-term scaled by total assets) accounts
for around one fifth to one quarter of total assets for the sample of firms. The average and median levels of book leverage
for these firms are 23.6% and 21.8%, respectively, indicating considerable use of debt. Panel B shows the summary
statistics for aggregate and disaggregate CR performance scores. CR performance score has a mean and median of
46.439 and 38.835, respectively. Among the CR pillars, environment has the lowest mean and median scores (44.646
and 32.100, respectively), followed by social (48.231 and 44.250, respectively). Social performance also has lower
standard deviation (28.850), indicating more uniform commitment across firms to this attribute. Environment, which is
arguably the more popular of the two components, exhibits higher variation, due potentially to considerable variation
across industries in its sub-features (e.g., carbon emissions, waste reduction, water management, etc.).
Panel C presents summary statistics for control variables. The sample of firms’ average profitability, market-
to-book ratio, size, R&D expenditures, and tangible assets are 17.5%, 1.762, 15.997, 4.6%, and 27.2%, respectively.
Finally, these firms hold, on average, 14.7% financial slack resources, spend around 23.9% of sales revenue for selling
expenses, experience around 4.2% volatility in earnings, and have relatively good corporate governance (a median of
78.290/100).
In Table 20, I divide the sample into three components, designated as firm-year observations where overall CR
score is in the top 30%, mid 40%, or bottom 30% of the three-digit SIC industry median CR performance in a given
year. I then compare the firm characteristics of the bottom and top CR performance groups. Columns (1)-(2), (3)-(4),
and (5)-(6) report the number of observations and means of the firm characteristics in cases where CR is in the bottom,
mid, and top tertile of the industry medians, respectively. The last two columns, (7) and (8), present the coefficients and
t-statistics for the difference in firm characteristics between firms with bottom and top CR performances in the sample;
i.e., the difference between columns (2) and (6). These statistics show that firms with top CR performance have slightly
lower leverage than those with bottom CR performance. The average firm leverage for top and bottom CR firms are
23.4% and 24.7%, respectively, resulting in a weakly significant average leverage difference of 1.3% (at the 10% level)
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between these two groups of firms. These numbers provide no evidence of a meaningful negative relation between the
extent of a firm’s CR engagement and its leverage ratio.
[Table 20 about here.]
The R&D spendings of superior CR firms are on par with those of their underperforming counterparts. I also
do not observe any material difference in the level of tangible asset and profitability between the two groups of firms.
The top performers, on the other hand, incur significantly lower selling expenses (a statistically significant difference of
3.4% at the 1% level). High performers are also, on average, larger than poor performers. The average difference in total
assets between the two groups of firms is $29,234 million and is highly statistically significant (at the 1% level). Low
performers tend to have better growth prospects (proxied by market-to-book ratio) than top performers. The difference
in the market-to-book ratios of the two groups is 27.4% and is significant at the 1% level. Similarly, firms with higher
CR performance show lower asset growth than their low-performing counterparts. Whereas the former experience, on
average, 8.7% annual growth in assets, the latter show a remarkable 13.9%, indicating a 5.2% difference between the
two groups of firms. Top performers also incur lower depreciation expenses (4.3% of book assets, on average) than low
scorers (4.9%, on average).
I observe significant difference in the dividend-paying behavior of firms between the two groups. In particular,
top scorers are more likely to pay dividends than their low-performing counterparts. I also find that low performers hold
significantly higher financial slack resources than high performers and do not seem to use them for CR investments. The
average level of cash and short-term investments for firms with low and high overall CR performance is 16.1% and
13.5% of total assets, respectively. The difference of around 2.6% is statistically significant at the 1% level. Firms in the
top 30% of the CR scale exhibit lower earnings volatility than the bottom 30% group. The difference is 2.2% and is
statistically significant to distinguish between the two groups. Regarding their membership in socially controversial
industries, I do not observe a major difference between high and low performers.
These statistics highlight significant variations in firm characteristics with the extent of firms’ commitment
to CR attributes and call for further analysis of the relation between CR attributes and capital structure decisions. Of
particular interest, I observe no meaningful difference in leverage between high and low performers. Top-scoring firms
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commonly exhibit strong commitment to both environmental and social reputation, which grants them a higher ranking
than their more selective counterparts. Hence, I can interpret these preliminary results in favor of the moderating role of
a firm’s reputation as an environmentally conscious firm on the proposed negative link between its stakeholder relations
and leverage choice.
Results
Leverage and CR Performance
In this section, I employ the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression method to test how a firm’s commitment
to environmental and social responsibility affects its leverage. I use leverage ratio, defined as short- and long-term debt
divided by total book assets, as the main proxy for firm leverage. To explain leverage, I use environmental and social
performance scores, a set of firm leverage determinants, and year and industry fixed effects. I report p-values based on
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.39
[Table 21 about here.]
Table 21 presents estimates of the OLS regressions that explain the observed firm leverage. Model (1) shows
the results for the baseline regression model that includes all of the firm characteristics, excluding those related to
CR performance. The results suggest that larger firms and firms with higher tangible assets are likely to hold higher
debt. I obtain significant and positive coefficients on the market-to-book ratio and depreciation expenses, indicating
that firms with high growth opportunities and higher depreciation expenses tend to use more debt. On the other hand,
dividend-paying firms have lower leverage, in line with my expectation that such firms are less financially constrained
and, thus, rely less on debt financing. Similarly, firms that are profitable and carry more financial slack resources also
are less leveraged in that they are less dependent on external financing, as suggested by the pecking order theory. Firms
with higher earnings volatility are also associated with lower leverage, due, potentially, to lower tax benefits from debt
for such firms. Better corporate governance is also associated with lower use of debt. Lastly, in line with Hong and
39Petersen (2009) suggests that clustering standard errors on multiple dimensions provides less biased estimates of confidence intervals. Therefore,
in unreported results, I estimate the regressions using standard errors clustered by (1) firm, (2) both firm and year, and (3) both industry and year. The
results remain unchanged.
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Kacperczyk (2009), firms operating in socially controversial industries are associated with higher leverage, as indicated
by the positive coefficient (coefficient significant at the 1% level) on the sin industry indicator variable. I do not evidence
any significant association between leverage and R&D, selling expenses, and asset growth.40
Model (2) integrates into the baseline model the aggregate CR performance variable and examines the extent
to which a firm’s commitment to environmental and social stewardship relates to its leverage. I observe the relation
between CR performance and leverage to be negative yet statistically insignificant. One explanation is that for firms that
utilize multidimensional CR strategies, features of CR that lead to lower leverage could be moderated by those that
incentivize the use of debt, resulting in an overall insignificant influence on firm leverage. Consequently, I analyze the
two main aspects of CR activities, environmental and social responsibility, in detail in Model (3). Regarding the control
variables in Model (2), I mostly observe a similar picture to that in Model (1). Larger firms, sin industry firms, and
those with higher levels of tangible assets and better growth opportunities are more leveraged, while dividend-paying
firms, profitable firms, and those with high slack resources and volatile earnings are associated with lower leverage.
In Model (3), I substitute overall CR performance score with its two main components, environmental and
social performance scores. These findings underscore the significant impact of both features of CR on leverage. In
particular, firms that score high on environment are associated with higher leverage (coefficient significant at the 5%
level), ceteris paribus, consistent with Sharfman and Fernando (2008), who document a shift from equity to debt
financing induced by better environmental risk management practices. In contrast, I find that firms with better social
performance maintain significantly lower leverage (coefficient significant at the 1% level), again consistent with some
other studies in the literature on the leverage impact of a firm’s commitment to achieve or maintain its social identity. The
coefficients on these two subcomponents of CR together explain the weak negative coefficient on the CR performance
score in Model (2). Other parameter estimates in Model (3) are also comparable to those in Models (1) and (2). Firms
with more tangible assets and that are larger hold higher debt. Market-to-book ratio and sin industry membership
also relate positively to debt ratio. The relation between leverage and profitability, act of paying dividends, level of
40My finding of an insignificant R&D effect on leverage is contrary to Titman and Wessels (1988), who suggest that features such as growth
opportunities and product uniqueness could be captured by this particular variable. They note that R&D expenses (and selling expenses as well) proxy
for growth prospects and product reputation in the absence of market-to-book ratio. Accordingly, I redo the analysis by leaving out the market-to-book
ratio in the regressions in Models (1)-(3), where the effects of these factors on leverage are insignificant. In unreported results, I fail to find supporting
evidence for their argument.
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financial slack, and earnings volatility are all highly significant and negative. I observe an insignificantly negative
relation between a firm’s debt ratio and R&D and selling expenses, and again an insignificantly positive relation between
leverage and asset growth.
In Models (4)-(5), I perform industry fixed-effect regressions to account for potential across-industry variations
that could influence the relation between CR performance and leverage. The intuition is that some particular industry
firms, for example energy companies, could spend more to manage their impact on the environment than their
counterparts in other industries, or technology companies could be more socially oriented than non-technology firms.
The across-industry variation in firms’ CR practices will have implications for their capital structure decisions through
various channels, as outlined in other studies; e.g., environmental risk management (Sharfman & Fernando, 2008),
reputation (Titman & Wessels, 1988), employee relations (Verwijmeren & Derwall, 2010), and union policies (Matsa,
2010; Perotti & Spier, 1993). In Models (4) and (5), I use industry-indicator variables, defined based on the first
three digits of a firm’s SIC code (not reported). Hence, the coefficients on the CR-related variables will capture the
within-industry variations in the relation between each of these variables and leverage.
Model (4) shows the results for the analysis of the extent to which within-industry variation in overall CR
performance explains the variation in leverage ratio. These results present a similar picture as in Model (2) for almost
all of the control variables except for depreciation expense, dividend dummy, asset growth, and corporate governance.
Specifically, the coefficient on the depreciation expense turns slightly negative, while that on dividend dummy turns
insignificantly positive. The inclusion of CR performance in Model (4) improves the significance of asset growth
(the coefficient becomes significant at the 1% level), the explanation to which resides in the pecking order theory that
suggests the use of debt to finance growth in investments. Yet I continue to find an insignificantly negative coefficient on
the CR variable. Overall, these results once again indicate no major leverage impact of within-industry variation in the
overall CR engagement of firms.
Again, I further investigate the findings in Model (4) by disaggregating the CR performance variable into
its subcomponents, environmental and social. The results are presented in Model (5). This model presents whether
the previously documented relations in Model (3) between leverage and disaggregated measures of CR hold when I
use industry fixed-effect regressions. Consistent with the results in Model (3), environmental and social variables are
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both significant (at the 5% level), and are positive and negative, respectively. Compared with Model (3), the effect of
environmental performance on leverage is mostly preserved, while that of social performance is reduced almost by half,
bringing the combined effect of environmental and social variables down to almost zero.
Using a similar approach, in Models (6) and (7), I examine whether cross-industry variations in firms’
environmental and social profiles have any influence on leverage ratio. To capture the unique impact of different
industries, I first calculate industry averages of debt ratio, all CR-related variables, and the firm characteristics over the
entire sample period for all firms that belong to the same industry group, defined based on a firm’s three-digit SIC
code. Then, I perform cross-sectional regression analysis to estimate separately the impact of industry-average CR
performance and its subfeatures on leverage ratio, controlling for all standard firm-level characteristics from earlier
models. Surprisingly, in Model (6), I find a significantly negative (at the 5% level) relation between leverage and overall
CR performance. The effect of CR performance on leverage here is also more pronounced, as presented by a greater
coefficient. Similarly, environmental and social performance scores preserve their significantly positive and negative
relations with debt ratio, respectively, as shown in Model (7). These results indicate that cross-industry variations in CR
performance and its subcomponents contribute significantly to the variations in debt ratios across industries.
Collectively, these results explain how an aggregate CR performance variable blends the conflicting effects
of its components. More importantly, detailed analysis of these components provides us a clearer view of the unique
contributions of each of these features. The influences of environmental and social practices seem to be robust across
models and appear to be driving the overall CR profile of the company and its relation with leverage ratio. The results
also identify cross-industry variations as an important determinant of leverage ratio, which outweigh within-industry
variations in CR performance in affecting leverage ratios. Lastly, the gap between the effects of environmental and
social performance almost disappears when considering within-industry variation in leverage due to a weakening in the
effect of social performance.
Analysis of Alternative Mechanisms
In this subsection, I try to identify where and how changes in incentives for particular CR policies lead to
variations in firms’ leverage decisions. Companies usually exercise multiple CR-related practices simultaneously, and
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given their different effects on leverage, the overall impact is subject to major variations depending on the particular
motivation that drives firm behavior. This has implications for capital structure and calls for further examination of
whether the above findings are consistent across a variety of models, each of which represents a potential point of
divergence from the observed relations.
First, I examine the extent to which different features of CR performance impact a firm’s leverage when the
firm shows above-industry performance in all of these features of CR. I partition the sample into two components: firms
with above- and below-industry-median CR performance. The former includes the focus group of firms for which high
CR performance is likely a result of high performance in multiple aspects of CR engagement. Therefore, the coefficient
on the CR performance variable in these regressions will reflect the effect of the dominant feature of CR.
Table 22 reports the results of these regressions. In columns (1) and (2), I use individual CR component scores
as the key CR variables to estimate the effects of each component on leverage for above- and below-industry-median CR
performance groups, respectively. Column (1) shows that, for the former group of firms, environmental performance
dominates social performance with a highly significant (at the 1% level) and positive impact on leverage. Surprisingly, I
do not observe any meaningful association between leverage and social performance for the same group. In contrast, for
the below-industry-median group, I observe that the coefficient on the social variable turns negative and significant at
the 1% level, while that on the environment loses its significance and turns slightly negative. These findings are further
supported by the results in columns (3) and (4). In column (3), I substitute disaggregate measures with the composite
CR performance measure to test its relation with leverage. Consistent with the above results, I find that the coefficient
estimate on the aggregate CR variable for the high-performing group is positive, attesting to a positive overall impact
driven solely by the highly significant and positive impact of the environmental performance for this particular sample
of firms. Conversely, but as expected, the aggregate impact of CR score on leverage is negative and highly significant at
the 1% level for firms with below-industry-median CR performance. Furthermore, in each of these subsamples, I have
almost equal numbers of firms with superior environmental or social performances. This shows that, particularly for the
high-performing group, the observed leverage impact is not driven by a prioritization of commitments in these domains.
Overall, these results suggest that the impact on leverage of a firm’s reputation for good social relations is not a common
phenomenon, particularly for those that strive to build and maintain their reputation as good corporate citizens in the
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eyes of their multiple stakeholders.
[Table 22 about here.]
Second, the trade-off theory predicts a negative relation between cash flow volatility and use of debt in that
firms with volatile cash flows are more likely to experience problems in fulfilling their requirements from debt financing.
This uncertainty in future cash flows will also prevent firms from reaping the most tax benefits of debt financing. One
might reasonably expect that firms that attach a greater value to their reputation for good stakeholder relations will use
even less debt, with increasing uncertainty in cash flows, to credibly commit themselves to fulfill their obligations to
stakeholders. Good environmental risk management, on the other hand, could reduce the uncertainty in a firm’s future
cash flows through avoiding potential regulatory issues resulting from environmental liabilities (Barth & McNichols,
1994). This implies that firms that adopt better environmental risk management practices can use more debt financing
than firms with poor environmental performance. Moreover, this implied positive relation will be more pronounced
for firms with higher uncertainty inherent in their cash flows. I test these predictions by dividing the sample into two
groups, firms with higher and lower cash flow volatility, and estimating the regressions using each of these subsamples
separately. I estimate cash flow volatility as the standard deviation of the cash flows of a firm over the past 5 years. I
then assign all firms into two groups: those with above- or below-industry-median volatility in cash flows.
[Table 23 about here.]
Table 23 presents the results of the analysis. I find that the coefficient on the overall CR performance is
significantly positive (at the 1% level) for firms with high cash flow volatility, as shown in column (1). In contrast,
the relation between aggregate CR performance and leverage is negative yet insignificant for the sample of firms with
low cash flow volatility. The test of the difference in coefficients on CR performance variable between these two
subgroups is also significant (at the 5% level), supporting my prediction that the leverage impact of environmental risk
management practices dominates that of social performance in regard to the reduced uncertainty in a firm’s future
activities. I support this argument with the analysis of each subcomponent in columns (3) and (4). The significant and
positive relation between leverage ratio and CR performance in column (1) is driven by the highly significant (at the 1%
level) and positive impact of environmental performance, shown in column (3). Social performance, on the other hand,
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has no significant relation with leverage for the same group. In addition, the number of superior-environmental- or
superior-social-performing firms are mostly balanced in all of these samples. These results support my predictions
and suggest that risk reduction benefits of environmental risk management provide considerable incentives for firms
with greater uncertainty in their cash flows, resulting in environmental activities outweighing stakeholder concerns in
determining capital structure.
Finally, the trade-off theory of capital structure also emphasizes the balance between tax benefits and financial
distress costs of debt. Better environmental risk management improves perceived riskiness of the firm and, thereby,
allows for higher leverage. For a given level of risk, increased leverage, in turn, increases the amount of income that
could be shielded from taxation. This implies an indirect positive relation between tax advantages of a firm and its
environmental performance, as environmental activities reduce both immediate and future risks of a firm and improve its
overall perceived riskiness. Thus, I predict that this positive link between environmental performance and leverage will
be stronger for firms that have higher amounts of taxable income for which the extent of tax shield will be more crucial.
[Table 24 about here.]
I estimate taxable income by the level of earnings before interest and taxes scaled by total assets of a firm in a
given year. I use overall sample median level of taxable income in a given year as the cutoff to divide the firms into two
categories: those with high and low taxable income. I examine both of these subsamples, predicting a more pronounced
positive association between leverage and environmental performance for firms with higher levels of taxable income.
The results of these analyses are presented in Table 24. The coefficient estimates on the CR performance variable are
positive for both groups of firms, while the test of the difference in these coefficients fails to reject the null of equality
between firms with higher taxable income and those with lower taxable income. On the other hand, the analysis of the
coefficients on environmental and social performance, shown in columns (3)-(4), support my predictions and indicate a
stronger influence of environment on leverage for the high and low taxable income subsamples, although the effect
is stronger in the latter (the coefficients are significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively). I document no major
relation between leverage ratio and social performance for either group of firms.
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Analysis of the Results Using Alternative Models of Capital Structure
In this section, I validate the results in Table 21 using alternative models from the literature on capital structure.
I focus particularly on the stakeholder theory of capital structure because the extent to which the observed negative
relation between CR performance score and leverage is driven by a firm’s treatment of its stakeholders (i.e., social
performance) allows us to test some predictions of this theory. I start with identifying the conditions under which a
firm’s concerns regarding the alignment of incentives with its stakeholders receive higher priority and, thereby, shape
its CR engagement policies and determine capital structure. For example, leverage and the associated high risks of
default could prevent firms from honoring their implicit contracts with their stakeholders (Maksimovic & Titman,
1991), resulting in these stakeholders refraining from investing in such firms. Thus, firms that commit themselves to
better stakeholder relations should limit their use of debt. A positive environmental posture can provide some relief to
potentially distressed firms, as firms that are committed to environmental management as a risk management strategy
will have lower perceived risk (Bouslah et al., 2013; Leland, 1998) and access to lower cost of capital (Chava, 2014;
El Ghoul et al., 2011; Sharfman & Fernando, 2008), and thus can maintain higher leverage. Therefore, how a strong
environmental profile and orientation to social interactions together will influence leverage for firms that are more likely
to experience financial distress is an empirical question that I will examine first.
[Table 25 about here.]
I test my argument in two ways. Following Bae et al. (2011), I use firm size (total sales) and proportion
of firms with negative EBIT in a two-digit SIC industry in a given year as the proxies for the likelihood of financial
distress. Table 25 presents the regression results of these analyses. The results in columns (1)-(4) and (5)-(8) are obtained
using firm size and the proportion of negative EBIT firms in an industry in a given year, respectively. In even-numbered
columns, I also provide regression results for the rest of the sample, containing less financially distressed firms and
industries.
The results in column (1) are consistent with my priors, albeit indicating only a weak negative relation between
composite CR score and leverage. Apparently, this effect is driven by a stronger negative impact of social performance
for the financially distressed sample in column (3). In line with the stakeholder theory, I expect the negative relation
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to be more pronounced for firms with tighter financing constraints (column 3) then their less financially constrained
counterparts (column 4) and, thus, to reject the null of no significant difference between the two coefficients. The
results of these tests attest to a stronger leverage impact of social engagement for financially distressed firms as well,
consistent with the predictions of Maksimovic and Titman (1991). Whereas environmental management does not seem
to moderate the incentives to adjust leverage for firms with reputational capital for good stakeholder relations at stake, a
positive environmental profile still allows even such firms to use significantly more debt.
However, the alternative financial distress proxy provides a quite different picture. As shown in columns (5)-(8),
in industries with higher proportions of financially distressed firms, a strong positive impact of a firm’s environmental
profile outweighs the negative yet not as strong impact of social performance. I also do not evidence any difference in
the coefficients on the social engagement variable between the two samples. Collectively, these results do not provide
conclusive evidence of a stronger leverage impact of social engagement for financially distressed firms, as predicted by
the stakeholder theory of capital structure. Additionally, the tests of whether environmental risk management alters the
way stakeholder reputation considerations determine firms’ leverage decisions do not provide satisfactory evidence along
these lines. Regarding the nondistressed firm sample in columns (2) and (4), the results yield a completely different
story and contradict the argument that leverage and social performance are negatively associated. In particular, I find
an overall positive and highly significant coefficient (at the 1% level) on aggregate CR variable in column (2), again
contrary to the predictions of the stakeholder theory of capital structure. The details in column (4) show that social
performance loses its significance, while environmental practices dominate the overall impact on leverage ratio of CR
practices.
Second, I test an alternative prediction of the Maksimovic and Titman (1991) model. The extent of the
alternative uses of a firm’s assets will determine their reputational value as unique assets. Consistent with theMaksimovic
and Titman (1991) model, firms that offer unique products/services establish closer ties with and rely more on the
well-being of their key stakeholders, such as employees, customers, and suppliers. From the stakeholders’ perspective,
they are also more concerned about the financial well-being of their organizations due to the higher costs of bankruptcy
they incur in case of a liquidation. Thus, they will require higher compensation for increased bankruptcy risk, to
which a firm will obey or choose to lower its liquidation risk by decreasing leverage as a commitment mechanism.
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The latter implies a stronger negative relation between firm leverage and its commitment to maintain its reputation for
good stakeholder relations, especially for firms with firm-specific assets or producing unique products, i.e., lack of
alternative uses (Kale & Shahrur, 2007; Titman & Wessels, 1988). Following Bae et al. (2011), I proxy the extent of the
alternative uses of assets (asset specificity) with the ratio of the level of a firm’s R&D expenditures to its total assets
(R&D intensity). I then divide the sample of firms into two categories, by the industry median asset specificity for each
year, and assign firms to high and low asset specificity groups based on the relative value of their asset specificity score
to the industry-year median.
[Table 26 about here.]
The results are presented in Table 26. The coefficient on the aggregate CR performance variable in column
(1) (high asset specificity) is negative yet insignificant, while that in column (2) (low asset specificity) is positive and
significant at the 5% level. Consistent with the predictions of Maksimovic and Titman (1991), social performance has a
significantly negative coefficient and solely determines the relation between leverage and CR performance, presented in
column (3). In contrast, environmental practices solely determine firm leverage for low-asset-specificity firms, while
social performance loses its significance for the same group, as column (4) presents. However, I fail to reject the null of
no difference in coefficients on social performance variable across the two subgroups, contrary to the predictions of the
Maksimovic and Titman (1991) model. The composition of each group reflects almost equal balance of firms with
superior environmental and social performance. Overall, these results do not provide enough support for the predictions
of the Maksimovic and Titman (1991) model. On the other hand, the results once again point to the significant role of
environmental risk management on firm leverage even in the presence of stakeholder concerns.
Robustness Checks
Endogeneity. Extant research treats CR as an endogenous variable (e.g., Bae et al., 2011; Jiao, 2010).
Endogeneity problems could be due to a number of reasons. For example, omitted variable bias arises when a potentially
relevant variable is excluded from the structural equation. If this variable determines both a firm’s leverage and its
propensity to engage in responsible practices, it will result in problems in the interpretations of the parameter estimates
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obtained using the OLS method. This is far from an uncommon concern in the studies on CR, as numerous factors
are tested in the relevant literature for their influence on CR performance. Another potential endogeneity problem
could be driven by reverse causality. My implicit assumption in the structural equation is a unidirectional explanatory
relationship from CR performance to leverage. Yet managerial decisions to engage in responsible practices may also be
driven by a firm’s leverage. Availability of financial resources, for example, is an important factor in choosing a firm’s
level of CR engagement (Waddock & Graves, 1997). Debt could also be utilized as a managerial control mechanism
to institute managerial efficiency and mitigate opportunistic behavior (Hanka, 1998; Jensen, 1986). If CR activities
are considered value-decreasing and driven by managers for private benefits, leverage will also result in a reduction in
resources (and efforts) allocated to CR projects.41 Thus, capital structure choice may be a determinant of a firm’s CR
commitment, suggesting a reverse-causal relation that could not be captured by a naive OLS framework.
To address these potential endogeneity concerns and test the unique, uncontaminated contribution of the level
of a firm’s environmental and social profile to its capital structure, I employ an instrumental variables approach in a
two-stage least squares (2SLS) framework. I use industry-median CR performance scores as the instruments in these
regressions. The motivation is twofold: first, I do not expect any significant, meaningful influence of industry-standard
CR performance on firm leverage beyond its impact through a firm’s current CR policy, and thus the proposed
instrumental variable satisfies the exclusion restriction. Moreover, using an industry-level CR variable as an instrument
further limits potential influence of unobserved firm-level characteristics that are also correlated with firm leverage.
Second, CR climate in an industry has considerable influence on its members’ CR policies. Considering CR as a source
of competitive advantage (Greening & Turban, 2000; McWilliams, Siegel, & Wright, 2006), firms would not want to
fall behind their industry peers on their CR practices. This induces firms to align their firm-level CR policies with the
industry standards, and thus satisfies the relevancy requirement for the instrumental variable.
[Table 27 about here.]
Table 27 shows the results of these regressions. A number of noteworthy features are present. First, diagnostic
checks indicate that the instruments are valid. I find that the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) tests reject the null hypothesis
41See Barnea and Rubin (2010) for further discussion on how firm management may use CR engagement as a tool for private benefits and its
relation to firm leverage.
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of underidentification. The corresponding test statistics and p-values are provided in Table 27. I further check to see
if the instruments are actually strong instruments and perform well. For this purpose, I provide F-statistics from the
first-stage regressions. These statistics are all greater than the 10 cutoff suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005) and validate
the strength of the instruments.
In Models (1) and (2), I test the relation between leverage and overall CR performance. I use industry-median
CR performance, defined by a firm’s three-digit SIC industry group in a given year. Model (1) shows the first-stage
regression results. I observe an adjusted R2 of 0.644, indicating that the industry-level instrument along with control
variables predict firm-level CR performance effectively. In Model (2), I use predicted values from the first-stage
regression to replace actual CR performance and continue to document an insignificant relation between CR performance
of a firm and its leverage ratio, consistent with the earlier findings in Table 21.
Models (3)-(5) show the results for the IV regressions using industry-level instruments for environmental and
social dimensions. These instruments are calculated using the same logic as that behind calculating the instrument
for the aggregate CR performance variable. The 2SLS estimators are obtained using all the instruments. First-stage
regression results are presented in Models (3) and (4) for environmental and social performances, respectively. Again,
the adjusted R2 values for the regression models are considerably high and the F-statistics are above the 10 threshold as
well, attesting to the validity of the instrumental variables. I find that the coefficients on the industry-level instrumental
variables are statistically significant. Model (5) presents the results for the second-stage regressions. In this structural
model, I substitute environmental and social performance variables with the predicted values I obtained from the
regressions in (3) and (4). I keep finding similar coefficients on the variables of interest as those in Table 21. The
observed relation between leverage and environment is positive and significant at the 1% level. The estimated coefficient
on social performance is still negative and significant (at the 1% level). Overall, these results uniformly support the
earlier findings.
Causality. In this section, I delve deeper into the causal relationship between leverage and the extent of a
firm’s environmental and social commitments. In particular, I analyze whether the lags of firm leverage determine
a firm’s engagement with the environment and other nonfinancial stakeholders or whether a firm’s relationship with
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such surrounding forces influences its financial leverage decisions. This will help us outlay the direction of causation
between corporate financing decisions and CR attributes and thus identify potential reverse-causality issues.
The original model predicts that the extent of a firm’s commitment to environmental and social issues
influences its capital structure, while several studies predict the opposite. As suggested by Waddock and Graves (1997),
although improved CR performance can lead to better stakeholder engagement and higher financial performance (good
management hypothesis), better financial performance and lower financial constraints can also lead to higher CR
investment (slack resource hypothesis). The procedure I use in this paper focuses on the lead-lag relationship rather than
the usual notion of causation. A change in the CR attributes is said to influence a change in leverage if, given the lagged
values of a change in leverage, the lagged values of a change in CR variables are jointly statistically significant and
predict the change in leverage. As mentioned above, an influence in the opposite direction is equally possible, according
to the slack resources view. In that case, the direction of causality runs in the opposite way and a change in firm leverage
is said to influence a change in CR engagement if, given the lagged values of a change in CR attributes, the lagged values
of a change in leverage ratio are jointly statistically significant and predict the change in a firm’s commitment to CR.
I estimate the following regression models and obtain coefficient estimates for the causality tests:
Dit =α1 + λ11Dit−1 + λ12Dit−2 + λ13Dit−3
+ θ11CRPit−1 + θ12CRPit−2 + θ13CRPit−3 + φ1Xit + ν1it (6)
CRPit =α2 + λ21CRPit−1 + λ22CRPit−2 + λ23CRPit−3
+ θ21Dit−1 + θ22Dit−2 + θ23Dit−3 + φ2Xit + ν2it (7)
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In Equation 6 and Equation 7, Dit is the change in leverage ratio of firm i from year t − 1 to t. α is a constant;
CRPit is the change in a firm’s aggregate CR or disaggregated environmental or social performance score from year
t − 1 to t. Xit is the change in firm-level control variables as explained above; λ and θ are the estimated first and second
regression coefficients that are used for causality analysis; i, firm; t, year. For each equation above, I test for the joint
significance of the coefficients of interest, hypothesizing that the variables of interest do not influence the dependent
variable. For example, in Equation 6, I test for the joint significance of the set of coefficients θ11, θ12, and θ13, failing to
reject the null hypothesis, which would suggest that the particular CR attribute does not influence leverage ratio.
[Table 28 about here.]
The results of the causality tests are reported in Table 28. Consistent with the main findings above, I document
a significant causal effect of past changes in environmental performance on firm leverage. The causal effect of past
changes in social performance on current change in leverage, however, is significant only at 10% indicating a weak
influence on leverage decisions. I fail to document any material impact of lagged changes in leverage ratio on any of the
variables of CR engagement. There is also no causal relationship between aggregate CR performance and leverage.
Collectively, these results attest to the validity of my model and suggest that the direction of the causal relationship
between financial leverage decisions and CR policies is consistent with the good management hypothesis.
In unreported results, I also follow Love and Zicchino (2006) and transform all regression variables to account
for any heterogeneity in the cross-section units and time effects in the data and perform the Granger causality test
(Granger, 1969). Regarding the former, I use forward mean-differencing; that is, for each observation I calculate the
forward mean of all future observations for the same firm and subtract this average from the corresponding observation
to remove the fixed effects in the data. Regarding the latter, I calculate the annual mean for each firm-year observation
and subtract it again from the corresponding observation to eliminate the influence of time effects in the data. The
transformed variables are then used to implement the Granger causality tests. I obtain qualitatively similar results.
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Conclusion
Despite a well-developed theoretical background and the vast empirical research on CR, there is lack of
conclusive, direct evidence to explain how a firm’s broad CR policy affects its capital structure decisions. In this paper, I
attempt to shed some light on one particular aspect of this issue, namely the effect on corporate financing decisions of a
firm’s environmental orientation and its (social) relationship with other nonfinancial stakeholders, including customers,
suppliers, employees, and communities. Environmental practices have serious implications for the solvency of firms and
their credit risks. Reducing exposure to legal, reputational, and regulatory risks, a proactive environmental management
approach results in better access to capital, improves debt capacity, and reduces cost of capital, all of which translate
into a tendency to use more debt (R. Bauer & Hann, 2010; Chava, 2014; Cheng et al., 2014; Sharfman & Fernando,
2008). The results uniformly support this argument and document the unique role that environmental performance plays
on firm leverage.
This study also complements existing work on how stakeholder relations of a firm affect its capital structure
decisions. As first pointed out by Titman (1984), liquidation risk and costs associated with it for the stakeholders
determine their relation-specific investments in a firm. Several studies lend support to this argument. The results of these
studies suggest firms that implement stakeholder-friendly policies maintain lower leverage to reduce the risk of insolvency
and thus show their commitment to their stakeholders’ concerns, encouraging them for firm-specific investments. I argue
that environmental risk management activities can moderate this relationship by mitigating default risk and improving a
firm’s reputation for good stakeholder treatment. I test this prediction in three ways. First, using firms that stand out as
both environmental and social stewards, I show that the leverage effect of environmental performance persists, while
that of stakeholder engagement disappears. Second, I document that environmental management solely contributes to
capital structure where its expected benefits surpass costs. Lastly, environmental risk management preserves its impact
on leverage decisions even when the incentive for firms to provide a strong commitment to honor implicit contracts with
stakeholders is paramount, although the effect on capital structure of the latter is stronger.
To the best of my knowledge, these results provide the first direct evidence for the main and moderating
roles of environmental risk management on corporate financing decisions. The results further suggest that researchers
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should distinguish between environmental activities and social engagement, and examine them together to determine
whether variations in leverage ratios should be attributed to social or environmental dimensions. Though examining
these two pillars of a firm’s broad CR strategy in isolation might be interesting, it is equally, if not more, important
to examine them together to understand how they interact with each other, to weigh their relative importance, and to
build a broader picture of how management balances between the conflicting incentives to implement the optimal firm
value-maximizing policy.
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Table 19: Descriptive Statistics
N Mean Median St.Dev.
Panel A: Dependent variable
Firm leverage 4,741 0.236 0.218 0.182
Panel B: CR variables
CR performance 4,741 46.439 38.835 28.555
Environmental 4,741 44.646 32.100 31.741
Social 4,741 48.231 44.250 28.850
Panel C: Control variables
R&D expense 4,741 0.046 0.004 0.125
Selling expense 4,741 0.239 0.212 0.215
Tangible assets 4,741 0.272 0.207 0.215
Size (in USD billions) 4,741 15.997 5.338 43.434
Market-to-book ratio 4,741 1.762 1.393 1.261
Depreciation expense 4,741 0.045 0.040 0.032
Dividend dummy 4,741 0.627 1.000 0.484
Profitability 4,741 0.175 0.161 0.114
Financial slack 4,741 0.147 0.099 0.146
Asset growth 4,741 0.110 0.059 0.330
Earnings volatility 4,741 0.042 0.025 0.099
Sin stock 4,741 0.035 0.000 0.184
Governance 4,741 74.724 78.290 16.588
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Table 21: Determinants of Leverage Ratio
Leverage Model Industry Fixed Effect Across-Industry Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CR performance -0.0175 -0.00267 -0.142∗∗
(0.15) (0.83) (0.04)
Environmental 0.0298∗∗ 0.0242∗∗ 0.136∗∗
(0.01) (0.04) (0.05)
Social -0.0524∗∗∗ -0.0284∗∗ -0.299∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
R&D expense -0.0204 -0.0190 -0.0194 0.00840 0.0105 0.192 0.166
(0.56) (0.58) (0.57) (0.82) (0.77) (0.28) (0.34)
Selling expense -0.0179 -0.0179 -0.0149 -0.0300 -0.0301 0.00778 0.0162
(0.30) (0.30) (0.39) (0.13) (0.13) (0.87) (0.72)
Tangible assets 0.0483∗∗∗ 0.0485∗∗∗ 0.0485∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.0445 0.0479
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.51) (0.46)
Size 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0151∗∗∗ 0.0155∗∗∗ 0.00737∗∗ 0.00739∗∗ 0.0560∗∗∗ 0.0628∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Market-to-book ratio 0.0157∗∗∗ 0.0158∗∗∗ 0.0163∗∗∗ 0.0120∗∗ 0.0123∗∗ 0.0161 0.0247
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.70) (0.54)
Depreciation expense 0.268∗∗ 0.266∗∗ 0.250∗∗ -0.271∗ -0.276∗ -0.0159 -0.0754
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.96) (0.82)
Dividend dummy -0.0174∗∗∗ -0.0162∗∗∗ -0.0171∗∗∗ 0.00141 0.00110 -0.104∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.84) (0.87) (0.02) (0.01)
Profitability -0.297∗∗∗ -0.293∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.219∗∗∗ 0.0402 0.0532
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.91) (0.89)
Financial slack -0.354∗∗∗ -0.353∗∗∗ -0.360∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.699∗∗∗ -0.688∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Asset growth 0.00309 0.00221 0.00178 0.0247∗∗∗ 0.0247∗∗∗ 0.0858 0.0947
(0.71) (0.79) (0.83) (0.00) (0.00) (0.38) (0.32)
Earnings volatility -0.0781∗∗∗ -0.0787∗∗∗ -0.0803∗∗∗ -0.0500∗∗∗ -0.0509∗∗∗ 0.0634∗ 0.0646∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.06)
Sin stock 0.0711∗∗∗ 0.0706∗∗∗ 0.0712∗∗∗ 0.0794∗∗∗ 0.0806∗∗∗ 0.0820 0.104
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.25) (0.15)
R&D dummy 0.0405∗∗∗ 0.0386∗∗∗ 0.0392∗∗∗ 0.0559∗∗∗ 0.0561∗∗∗ 0.0154 0.0185
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.62) (0.55)
Governance -0.100∗∗∗ -0.0887∗∗∗ -0.0865∗∗∗ -0.0255 -0.0250 0.0293 0.0306
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.25) (0.26) (0.85) (0.83)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Industry dummies No No No Yes Yes No No
Adjusted R2 0.176 0.176 0.178 0.478 0.479 0.227 0.269
N 4741 4741 4741 4741 4741 141 141
p-values in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 22: Leverage Regressions by CR Performance Groups
Overall CR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Low High Low
CR performance 0.0362∗ -0.153∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.00)
Environmental 0.0385∗∗∗ -0.0324
(0.01) (0.35)
Social -0.00944 -0.106∗∗∗
(0.60) (0.00)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.21 0.16 0.21
N 2333 2408 2333 2408
Number of environmental
high performers 2086 249 2086 249
Number of social
high performers 2096 260 2096 260
p-values in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 23: Leverage Regressions by Cash Flow Volatility
Cash Flow Volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Low High Low
CR performance 0.0432∗∗ -0.0101
(0.01) (0.54)
Environmental 0.0473∗∗∗ 0.0199
(0.01) (0.22)
Social -0.00696 -0.0323∗
(0.73) (0.06)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.168 0.203 0.168 0.203
N 2125 2026 2125 2026
Number of environmental
high performers 839 1004 839 1004
Number of social
high performers 834 1008 834 1008
Test of equal coefficients (p-value)
CR 0.024
Environmental 0.250
Social 0.344
p-values in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 24: Leverage Regressions by a Firm’s Taxable Income Level
Firm’s Taxable Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Low High Low
CR performance 0.0122 0.0261∗
(0.40) (0.09)
Environment 0.0294∗∗ 0.0551∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.00)
Social -0.0195 -0.0342∗
(0.29) (0.06)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.133 0.219 0.133 0.221
N 2623 2118 2623 2118
Number of environmental
high performers 1170 916 1170 916
Number of social
high performers 1202 894 1202 894
Test of equal coefficients (p-value)
CR 0.513
Environmental 0.246
Social 0.567
p-values in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 26: Leverage Regressions by R&D Intensity
R&D Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Low High Low
CR performance -0.0283 0.0379∗∗
(0.24) (0.02)
Environmental 0.0147 0.0519∗∗∗
(0.49) (0.00)
Social -0.0495∗∗ -0.0191
(0.05) (0.31)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.157 0.175 0.158 0.177
N 1293 1879 1293 1879
Number of environmental
high performers 710 923 710 923
Number of social
high performers 699 914 699 914
Test of equal coefficients (p-value)
CR 0.020
Environmental 0.166
Social 0.326
p-values in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 27: Instrumental Variables Regressions
Leverage Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First
Stage
Second
Stage
First
Stage (Envir)
First
Stage (Social)
Second
Stage
CR performance 0.0125
(0.571)
Environmental 0.0844∗∗∗
(0.000)
Social -0.0845∗∗∗
(0.002)
R&D expense -0.688 -0.0214 -7.885∗ 1.602 -0.0220
(0.856) (0.538) (0.071) (0.677) (0.527)
Selling expense 6.521∗∗∗ -0.0179 10.46∗∗∗ 6.004∗∗∗ -0.0118
(0.001) (0.300) (0.000) (0.004) (0.496)
Tangible assets -1.403 0.0481∗∗∗ -0.0277 -2.096 0.0479∗∗∗
(0.370) (0.001) (0.988) (0.230) (0.001)
Size 9.510∗∗∗ 0.0120∗∗∗ 10.10∗∗∗ 9.001∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Market-to-book ratio 0.379 0.0156∗∗∗ 0.267 0.655∗∗ 0.0167∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.001) (0.372) (0.025) (0.000)
Depreciation expense 27.89∗∗ 0.270∗∗ 40.10∗∗∗ 14.07 0.235∗
(0.021) (0.026) (0.005) (0.236) (0.051)
Dividend dummy 3.525∗∗∗ -0.0183∗∗∗ 3.817∗∗∗ 3.016∗∗∗ -0.0201∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Profitability 18.30∗∗∗ -0.299∗∗∗ 14.53∗∗∗ 23.48∗∗∗ -0.280∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Financial slack 8.324∗∗∗ -0.355∗∗∗ 12.60∗∗∗ 2.427 -0.369∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.320) (0.000)
Asset growth -5.972∗∗∗ 0.00372 -5.946∗∗∗ -5.930∗∗∗ 0.00272
(0.000) (0.651) (0.000) (0.000) (0.740)
Earnings volatility -1.113 -0.0777∗∗∗ -1.473 -1.604 -0.0811∗∗∗
(0.729) (0.005) (0.678) (0.624) (0.004)
Sin stock -6.121∗∗∗ 0.0714∗∗∗ -6.227∗∗∗ -5.374∗∗∗ 0.0725∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
R&D dummy -5.960∗∗∗ 0.0419∗∗∗ -6.872∗∗∗ -5.057∗∗∗ 0.0429∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Governance 52.43∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗ 53.42∗∗∗ 51.56∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Instrumental variables (Industry-median...)
CR performance 0.506∗∗∗
(0.000)
Environmental 0.613∗∗∗ -0.0370∗∗
(0.000) (0.029)
Social -0.138∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.644 0.175 0.620 0.591 0.174
N 4741 4741 4741 4741 4741
Underidentification test 784.210 664.626
p-value 0.000 0.000
F-statistic 496.688 35.690 494.123 368.417 35.343
p-values in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 28: Tests of Causality Between Leverage Ratio and CR Measures
Null Hypothesis Wald Test(p-Value)
Leverage does not influence CR Performance (0.379)
Overall CR Performance does not influence Leverage (0.200)
Leverage does not influence Environmental Performance (0.073)
Environmental Performance does not influence Leverage (0.001)
Leverage does not influence Social Performance (0.484)
Social Performance does not influence Leverage (0.064)
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Appendix A
Table 29: The CSR-S Monitor - Contextual Elements Definitions.
Contextual Element Definition Illustrative Sub-Elements
Chair/Executive Message
The Chair/Executive Message Contextual Element measures the quality of information
provided by the company in the introductory statement of their CSR report about their
management commitment and effectiveness across all CSR subjects, in terms of current
achievements and future targets.
(1) Message Signatory
(2) CSR Key Topics
(3) Current Achievements
(4) Future Targets
Environment
The Environment Contextual Element measures the quality of information provided by the
company about their management commitment and effectiveness regarding environmental
issues such as waste management, climate change, and biodiversity; as well as disclosure
about product or process innovation opportunities, reducing the firm’s environmental
impact through their supply chain, and any environmental accidents.
(1) Waste Management
(2) Climate Change
(3)Water Management
(4) Biodiversity
(5) Sourcing
(6) Accidents/Spills/Fines
(7) Environmental Opportunities/Innovation
(8) Packaging Materials
Philanthropy & Community
Involvement
The Philanthropy & Community Involvement Contextual Element measures the quality of
information provided by the company about their management commitment and
effectiveness regarding their charitable activities, including the type (cash, in-kind,
employee engagement), purpose and geographic scope of contributions, and how their
philanthropy is tied to their business.
(1) Cash Donations
(2) In-kind Donations
(3) Employee Engagement
(4) Donation Matching
(5) Purpose of Activities
(Healthcare, Education, etc.)
(6) Geographic Scope of Activities
(7) Integration with Business
External Stakeholder Engagement
The External Stakeholder Engagement Contextual Element measures the quality of
information provided by the company about their management commitment and
effectiveness toward integrating the advice of external stakeholders in their business
operations, including CSR-related projects. Engagement at both the field level (single-site)
and corporate level (company-wide) is examined.
(1) Engagement for Business Operations
(2) Engagement for CSR-related Projects
(3) Engagement for Governance/Oversight
(4) Engagement for Field Level and Corporate Level
Projects and Policies
Supply Chain
The Supply Chain Contextual Element measures the quality of information provided by the
company about their management commitment and effectiveness regarding the CSR
aspects of their relationship with suppliers, including the procurement process, contract
terms, and monitoring/auditing of suppliers (including contractors, sub-suppliers,
joint-venture partners, or other major business associates).
(1) Union Relations
(2) Employee Health & Safety
(3) Supply Chain Labor Standards
(4) Child Labor
(5) Women & Minority Contracting
(6) Supply Chain Certifications
(7) Local/Global Sourcing
Continued on next page
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Table 29 – continued from previous page
Contextual Element Definition Illustrative Sub-Elements
Labor Relations
The Labor Relations Contextual Element measures the quality of information provided by
the company about their management commitment and effectiveness regarding its
treatment of employees, both direct (employed by the company) and indirect (employed by
a partner, such as a supplier). Areas covered include compensation and benefits, health and
safety, professional development opportunities, commitment to diversity and equal
opportunity, and union relations.
(1) Union Relations
(2) Cash Profit Sharing
(3) Employee Involvement (in ownership, stocks)
(4) Employee Health & Safety
(5) Supply Chain Labor Standards
(6) Compensation & Benefits
(7) Professional Development
(8) Child labor
(9) Employment of Underrepresented Groups
(10) Workforce Diversity/Equal Opportunity
Governance
The Governance Contextual Element measures the quality of information provided by the
company about their management commitment and effectiveness toward following best
practice governance principles in areas including the composition and level of
independence of their board of directors, compensation of top management, commitment
to relevant governance codes, and shareholder engagement.
(1) Board Composition
(2) Top Management Compensation
(3) Governance Codes/Policies
(4) Shareholder Engagement
Anti-Corruption
The Anti-Corruption Contextual Element measures the quality of information provided by
the company about their management commitment and effectiveness regarding the
prevention of bribery and corruption, through policies and procedures for monitoring
activities which are vulnerable; as well as describing any investigation currently underway
by regulatory authorities and the steps the company is taking to address the situation.
(1) Policies for Preventing Corruption
(2) Discussion of Publicized Cases of Corruption
(3) Political Instability
Human Right
The Human Rights Contextual Element measures the quality of information provided by
the company about their management commitment and effectiveness regarding their
impacts on local communities and the rights of indigenous peoples, support for any
controversial regimes, and their commitment to protecting freedom of expression and
preventing censorship. Note that human rights topics tied to labor issues are covered under
the Labor Relations and/or Supply Chain Contextual Elements.
(1) Community Impact
(2) Indigenous Peoples Relations
(3) Support for Controversial Regimes
(4) Freedom of Expression/Censorship
(5) Discussion of Publicized Cases of Human Rights
Violations
Codes of Conduct
The Codes of Conduct Contextual Element measures the quality of information provided
by the company about their management commitment and implementation of internal and
external codes of conduct in the CSR area. Including an individual company code of
conduct, industry codes of conduct (such as the International Council on Mining and
Metals), and universal codes of conduct (such as the UN Global Compact).
(1) Individual Company Codes of Conduct
(2) Industry Codes of Conduct
(3) Universal Codes of Conduct
(4) Involvement in Code Governance Structure
Integrity Assurance
The Integrity Assurance Contextual Element measures the quality of information provided
by the company about their management commitment and effectiveness regarding
independent verification of the CSR report, either in its entirety or for specific Contextual
Elements.
(1) Independent Third-Party Verification Statement
(Internal Assessment, External Assessment)
(2) Specific Contextual Element Assurance
Source: www.csrsmonitor.org
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Table 30: The CSR-S Monitor Sample Scoring Criteria - Environment.
Level Criteria Illustrative Examples
0
Report does not discuss activities toward reducing/mitigating
the environmental impacts of the company’s business in a
meaningful way.
“The Group has three specific sustainability management goals which are: being wise, being smart and being
sustainable... We endeavor to minimize social and environmental risks through green management... KB Financial
Group has been dedicated to resolving global environmental issues which are becoming increasingly more serious...”
(KB Financial Group Inc., 2014)
I
Report provides minimal depth of information on the scope of
coverage of the company’s activities toward
reducing/mitigating the environmental impacts of the
company’s business. Discussion categorized as incomplete and
vague.
“Johnson Controls generally remained on track to achieve our 10-year greenhouse gas, energy, water and waste
intensity goals in 2013. We are committed to an annual 1 percent absolute reduction of greenhouse gas emissions
across all our businesses. The improvements we make also enhance our financial results. Over the past 10 years,
revenue has increased 78 percent while our carbon footprint has increased only 10 percent...” (Johnson Controls, Inc.,
2014)
II
Report provides fair depth of information on the scope of
coverage of the company’s activities toward
reducing/mitigating the environmental impacts of the
company’s business, including measurable results. Discussion
categorized as reasonably comprehensive and detailed.
“Freescale established a goal in 2010 to reduce our water consumption by our manufacturing operations by 50% over
our 2008 baseline. In 2013, we had a significant production increase over 2012, increasing our absolute water
consumption amount; however, we still hope to achieve this 2015 goal... We implemented conservation projects that
saved more than 42 million gallons of water and 14.9 million kWh per year...” (Freescale Semiconductor, Ltd., 2014)
III
Report provides good depth of information on the scope of
coverage of the company’s activities toward
reducing/mitigating the environmental impacts of the
company’s business, including measurable results and
comparisons of outcomes at a company or industry level.
Discussion categorized as comprehensive and detailed.
“In 2013, the total extrapolated amount of carbon emissions from our business operations decreased from 209 to 169
kilotons compared to 2012 and per FTE from 2.4 to 2.2 tons... In the spring of 2012, we partnered with an electric
taxi service to support the transportation needs of employees in the Netherlands. Through this initiative, we have
‘greened’ 18,000 kilometers of journeys up to year-end 2013... Our Sustainable Procurement program, which began in
the Netherlands in 2012, takes this a step further by embedding ING’s procurement policy towards suppliers into our
processes...” (ING Groep N.V., 2014)
IV
Report provides excellent depth of information on the scope of
coverage of the company’s activities toward
reducing/mitigating the environmental impacts of the
company’s business, including measurable results and
comparisons of outcomes at the company or industry level.
Discussion categorized as comprehensive and detailed, and is
noted for reaching an exceptional level of disclosure.
“Since fiscal 2009, we have decreased our total water use by 44.8% and achieved a one-year reduction of nearly 9.8%
in fiscal 2012. Over the past four years, we have lowered water use by more than 2,750 million liters... Hazardous
waste makes up only 0.04% of our total waste output. In fiscal 2013, our volume of waste produced rose by 44% from
the previous year. This increase was due to activities relating to cleaning out an old fuel oil tank at one of our
distilleries, which caused 30 tons of redundant fuel to be sent to a facility to be filtered and then blended as fuel for a
power plant... Three major air pollutants are sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOX) and particulate matter (PM).
These emissions increased by nearly 12% in fiscal 2013, from 1,010 metric tons to 1,134 metric tons, primarily due to
our burning a greater amount of heavy fuel oil to compensate for our decreased biogas generation...” (Bacardi
Limited, 2014)
* Scope of Coverage – Defined as the range of topics and locations discussed in the report. A wide scope of coverage means the company includes information about many of the relevant
topics of the Element, both domestic and international.
** Depth (of information) – Defined as the level of specificity and type of detail included in the report about the different relevant topics and locations of operations. Strong depth of information
means the company discussed the Element both narratively (citing specific cases or events) and quantitatively, with a focus on the managerial aspects of the communication, including
information on how the relevance of different topics is determined.
Source: www.csrsmonitor.org
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Appendix C
Table 31: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG Framework: Key Performance Indicators for Environmental and Social
Pillars
Pillars Environmental Performance Social Performance
Employment quality
Resource reduction Health & safety
Training & development
Categories Emission reduction Diversity
Human Rights
Product innovation Community
Product responsibility
Source: http://im.thomsonreuters.com/solutions/content/asset4-esg/
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY ON CAPITAL STRUCTURE 111
Appendix D
Table 32: A Sample of Data Points and Key Performance Indicators Included in the ASSET4 ESG Database.
Environmental Social
Energy use total Employees leaving
Electricity purchased Turnover of employees
Water withdrawal total Total injury rate
Water recycled Accidents total
CO2 equivalents emission total Lost time injury rate
NOx emissions Lost working days
SOx emissions Average training hours
VOC emissions Training costs total
Waste total Women employees
Waste recycled total Women managers
Hazardous waste Average age
Spills and pollution controversies Health & safety controversies
Source: http://im.thomsonreuters.com/solutions/content/asset4-esg/
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